Spectrum Property Rights Versus a Commons Model: Exploitation of Mesh Networks
This paper combines models and ideas from radio-engineering literature and economics to address the need for regulation of spectrum allocation in a commons scenario. It discusses under what conditions a laissez-faire policy towards spectrum usage would engender the inefficiencies of a spectrum com- mons allocation regime; to overcome such potential inefficiency, centralised allocation or a formal market for spectrum (with well-defined property rights) is required.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2007|
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