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Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model of Endogenous Private Valuations

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  • Juan-Jos� Ganuza

    ()
    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Abstract

I study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object to one of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. The auctioneer does not know bidders' preferences but has private information about the characteristics of the object, and must decide how much information to reveal prior to the auction. I show that the auctioneer has incentives to release less information than would be efficient and that the amount of information released increases with the level of competition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficient level of information.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 583-598

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:3:p:583-598

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Cited by:
  1. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On information and competition in private value auctions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006.
  2. Juan José Ganuza & José Penalva, 2005. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Working Papers, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics 158, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Daniel Z. Li, 2013. "Revealing Product Information to Bidders with Differentiated Preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2235-2244.
  4. Alexandre de Cornière & Romain De Nijs, 2013. "Online Advertising and Privacy," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 650, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Cristián Troncoso Valverde, 2011. "Information Provision in Competing Auctions," Working Papers, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales 25, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
  6. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

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