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Citations of

Neil Rickman

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

RePEc Biblio mentions

As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography of Economics:
  1. Alan Collins & Guy Judge & Neil Rickman, 2007. "On the economics of plagiarism," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 93-107, October.

    Mentioned in:

    1. > Economics Profession > Ethics in Economics > Plagiarism

Wikipedia mentions

(Only mentions on Wikipedia that link back to a page on a RePEc service)
  1. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.

    Mentioned in:

    1. Harrinqton paradoksu in Wikipedia (Azerbaijani)
    2. Harrington paradox in Wikipedia (English)

Working papers

  1. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Delegation to Independent Regulators and the Ratchet Effect," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0911, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Fiocco, Raffaele & Strausz, Roland, 2014. "Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation," CEPR Discussion Papers 9928, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  2. Paul Levine & Klaus Moessner & Neil Rickman, 2007. "Spectrum Property Rights Versus a Commons Model: Exploitation of Mesh Networks," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0607, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnon Tonmukayakul & Martin Weiss, 2008. "A study of secondary spectrum use using agent-based computational economics," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 125-151, October.

  3. Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2006. "Price Regulation and the Commitment Problem: Can Limited Capture be Beneficial?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0106, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2011. "Delegation to Independent Regulators and the Ratchet Effect," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0911, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

  4. Robert Witt & Neil Rickman, 2005. "Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0105, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo & Francisco González-Gómez & Jorge Guardiola, 2011. "The importance of time in referee home bias due to social pressure. Evidence from Spanish football," FEG Working Paper Series 03/11, Faculty of Economics and Business (University of Granada).
    2. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann & Andreas Kontoleon, 2009. "Two's Company, Three's a Group: The impact of group identity and group size on in-group favouritism," Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers 41.2009, University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics, revised 2009.
    3. Babatunde Buraimo & David Forrest & Robert Simmons, 2007. "The Twelfth Man? Refereeing Bias in English and German Soccer," Working Papers 0707, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    4. Katherine G. Yewell & Steven B. Caudill & Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., 2014. "Referee Bias and Stoppage Time in Major League Soccer: A Partially Adaptive Approach," Econometrics, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 1-19, February.
    5. Roberto Antonietti, 2008. "Il ruolo economico dell’arbitro di calcio: una rassegna della letteratura e alcune questioni aperte," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 4(3), pages 75-103, Dicembre.
    6. Alex Bryson & Babatunde Buraimo & Rob Simmons, 2010. "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1019, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    7. Peter Dawson & Stephen Dobson, 2008. "The Influence of Social Pressure and Nationality on Individual Decisions: Evidence from the Behaviour of Referees," Working Papers 0809, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
    8. Andrés Picazo-Tadeo & Francisco Gónzalez-Gómez & Jorge Guardiola Wanden-Berghe, 2011. "Referee home bias due to social pressure. Evidence from Spanish football," Working Papers 1119, Department of Applied Economics II, Universidad de Valencia.
    9. Reilly, Barry & Witt, Robert, 2011. "Disciplinary sanctions in English Premiership Football: Is there a racial dimension?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 360-370, June.
    10. Juan Mendoza & Andrés Rosas, 2013. "Referee Bias in Professional Soccer: Evidence from Colombia," VNIVERSITAS ECONÓMICA 011059, UNIVERSIDAD JAVERIANA - BOGOTÁ.
    11. Dohmen, Thomas & Sauermann, Jan, 2015. "Referee Bias," IZA Discussion Papers 8857, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    12. Dey, Oindrila & Banerjee, Swapnendu, 2013. "Status, incentives and random favouritism," MPRA Paper 49188, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  5. Hawdon, David & Hunt, Lester & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 2005. "Optimal Sliding Scale Regulation: An Application to Regional Electricity Distribution in England and Wales," CEPR Discussion Papers 4934, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Miraldo, Marisa & Siciliani, Luigi & Street, Andrew, 2011. "Price adjustment in the hospital sector," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 112-125, January.
    2. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    3. Stroffolini, Francesca, 2012. "Access profit-sharing regulation with information acquisition and transmission," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 161-174.
    4. Francesca Stroffolini, 2009. "Access Profit-Sharing Regulation with Information Transmission and Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 214, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

