A game-theoretic rendering of promises and threats
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 21 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 295-314
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Klein, D.B., 1991. "A Game-Theoretic rendering of Promises and Threats," Papers 90-91-21, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2007.
"Firm Regulation and Profit Sharing: A Real Option Approach,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 56.
- Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonese, 2006. "Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach," Working Papers 2006.7, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2007. "Firm Regulation and Profit-Sharing: A Real Option Approach," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0052, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2000.
"Is There a Hold-up Problem?,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
357, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Is There a Hold-up Problem?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.
- Kouroche Vafaï, 1999. "A Theory of Abuse of Authority in Hierarchies," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-07, CIRANO.
- Lundquist, Tobias & Ellingsen, Tore & Gribbe, Erik & Johannesson, Magnus, 2009. "The aversion to lying," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 81-92, May.
- Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2004.
"Opting-out in profit-sharing regulation,"
Industrial Organization
0403002, EconWPA.
- Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2004. "Opting-out in profit-sharing regulation," Industrial Organization 0403001, EconWPA.
- Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1996.
"Threats without Binding Commitment,"
NBER Working Papers
5461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1995. "Threats Without Binding Commitment," Discussion Papers 1139, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 2000. "Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Commitment," UCLA Economics Working Papers 799, UCLA Department of Economics.
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