IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rco/dpaper/220.html

Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate: Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Gaessler, Fabian

    (MPI-IC Munich)

  • Harhoff, Dietmar

    (MPI-IC Munich)

  • Sorg, Stefan

    (MPI-IC Munich)

Abstract

We investigate the causal effect of patent rights on cumulative innovation, using large-scale data that approximate the patent universe in its technological and economic variety. We introduce a novel instrumental variable for patent invalidation that exploits personnel scarcity in post-grant opposition at the European Patent Office. We find that patent invalidation leads to a highly significant and sizeable increase of follow-on inventions. The effect is driven by cases where the removal of the individual exclusion right creates substantial freedom to operate for third parties. Importantly, our results suggest that bargaining failure between original and follow-on innovators is not limited to environments commonly associated with high transaction costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaessler, Fabian & Harhoff, Dietmar & Sorg, Stefan, 2019. "Bargaining Failure and Freedom to Operate: Re-evaluating the Effect of Patents on Cumulative Innovation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 220, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:220
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/220.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Markus Nagler & Monika Schnitzer & Martin Watzinger, 2022. "Fostering the Diffusion of General Purpose Technologies: Evidence from the Licensing of the Transistor Patents," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 838-866, December.
    3. Robin Mamrak, 2023. "Antitrust and (Foreign) Innovation: Evidence from the Xerox Case," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 396, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Gold, E. Richard, 2021. "The fall of the innovation empire and its possible rise through open science," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(5).
    5. Nagler, Markus & Sorg, Stefan, 2020. "The disciplinary effect of post-grant review – Causal evidence from European patent opposition," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(3).
    6. Arianna Martinelli & Julia Mazzei & Daniele Moschella, 2022. "Patent disputes as emerging barriers to technology entry? Empirical evidence from patent opposition," LEM Papers Series 2022/12, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:220. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Viviana Lalli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://rationality-and-competition.de .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.