When do Firms Break the Law in Order to Reduce Marginal Cost? - An Application to the Problem of Environmental Inspection
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsEnvironmental Inspection; Market Structure; Product Differentiation; Bertrand; Cournot;
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2012-09-30 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2012-09-30 (Informal & Underground Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2012-09-30 (Law & Economics)
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