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Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts

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Author Info
Kockesen, L.
Ok, E.

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File URL: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9186/RR99-11.PDF
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 99-11.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:99-11

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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 998-8936
Fax: (212) 995-3932
Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html
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Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
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Related research
Keywords: STRATEGIC DELEGATION; UNOBSERVABLE CONTRACTS; FORWARD INDUCTION.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Fershtman, Chaim & Gneezy, Uri, 2001. "Strategic Delegation: An Experiment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 352-68, Summer.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Elisabetta Iossa & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2009. "Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B," CEIS Research Paper 147, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
  2. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2006. "Corporate Social Responsibility in Oligopoly," Working Papers 0707, University of Crete, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
  3. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bernd Theilen, 2007. "Delegation and Information Sharing in Cournot Duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 21-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Levent Kockesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2009. "Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts," TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0908, TUSIAD-Koc University Economic Research Forum. [Downloadable!]
  6. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Do firms' owners delegate both short-run and long-run decisions to their managers in equilibrium?," Working Papers 0815, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Robert Ritz, 2005. "Strategic incentives for market share," Economics Series Working Papers 248, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2009. "Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment," Working Papers 0905, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. V. Bhaskar, 2004. "Games Played in a Contracting Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 583, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2007. "Endogenous Strategic Managerial Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 0706, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Levent Koçkesen & Emanuele Gerratana, 2008. "Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts," TÜSÄ°AD-Koç University Economic Research Forum Working Papers 0803., TUSIAD-Koc University Economic Research Forum. [Downloadable!]
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