Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy
This paper uses an optimal contract approach to examine the issue of compliance monitoring in agri-environmental policy when the farmer is risk neutral and risk averse. The environmental agency chooses monitoring accuracy and payments for farmer's (non-)compliance. With a risk-neutral farmer, an optimal policy involves maximum allowable reward for compliance and maximum allowable penalty for non-compliance.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/economics|
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