Threats without Binding Commitment
AbstractThis paper explores the power of threats in the absence of binding commitment. The threatener cannot commit to carrying out the threat if the victim refuses payment, and cannot commit to not carrying out the threat if payment is made. If exercising the threat is costly to the threatener, then the threat cannot succeed in extracting money from the victim. If exercising the threat would benefit the threatener, however, then the threat's success depends upon whether the threat may be repeated. In the equilibrium of a finite-period game, the threat is carried out and the victim makes no payments. In an infinite-horizon game, however, it is an equilibrium for the victim to make a stream of payments over time. The expectation of future payments keeps the threatener from exercising the threat.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5461.
Date of creation: Feb 1996
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Steven Shavell & Kathryn E. Spier, 2002. "Threats Without Binding Commitment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1).
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Other versions of this item:
- Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1995. "Threats Without Binding Commitment," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1139, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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