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Strategic information transmission and stochastic orders

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  • Szalay, Dezsö

Abstract

I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of Receiver actions. I provide comparative statics results with respect to the distribution of types for distributions that are comparable in the likelihood ratio order, implying, e.g., that advice from a better informed Sender induces the Receiver to choose actions that are more spread out.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems with number 386.

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Date of creation: Sep 2012
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:386

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Keywords: strategic information transmission; cheap talk; uniqueness; comparative statics; logconcavity; likelihood ratio order;

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References

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  1. An, Mark Yuying, 1995. "Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics 95-03, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  2. Dezsö SZALAY, 2004. "Contracts with Endogenous Information," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 04.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  3. Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po publications 2014-04, Sciences Po.
  4. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
  5. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2004. "Multidimensional Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4393, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Ambrus, Attila & Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  7. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  8. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
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Cited by:
  1. Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2014-04, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.

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