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Corporate Social Responsibility in Oligopoly

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Author Info
Constantine Manasakis () (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)
Evangelos Mitrokostas () (Department of Economics, University of Crete)
Emmanuel Petrakis () (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper studies firms owners' incentives to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities in an oligopolistic market, in a strategic delegation and vertical product differentiation context. Firms' owners have the opportunity to hire "socially responsible" managers and delegate to them CSR effort and market competition decisions. In equilibrium, both owners employ socially responsible managers. The strategic behavior of owners to hire socially responsible managers increases both output and profits. The societal consequences of Corporate Social Responsibility are also discussed.

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File URL: http://www.soc.uoc.gr/econ/wpa/docs/CSR_olig_02.07_f.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Crete, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0707.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2006
Date of revision: 15 Jan 2007
Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0707

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Related research
Keywords: Oligopoly Vertical Product Differentiation Corporate Social Responsibility Strategic Managerial D

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Social Responsibility

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Abagail McWilliams & Donald S. Siegel & Patrick M. Wright, 2006. "Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic Implications," Journal of Management Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(1), pages 1-18, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. BENABOU, Roland & TIROLE, Jean, 2003. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," IDEI Working Papers 389, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information," Working Papers 0510, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Miller, Nolan H. & Pazgal, Amit, 2005. "Strategic trade and delegated competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 215-231, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Aleix Calveras & Juan-JosÉ Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2007. "Regulation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Activism," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(3), pages 719-740, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hackner, Jonas, 2000. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2003. "Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(3), pages 419-445, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Colin Mayer, 1999. "Firm Control," OFRC Working Papers Series 1999fe07, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  11. David P. Baron, 2003. "Private Politics," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 31-66, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Nolan Miller & Amit Pazgal, 2002. "Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 51-68. [Downloadable!]
  14. Donald S. Siegel & Donald F. Vitaliano, 2006. "An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic Use of Corporate Social Responsibility," Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics 0602, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok, 2004. "Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 397-424, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Miller, Nolan H & Pazgal, Amit I, 2001. "The Equivalence of Price and Quantity Competition with Delegation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 284-301, Summer.
  17. Leonardo Becchetti & Luisa Giallonardo & Elisabetta Tessitore, 2006. "Consumer driven market mechanisms to fight inequality: the case of CSR/product differentiation models with asymmetric information," Working Papers 50, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. [Downloadable!]
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