  6. Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2003. "The determinants of employee crime in the UK," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0703, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2004. "Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition," NBER Working Papers 11006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Seeun Jung & Kenneth Houngbedji, 2014. "Shirking, Monitoring, and Risk Aversion," PSE Working Papers halshs-00965532, HAL.
    3. C. Bram Cadsby & Fei Song & Francis Tapon, 2008. "Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 0810, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    4. Seeun JUNG, 2014. "Risk Attitudes and Shirking on the Quality of Work under Monitoring: Evidence from a Real-Effort Task Experiment," THEMA Working Papers 2014-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

  7. Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2003. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0603, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

    Cited by:

    1. Brito Duarte & Pereira Pedro & Vareda João, 2013. "Investment, Dynamic Consistency and the Sectoral Regulator’s Objective," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 563-594, August.
    2. Maiorano, F. & Stern, J., 2007. "Institutions and investment in low and middle-income countries: the case of mobile communications," Working Papers 07/06, Department of Economics, City University London.
    3. Paul Levine & Neil Rickman & Francesc Trillas, 2006. "Price Regulation and the Commitment Problem: Can Limited Capture be Beneficial?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0106, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    4. Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Fransesc Trillas, 2006. "Lobbies, Delegation and the Under-investment Problem in Regulation," School of Economics Discussion Papers 2006, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    5. Paul Levine & Paul Levine & Jon Stern & Francesc Trillas, 2003. "Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0403, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    6. Antonio Estache & L. Wren-Lewis, 2008. "Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Laffont's Lead," Working Papers ECARES 2008_018, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

  8. Leese, Robert & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2002. "The Economic Effects of Spectrum Trading," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 123, Royal Economic Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnon Tonmukayakul & Martin Weiss, 2008. "A study of secondary spectrum use using agent-based computational economics," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 125-151, October.

  9. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Stern, Jon & Trillas, Francesc, 2003. "Independence and discretion in telecommunications regulation: lessons from independent central banks," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 191-201, December.
    2. Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 2002. "Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3200, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Paul Levine & Paul Levine & Jon Stern & Francesc Trillas, 2003. "Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons from Monetary Policy," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0403, School of Economics, University of Surrey.

  10. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, . "Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1038, Berkeley Electronic Press.

    Cited by:

    1. Kirstein, Roland & Gerhard, Hans, 2005. "The "Rainmaker's Dilemma": Bad Debt Loss Insurance in Settlement and Litigation," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Andrew Daughety & Jennifer Reinganum, 2014. "The Effect of Third-Party Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00002, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    3. Kirstein, Roland, 2004. "Anti-Teilen in Teams," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    4. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2006. "US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(5), pages 379-385.
    5. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
    6. Winand Emons, 2004. "Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0419, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    7. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2002. "Wozu Strafrecht? Another View of the Cathedral," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-14, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    8. Roland Kirstein, 2009. "Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining," FEMM Working Papers 09001, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    9. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.
    10. Roland Kirstein & Matthias Peiss, 2013. "Quantitative Machtkonzepte in der Ökonomik," FEMM Working Papers 130004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    11. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    12. Roland Kirstein, 2008. "Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung," FEMM Working Papers 08021, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

Articles

  1. Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2008. "Favouritism and Financial Incentives: A Natural Experiment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(298), pages 296-309, 05.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. David Hawdon & Lester C. Hunt & Paul Levine & Neil Rickman, 2007. "Optimal sliding scale regulation: an application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 458-485, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Neil Rickman & Robert Witt, 2007. "The Determinants of Employee Crime in the UK," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(293), pages 161-175, 02.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray & Neil Rickman, 2007. "Standard fees for legal aid: an empirical analysis of incentives and contracts," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 662-681, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephen, Frank H. & Fazio, Giorgio & Tata, Cyrus, 2008. "Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 212-219, September.

