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Patent Oppositions

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Listed:
  • Jonathan Levin

    (Stanford University)

  • Richard Levin

    (Yale University)

Abstract

In recent years, patent protection has extended into new areas, giving rise to serious concern about the lack of clear guidelines for patentability. We analyze the effect of introducing a patent opposition process that would allow patent validity to be challenged directly after a patent is granted. In many cases, such a system would avoid costly litigation at a later date. In other cases, the opposition process would increase the cost of conflict resolution, but would also reward holders of valid patents and limit the rewards to invalid patents. Our analysis suggests significant positive welfare gains from the introduction of a patent opposition process.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Levin & Richard Levin, "undated". "Patent Oppositions," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1005, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:yaloln:yale_lepp-1005
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    File URL: http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=yale/lepp
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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Calderini & Giuseppe Scellato, 2004. "Intellectual property rights as strategic assets: the case of european patent opposition in the telecommunication industry," KITeS Working Papers 158, KITeS, Centre for Knowledge, Internationalization and Technology Studies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jul 2004.
    2. Dietmar Harhoff & Georg von Graevenitz & Stefan Wagner, 2016. "Conflict Resolution, Public Goods, and Patent Thickets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 704-721, March.
    3. Bronwyn H. Hall & Stuart Graham & Dietmar Harhoff & David C. Mowery, 2004. "Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition," NBER Chapters,in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 4, pages 115-144 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I., 2003. "The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents," Research Papers 1804, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    5. Bronwyn H. Hall, 2003. "Business Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy," NBER Working Papers 9717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bronwyn H. Hall, 2009. "Business And Financial Method Patents, Innovation, And Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(s1), pages 443-473, September.
    7. Graham, Stuart J.H. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 38, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

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