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Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model of Endogenous Private Valuations

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Author Info
Juan-José Ganuza () (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

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Abstract

I study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object to one of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. The auctioneer does not know bidders' preferences but has private information about the characteristics of the object, and must decide how much information to reveal prior to the auction. I show that the auctioneer has incentives to release less information than would be efficient and that the amount of information released increases with the level of competition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficient level of information.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 35 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 583-598
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:35:y:2004:3:p:583-598

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  1. Juan José Ganuza, 2003. "Competition and Cost Overruns in Procurement," Economics Working Papers 772, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  2. Juan-Jose Ganuza & Jose S. Penalva-Zuasti, 2005. "On Information Revelation in Private Value Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000520, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Juan José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2006. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Economics Working Papers 937, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
  5. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva Zuasti, 2005. "On Information And Competition In Private Value Auctions," Working Papers wp2005_0503, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
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