  5. Alan Collins & Guy Judge & Neil Rickman, 2007. "On the economics of plagiarism," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 93-107, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Burton, Michael & Rigby, Dan, 2012. "The Market for Essays," 2013 Conference (57th), February 5-8, 2013, Sydney, Australia 152195, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    2. Guy Judge, 2008. "Plagiarism: Bringing Economics and Education Together (With a Little Help from IT)," Computers in Higher Education Economics Review, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 20(1), pages 21-26.
    3. Aurora A.C. Teixeira & Mariana Fontes da Costa, 2010. "Who rules the ruler? On the misconduct of Journal Editors," OBEGEF Working Papers 005, OBEGEF - Observatório de Economia e Gestão de Fraude;OBEGEF Working Papers on Fraud and Corruption.
    4. Rigby, Dan & Burton, Michael & Balcombe, Kelvin & Bateman, Ian & Mulatu, Abay, 2015. "Contract cheating & the market in essays," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 23-37.

  6. Fenn, Paul & Gray, Alastair & Rickman, Neil, 2007. "Liability, insurance and medical practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1057-1070, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Sofia, AmaralGarcia & Veronica, Grembi, 2011. "Curb your premium! evaluating state intervention in medical malpractice insurance," MPRA Paper 32301, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  7. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.
    2. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, 2014. "Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements," NBER Working Papers 19873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
    4. Anne Duchêne, 2015. "Patent Litigation Insurance," Working Papers 2015-621, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

  8. Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray & Neil Rickman, 2004. "The Economics of Clinical Negligence Reform in England," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(496), pages F272-F292, 06.

    Cited by:

    1. Amaral-Garcia, Sofia & Grembi, Veronica, 2014. "Curb your premium: The impact of monitoring malpractice claims," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 139-146.
    2. Fenn, Paul & Gray, Alastair & Rickman, Neil, 2007. "Liability, insurance and medical practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1057-1070, September.
    3. Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja, 2007. "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 423-441, December.
    4. Sofia, AmaralGarcia & Veronica, Grembi, 2011. "Curb your premium! evaluating state intervention in medical malpractice insurance," MPRA Paper 32301, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  9. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004. ""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6vn9877z, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2001. "FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2001-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.

  11. Gray, Alastair & Rickman, Neil & Fenn, Paul, 1999. "Professional Autonomy and the Cost of Legal Aid," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 545-58, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Robert Witt & Neil Rickman, 2005. "Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0105, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    2. Stephen, Frank H. & Fazio, Giorgio & Tata, Cyrus, 2008. "Incentives, criminal defence lawyers and plea bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 212-219, September.
    3. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.
    4. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.

  12. Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Contingent fees and litigation settlement1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 295-317, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2002. "A note on settlements under the contingent fee method of compensating lawyers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 217-225, August.
    2. Emons, Winand, 2000. "Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 21-33, March.
    3. Hyde, Charles E., 2006. "Conditional versus contingent fees: Litigation expenditure incentives," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 180-194, June.
    4. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    5. Douglas Cumming, 2001. "Settlement Disputes: Evidence from a Legal Practice Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 249-280, May.
    6. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 2007. "Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 351-361, September.
    7. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
    8. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6vn9877z, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    9. Zhou, J., 2010. "Access to justice : An economic approach," Other publications TiSEM 9d70f451-35c4-4878-92bf-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2001. "FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2001-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    11. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2001. "A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt2vz8x310, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    12. Winand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees," Diskussionsschriften dp0407, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.

