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Economic incongruities in the European patent system

  • Bruno van Pottelsberghe

Bruno van Pottelsberghe argues that the consequences of the fragmentation of the European patent system are more dramatic than the mere prohibitive costs of maintaining a patent in force in many jurisdictions. The authors first show that heterogeneous national litigation costs, practices and outcome induce a high level of uncertainty. But also that a high degree of managerial complexity results from systemic incongruities due to easier parallel imports, possible time paradoxes and the de facto paradox of having EU-level competition policy and granting authority, ultimately facing national jurisdictional primacy on patent issues.

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File URL: http://www.bruegel.org/download/parent/226-economic-incongruities-in-the-european-patent-system/file/650-economic-incongruities-in-the-european-patent-system-english/
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Paper provided by Bruegel in its series Working Papers with number 226.

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Date of creation: Jan 2009
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Handle: RePEc:bre:wpaper:226
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  1. Pakes, Ariel & Schankerman, Mark A., 1978. "The Rate of Obsolescence of Knowledge, Research Gestation Labs, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources," Working Papers 78-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  2. Graham, Stuart J.H. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 38, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  3. Margaret K. Kyle, 2007. "Strategic Responses to Parallel Trade," NBER Working Papers 12968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2005. "Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes," Working Papers 0502, Research on Innovation.
  5. Bruno Van Pottelsberghe & Carine Peeters, 2006. "Economic and management perspectives on intellectual property rights," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/6185, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  6. Mejer, Malwina & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2008. "The London Agreement and the Cost of Patenting in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 7033, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Lerner, Josh, 1995. "Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 463-95, October.
  8. Bruno van Pottelsberghe, 2010. "The quality factor in patent systems," Working Papers 422, Bruegel.
  9. Bruno van Pottelsberghe, . "Lost property: The European patent system and why it doesn't work," Blueprints, Bruegel, number 312, November.
  10. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2002. "Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases," Staff General Research Papers 5231, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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