Civil and criminal sanctions against blackmail: an economic analysis
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 21 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
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