  13. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Goeschl, Timo & Jürgens, Ole, 2012. "Explaining uniformity in rule design: The role of citizen participation in enforcement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 166-177.
    2. Arun Malik, 2014. "The Desirability of forgiveness in regulatory enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, August.
    3. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
    4. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Tradeable-permit pollution control systems with and without commitment to auditing," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(1), pages 15-37, March.
    6. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation," Memorandum 02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    7. Decker, Christopher S. & Pope, Christopher R., 2005. "Adherence to environmental law: the strategic complementarities of compliance decisions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-5), pages 641-661, September.
    8. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The role of warnings in regulation: keeping control with less punishment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2801-2816, December.
    9. Arun Malik, 2007. "The Desirability of Forgiveness in Regulatory Enforcement," Working Papers 2008-14, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    10. Langpap, Christian & Shimshack, Jay P., 2010. "Private citizen suits and public enforcement: Substitutes or complements?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 235-249, May.
    11. Takayoshi Shinkuma & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 123-145, April.
    12. Lars Gårn Hansen & Frank Jensen & Linda Nøstbakken, 2010. "Quota Enforcement in Resource Industries: Self-Reporting and Differentiated Inspections," IFRO Working Paper 2010/10, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, revised May 2011.
    13. Helfand, Gloria E. & Berck, Peter & Maull, Tim, 2003. "The theory of pollution policy," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 249-303 Elsevier.
    14. Coria, Jessica & Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2015. "The Harrington Paradox Squared," Working Papers in Economics 608, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    15. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
    16. Marcello Basili & Filippo Belloc & Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2012. "Warning, Learning and Compliance: Evidence from Micro-data on Driving Behavior," Department of Economics University of Siena 639, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    17. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    18. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
    19. Christian Langpap, 2015. "Voluntary agreements and private enforcement of environmental regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 99-116, February.
    20. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2012. "Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 264-286, December.
    21. Blackman, Allen & Harrington, Winston, 1999. "The Use of Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution," Discussion Papers dp-99-39, Resources For the Future.
    22. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    23. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
    24. Häckner, Jonas & Herzing, Mathias, 2012. "When do Firms Break the Law in Order to Reduce Marginal Cost? - An Application to the Problem of Environmental Inspection," Research Papers in Economics 2012:11, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    25. Arguedas, Carmen & Cabo, Francisco & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2014. "Optimal Pollution Standards and Non-Compliance in a Dynamic Framework," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2014/08, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
    26. Heather Eckert & Andrew Eckert, 2010. "The geographic distribution of environmental inspections," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-22, February.
    27. Rassier, Dylan G. & Earnhart, Dietrich, 2015. "Effects of environmental regulation on actual and expected profitability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 129-140.
    28. Cory, Dennis C. & Rahman, Tauhidur, 2009. "Environmental justice and enforcement of the safe drinking water act: The Arizona arsenic experience," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(6), pages 1825-1837, April.
    29. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2014. "Self-Regulation and Regulatory Flexibility: Why Firms May be Reluctant to Signal Green," Working Papers 2014-11, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    30. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.

  14. Rickman, Neil & McGuire, Alistair, 1999. "Regulating Providers' Reimbursement in a Mixed Market for Health Care," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(1), pages 53-71, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Paula González, 2004. "Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 505-524.
    2. McPake, Barbara & Russo, Giuliano & Tseng, Fu-Min, 2014. "How do dual practitioners divide their time? The cases of three African capital cities," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 113-121.
    3. Ikuo Ishibashi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2012. "Should Public Sectors Be Complements of Private Sectors?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 712-730, December.
    4. Kurt R. Brekke & Lars Sørgard, 2006. "Public versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service," CESifo Working Paper Series 1679, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Paula González, 2005. "On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 513-527.
    6. Paula González & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2011. "A Theoretical Approach to Dual Practice Regulations in the Health Sector," Working Papers 11.01, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    7. Socha-Dietrich, Karolina & Zweifel, Peter, 2014. "Creaming and Dumping: Who on Whom?," COHERE Working Paper 2014:4, COHERE - Centre of Health Economics Research, University of Southern Denmark.
    8. Socha, Karolina Z. & Bech, Mickael, 2011. "Physician dual practice: A review of literature," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 1-7, September.
    9. Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Carol Propper, 2012. "Competition, Equity and Quality in Health Care," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 12/296, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    10. Schuster, Stephan, 2012. "Applications in Agent-Based Computational Economics," MPRA Paper 47201, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Socha, Karolina, 2010. "Physician dual practice and the public health care provision. Review of the literature," COHERE Working Paper 2010:4, COHERE - Centre of Health Economics Research, University of Southern Denmark.

