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Economic incongruities in the European patent system

  • Malwina Mejer


  • Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

Bruno van Pottelsberghe argues that the consequences of the fragmentation of the European patent system are more dramatic than the mere prohibitive costs of maintaining a patent in force in many jurisdictions. The authors first show that heterogeneous national litigation costs, practices and outcome induce a high level of uncertainty. But also that a high degree of managerial complexity results from systemic incongruities due to easier parallel imports, possible time paradoxes and the de facto paradox of having EU-level competition policy and granting authority, ultimately facing national jurisdictional primacy on patent issues.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 215-234

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:34:y:2012:i:1:p:215-234
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  1. Bruno van Pottelsberghe, . "Lost property: The European patent system and why it doesn't work," Blueprints, Bruegel, number 312, June.
  2. Kyle Margaret, 2011. "Strategic Responses to Parallel Trade," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 1-34, January.
  3. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2006. "Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 77-81, May.
  4. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2002. "Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases," Staff General Research Papers 5231, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  5. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2010. "The quality factor in patent systems," CEPR Discussion Papers 7921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Bruno Van Pottelsberghe & Carine Peeters, 2006. "Economic and management perspectives on intellectual property rights," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/6185, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Graham, Stuart J.H. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Lerner, Josh, 1995. "Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 463-95, October.
  9. Ariel Pakes & Mark Schankerman, 1979. "The Rate of Obsolescence Of Knowledge, Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources," NBER Working Papers 0346, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Malwina Mejer & Bruno Van Pottelsberghe, 2008. "The London Agreement and the Cost of Patenting in Europe," Working Papers ECARES 2008_032, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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