Grade Inflation and Education Quality
AbstractWe consider a game in which schools compete to place graduates in two distinct ways: by investing in the quality of education, and by strategically designing grading policies. In equilib- rium, schools issue grades that do not perfectly reveal graduate abilities. This leads evaluators to have less-accurate information. However, compared to fully-revealing assessments, strategic grading motivates greater investment in educating students. Although strategic grading distorts placement decisions, it can also increase graduate ability. Allowing grade in ation and related grading strategies can increase the probability that the evaluator selects a high-ability graduate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Miami, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2012-2.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 15 Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming: Under Review
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More information through EDIRC
Grade Inflation; Effort; Education Investment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-05-29 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EDU-2012-05-29 (Education)
- NEP-LAB-2012-05-29 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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