A Comparison of Alternative Procedures for the Selection of the Private Partner in PPP Projects
AbstractIn this work we compare three alternative procedures aimed at selecting a private partner in PPP projects: i.e. negotiation, auction and competitive negotiation. We show how the suitability of each of these selection mechanisms depends on many economic and institutional factors: e.g. the extent of contractual complexity, the degree of heterogeneity in firm costs, the level of competition, the probability of corruption. The main lesson of the paper is that the adoption of competitive negotiation can improve public welfare only if the institutional framework can ensure both an actual contestability of each contract and a low risk of corruption phenomena.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa in its series Working Papers - Economics with number wp2007_10.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Auctions; Negotiation; Information Policy; Corruption;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
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