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The Disciplinary Effect of Post-Grant Review

Author

Listed:
  • Nagler, Markus

    (LMU Munich)

  • Sorg, Stefan

    (MPI for Innovation and Competition)

Abstract

We study the causal impact of invalidating marginally valid patents during post-grant opposition at the European Patent Office on affected inventors\' subsequent patenting. We exploit exogenous variation in invalidation by leveraging the participation of a patent\'s original examiner in the opposition division as an instrument. We find a disciplinary effect of invalidation: Affected inventors file 20% fewer patent applications in the decade after the decision. This effect is entirely driven by a reduction in low-quality filings, i.e., filings that examiners associate with prior art that threatens the application\'s novelty or inventive step. We do not observe shifts into national patenting.

Suggested Citation

  • Nagler, Markus & Sorg, Stefan, 2019. "The Disciplinary Effect of Post-Grant Review," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 155, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:155
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    inventors; marginal patents; patent invalidation; patent opposition; postgrant review; epo; innovation;

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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