Optimal Information Disclosure
AbstractA sender randomly draws a “prospect” characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver. The receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and accepts the prospect if his Bayesian inference about the prospect’s relevance exceeds his opportunity cost. The sender’s profits are typically maximized by partial information disclosure, whereby the receiver is induced to accept less relevant but more profitable prospects (“switches”) by pooling them with more relevant but less profitable ones (“baits”). Extensions include maximizing a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus and allowing the sender to use monetary incentives.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 118 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 949 - 987
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
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- Andrey Fradkin, 2012. "Do Online Marketplaces Become More Efficient Over Time?," Working Papers 12-24, NET Institute.
- Edelman, Benjamin & Gilchrist, Duncan S., 2012. "Advertising disclosures: Measuring labeling alternatives in internet search engines," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 75-89.
- Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013. "Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy: Implications for Marketing and Campaigning," Working Papers 479, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Optimal Information Disclosure: Quantity vs. Quality," Discussion Papers 2013-19, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Bouvard, Matthieu & Levy, Raphael, 2013. "Two-sided reputation in certification markets," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 446, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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