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Wozu Strafrecht? Another View of the Cathedral

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  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

Der Beitrag befaßt sich mit der Frage, inwieweit dem Strafrecht ein Eigengewicht im staatlichen Sanktionensystem zukommt. Im Kern geht es dabei um die wechselseitige Beziehung zwischen Strafrecht und Zivilrecht, die paradigmatisch durch die Stichworte "Strafe und Schadenersatz" oder "Kriminalität und unerlaubte Handlung" umschrieben werden kann. Es wird eine rationale Theorie der Kriminalisierung entwickelt, die eine rationale Antwort auf die Frage ermöglicht, wann und warum man das Strafrecht benötigt.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2002. "Wozu Strafrecht? Another View of the Cathedral," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-14, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200214
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23128/1/2002-14_strafrecht.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6vn9877z, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004. ""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-575, December.
    4. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December.
    5. McChesney, Fred S., 1993. "Boxed in: Economists and benefits from crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-231, June.
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    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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