IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_3657.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Economics of Pending Patents

Author

Listed:
  • Johannes Koenen
  • Martin Peitz

Abstract

We provide a treatment of a number of questions pertaining to pending patents – a subject that has so-far mainly been discussed en-passant in the existing literature. We present the underlying institutional and legal framework that governs pending patents and some basic facts related to them. Then, we focus on the strategic considerations of firms in the earliest stage of the patenting process and the interplay with the patent office. This is followed by considering the perspective of the patent and trademark offices (PTOs), in particular, acknowledging the limited resources that are available to PTOs. Finally, we investigate the potential abuse of pending patents and the role of reputation of patenting firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Koenen & Martin Peitz, 2011. "The Economics of Pending Patents," CESifo Working Paper Series 3657, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3657
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3657.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-151, Spring.
    2. Caillaud, Bernard & Duchêne, Anne, 2011. "Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 242-252.
    3. Florian Schuett, 2013. "Patent quality and incentives at the patent office," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 313-336, June.
    4. Haeussler, Carolin & Harhoff, Dietmar & Mueller, Elisabeth, 2009. "To Be Financed or Not… - The Role of Patents for Venture Capital Financing," CEPR Discussion Papers 7115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011. "The quality factor in patent systems," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(6), pages 1755-1793, December.
    6. Joshua S. Gans & David H. Hsu & Scott Stern, 2008. "The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 982-997.
    7. Bronwyn H. Hall & Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, 2005. "Market Value and Patent Citations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 16-38, Spring.
    8. Rebecca Henderson & Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, 1998. "Universities As A Source Of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis Of University Patenting, 1965-1988," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 119-127, February.
    9. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, 2009. "Patents, Thickets and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 729-773, September.
    10. Joseph P. Cook, 2007. "On Understanding the Increase in U.S. Patent Litigation," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 48-71.
    11. Dietmar Harhoff & Stefan Wagner, 2009. "The Duration of Patent Examination at the European Patent Office," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(12), pages 1969-1984, December.
    12. Jay Pil Choi, 1998. "Brand Extension as Informational Leverage," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(4), pages 655-669.
    13. Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, 1999. "Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 197-213, Summer.
    14. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2008. "Introduction to Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk," Introductory Chapters,in: Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk Princeton University Press.
    15. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2006. "Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 77-81, May.
    16. Aoki, Reiko & Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 333-345, May.
    17. Koenen, Johannes & Peitz, Martin, 2015. "Firm reputation and incentives to “milk” pending patents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 18-29.
    18. Pierre Régibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2010. "INNOVATION CYCLES AND LEARNING AT THE PATENT OFFICE: DOES THE EARLY PATENT GET THE DELAY? -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 222-246, June.
    19. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
    20. Vidya Atal & Talia Bar, 2014. "Patent Quality and a Two-Tiered Patent System," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 503-540, September.
    21. Haeussler, Caroline & Harhoff, Dietmar & Müller, Elisabeth, 2009. "To Be Financed or Not... - The Role of Patents for Venture Capital Financing," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 253, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    22. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    23. Johnson, Daniel K N & Popp, David, 2003. " Forced Out of the Closet: The Impact of the American Inventors Protection Act on the Timing of Patent Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 96-112.
    24. Webster, Elizabeth & Palangkaraya, Alfons & Jensen, Paul H., 2007. "Characteristics of international patent application outcomes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 362-368, June.
    25. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yamauchi, Isamu & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2015. "An economic analysis of deferred examination system: Evidence from a policy reform in Japan," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 19-28.
    2. Yamauchi, Isamu & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2014. "An Economic Analysis of Deferred Examination System: Evidence from Policy Reforms in Japan," IIR Working Paper 14-05, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    3. Koenen, Johannes & Peitz, Martin, 2015. "Firm reputation and incentives to “milk” pending patents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 18-29.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    patenting; pending patents; innovation; patent office overload; patent inspection; grant delays;

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3657. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.