Effizienzaspekte alternativer Streitbeilegung
The paper compares the Nash bargaining solution of a simple settlement game (with perfect and complete information and imperfect decision making judges) to the equilibrium results of a trial game without settlement stage. The comparison allows for an evaluation of the efficiency of settlement with regard to primary and secondary cost. Das Paper stellt die Nash-Verhandlungslösung eines Vergleichsspiels (mit perfekter, vollständiger Information und imperfekten Gerichten) neben die Gleichgewichtslösungen eines Klagespiels ohne Vergleichsstufe. Die Ergebnisse erlauben Aussagen zu primären und tertiären Kosten (mithin zur Effizienz) von Prozessvergleichen.
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- Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2003.
""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation,"
CSLE Discussion Paper Series
2003-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, 2004. ""Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 555-, December.
- Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-11, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Roland Kirstein & Neil Rickman, . "Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1038, Berkeley Electronic Press.
- Kirstein, Roland & Rickman, Neil, 2002. ""Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6vn9877z, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994.
"Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency,"
Game Theory and Information
- Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1994. "Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-298, September.
- Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997.
"Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance,"
CSLE Discussion Paper Series
97-07, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December.
- Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
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