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Conflict resolution, public goods and patent thickets

  • Dietmar Harhoff

    (University of Munich)

  • Georg von Graevenitz

    (University of East Anglia in London)

  • Stefan Wagner

    (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)

Post-grant validity challenges at patent offices rely on the private initiative of third parties to correct mistakes made by patent offices. We hypothesize that incentives to bring post-grant validity challenges are reduced when many firms benefit from revocation of a patent and when firms are caught up in patent thickets. Using data on opposition against patents at the European Patent Office we show that opposition decreases in fields in which many others profit from patent revocations. Moreover, in fields with a large number of mutually blocking patents the incidence of opposition is sharply reduced, particularly among large firms and firms that are caught up directly in patent thickets. These findings indicate that post-grant patent review may not constitute an effective correction device for erroneous patent grants in technologies affected by either patent thickets or highly dispersed patent ownership.

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Paper provided by ESMT European School of Management and Technology in its series ESMT Research Working Papers with number ESMT-12-04 (R1).

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 13 Sep 2012
Date of revision: 25 Mar 2013
Handle: RePEc:esm:wpaper:esmt-12-04
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