  15. Fenn, Paul & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delay and Settlement in Litigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(457), pages 476-91, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
    2. Davis S. Kaplan & Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, 2006. "Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico," Working Papers 0606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    3. Ormosi, Peter L., 2012. "Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 370-377.
    4. Zhou, J., 2010. "Access to justice : An economic approach," Other publications TiSEM 9d70f451-35c4-4878-92bf-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Di Vita, Giuseppe, 2010. "Production of laws and delays in court decisions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 276-281, September.
    6. Kaplan, David S. & Sadka, Joyce, 2008. "Enforceability of labor law : evidence from a labor court in Mexico," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4483, The World Bank.
    7. Lode Vereeck & Manuela Mühl, 2000. "An Economic Theory of Court Delay," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 243-268, November.
    8. Morgan Westéus, 2014. "Settlement probability asymmetries in the Swedish Labour Court," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 485-512, December.
    9. Ayuso, Mercedes & Bermúdez, Lluís & Santolino, Miguel, 2015. "The dynamics of one-sided incomplete information in motor disputes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 77-85.
    10. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, 2014. "Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements," NBER Working Papers 19873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. van Velthoven, Ben & van Wijck, Peter, 2001. "Legal cost insurance and social welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 387-396, September.
    12. Yasutora Watanabe, 2005. "Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation," 2005 Meeting Papers 440, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.
    14. Graevenitz, Georg von, 2007. "Which Reputations Does a Brand Owner Need? Evidence from Trade Mark Opposition," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 215, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  16. Roger Bowles & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard and the Insurance of Legal Expenses*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 196-209, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Qiao, Yue, 2013. "Legal effort and optimal legal expenses insurance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 179-189.

  17. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn, 1998. "Insuring Litigation Risk: Some Recent Developments in England and Wales*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 210-223, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Brian G Main & Alan Peacock, 1998. "What price civil justice?," ESE Discussion Papers 6, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.

  18. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.

  19. Rickman, Neil, 1994. "The Economics of Contingency Fees in Personal Injury Litigation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 34-50, Spring.

    Cited by:

    1. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6vn9877z, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
    3. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil & Tzavara, Dionisia, 2004. "Legal expenses insurance, risk aversion and litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-119, March.
    4. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2011. "The case against lawyers’ contingent fees and the misapplication of principal-agent models," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 263-292, October.
    5. Neil Rickman & Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray, 1999. "The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 20(3), pages 261-286, September.
    6. Emons, Winand & Garoupa, Nuno, 2004. "The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 4473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2013. "The regulation of quality in the market for legal services: Taking the heterogeneity of legal services seriously," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(2), pages 267-291, August.

  20. Fenn, Paul & Rickman, Neil & McGuire, Alistair, 1994. "Contracts and supply assurance in the UK health care market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 125-144, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin Chalkley & Duncan McVicar, 2007. "Choice of Contracts in the British National Health Service: An Empirical Study," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 216, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    2. Eleonora Fichera & Hugh Gravelle & Mario Pezzino & Matt Sutton, 2013. "Choice of contracts for quality in health care: Evidence from the British NHS," Working Papers 085cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    3. Csaba, Ivan & Fenn, Paul, 1997. "Contractual choice in the managed health care market An empirical analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 579-588, October.
    4. Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1995. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9514, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    5. Antony Dnes & Neil Rickman, 1998. "Contracts for Legal Aid: A Critical Discussion of Government Policy Proposals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-265, May.
    6. De Fraja, Gianni, 2000. "Contracts for health care and asymmetric information," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 663-677, September.
    7. Lise Rochaix, 1997. "Asymétries d'information et incertitude en santé : les apports de la théorie des contrats," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 11-24.

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