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Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners

Author

Listed:
  • Gaétan de Rassenfosse
  • William E. Griffiths
  • Adam B. Jaffe
  • Elizabeth Webster

Abstract

A low-quality patent system threatens to slow the pace of technological progress. Concerns about low patent quality are supported by estimates from litigation studies suggesting that most US patents granted should not have been issued. We propose a new model for measuring patent quality, based on equivalent patent applications submitted to multiple offices. Our method allows us to distinguish whether low-quality patents are issued because an office implements a low standard or because it violates its own standard. The results suggest that quality in patent systems is higher than previously thought. Specifically, the percentage of granted patents that are below each office’s own standard is under 10% for all offices. The Japanese patent office has a higher percentage of granted patents below its own standard than those from Europe, the USA, Korea, and China. This result arises from the fact that Japan has a higher standard than other offices. (JEL O34, K2, L4, F42)

Suggested Citation

  • Gaétan de Rassenfosse & William E. Griffiths & Adam B. Jaffe & Elizabeth Webster, 2021. "Low-Quality Patents in the Eye of the Beholder: Evidence from Multiple Examiners," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 607-636.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:37:y:2021:i:3:p:607-636.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewaa026
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    JEL classification:

    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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