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We study the relationship between the length of patent review and the importance of inventions. We build a simple model of the U.S. patent review process. Among the model predictions are that, controlling for a patent's position in a new technology cycle, more important innovations would be approved more quickly. Also, the approval delay is likely to decrease as an industry moves from the early stages of an innovation cycle to later stages. These predictions are in line with the evidence we obtain from a data set on U.S. patents granted in the field of genetically modified crops from 1983 to 1999. We also show that failing to account for the innovation lifecycle - as previous studies have done - is likely to bias upwards the estimates of the relationship between delay and importance. Copyright 2010 The Authors. Journal compilation 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

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  • Pierre Régibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2010. "INNOVATION CYCLES AND LEARNING AT THE PATENT OFFICE: DOES THE EARLY PATENT GET THE DELAY? -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 222-246, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:2:p:222-246

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier.
    10. Schankerman, Mark & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2005. "Still Looking for Lost Profits: The Case of Horizontal Competition," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt5746p162, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    11. Choi, Jay Pil, 1998. "Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1249-1263, December.
    12. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2003. "Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 151-178, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Moura, Fabio Rodrigues de & Paes, Nelson Leitão & Farias, Tácito Augusto, 2014. "O Impacto do Tempo de Pendência das Patentes na Trajetória de Crescimento: Uma Análise com Base no Modelo Schumpeteriano de Crescimento Endógeno com Avanço de Qualidade," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 68(1), April.
    2. Lei, Zhen & Wright, Brian D., 2017. "Why weak patents? Testing the examiner ignorance hypothesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 43-56.
    3. repec:eee:indorg:v:56:y:2018:i:c:p:204-228 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:68:n:1:a:6 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:eee:worbus:v:53:y:2018:i:2:p:164-176 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Johannes Koenen & Martin Peitz, 2012. "The Economics of Pending Patents," Chapters,in: Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Wagner, Stefan & Wakeman, Simon, 2016. "What do patent-based measures tell us about product commercialization? Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(5), pages 1091-1102.
    8. Fabrizi, Simona & Lippert, Steffen & Norback, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2007. "Venture Capitalists, Asymmetric Information and Ownership in the Innovation Process," MPRA Paper 6265, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. NAGAOKA Sadao & YAMAUCHI Isamu, 2017. "Information Constraint of the Patent Office and Examination Quality: Evidence from the effects of initiation lags," Discussion papers 17040, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    10. Aka, Joël, 2017. "Market approval of phytosanitary active substances in Europe: An empirical duration analysis," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 143-153.
    11. R�gibeau, P & Rockett, K & Mariam, S, 2012. "Patent Pendency, Learning Effects, and Innovation Importance at the US Patent Office," Economics Discussion Papers 2863, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    12. Clément Bonnet, 2017. "Measuring Inventive Performance with Patent Data: an Application to Low Carbon Energy Technologies," Working Papers 1709, Chaire Economie du climat.
    13. Yamauchi, Isamu & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2013. "Does the outsourcing of prior art search increase the efficiency of patent examination?," IIR Working Paper 13-12, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    14. Dietl, M & Skrok, ? & Benalcazar, P & G?tkowski, M & Rockett, K, 2017. "Pendency and Thickets," Economics Discussion Papers 19979, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    15. Clément Bonnet, 2016. "Measuring Knowledge with Patent Data: an Application to Low Carbon Energy Technologies," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-37, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

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