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Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate: Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation

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  • Harhoff, Dietmar
  • Gaessler, Fabian
  • Sorg, Stefan

Abstract

We investigate the causal effect of patent rights on cumulative innovation, using large-scale data that approximate the patent universe in its technological and economic variety. We introduce a novel instrumental variable for patent invalidation that exploits personnel scarcity in post-grant opposition at the European Patent Ofï¬ ce. We ï¬ nd that patent invalidation leads to a highly signiï¬ cant and sizeable increase of follow-on inventions. The effect is driven by cases where the removal of the individual exclusion right creates substantial freedom to operate for third parties. Importantly, our results suggest that bargaining failure between original and follow-on innovators is not limited to environments commonly associated with high transaction costs

Suggested Citation

  • Harhoff, Dietmar & Gaessler, Fabian & Sorg, Stefan, 2019. "Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate: Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 13969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13969
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    Cited by:

    1. Nagler, Markus & Sorg, Stefan, 2020. "The disciplinary effect of post-grant review – Causal evidence from European patent opposition," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(3).
    2. Markus Nagler & Monika Schnitzer & Martin Watzinger, 2022. "Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 838-866, December.
    3. Robin Mamrak, 2023. "Antitrust and (Foreign) Innovation: Evidence from the Xerox Case," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 396, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Gold, E. Richard, 2021. "The fall of the innovation empire and its possible rise through open science," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(5).
    5. Arianna Martinelli & Julia Mazzei & Daniele Moschella, 2022. "Patent disputes as emerging barriers to technology entry? Empirical evidence from patent opposition," LEM Papers Series 2022/12, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patents; Cumulative innovation; Bargaining failure; Opposition; Freedom to operate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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