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Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation

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  • Feess, Eberhard
  • Ossig, Sonja

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  • Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja, 2007. "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 423-441, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:4:p:423-441
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    1. Gal-Or, Esther, 1999. "Optimal Reimbursement and Malpractice Sharing Rules in Health Care Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 237-265, November.
    2. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2000. "Government purchasing of health services," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 847-890, Elsevier.
    3. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
    4. William P. Rogerson, 1994. "Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital Under Prospective Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 7-51, March.
    5. Shavell, Steven, 1985. "Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 587-609, October.
    6. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1996. "Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 257-277, June.
    7. Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray & Neil Rickman, 2004. "The Economics of Clinical Negligence Reform in England," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(496), pages 272-292, June.
    8. Frey, Bruno S., 1993. "Shirking or work morale? : The impact of regulating," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1523-1532, December.
    9. Rogerson, William P, 1994. "Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital under Prospective Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 7-51, Spring.
    10. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1997. "Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers," Papers 0084, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    11. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1997. "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 746-755, September.
    12. Meltzer David & Chung Jeanette, 2002. "Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs Among High- and Low-Cost Admissions: Evidence from California, 1983 and 1993," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-52, January.
    13. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    14. Danzon, Patricia M., 1985. "Liability and liability insurance for medical malpractice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 309-331, December.
    15. Simon, Michael, 2000. "Neue Krankenhausfinanzierung - Experiment mit ungewissem Ausgang: Zur geplanten Umstellung auf ein DRG-basiertes Fallpauschalensystem," Discussion Papers, Research Group Public Health P 00-201, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    16. Ching‐to Albert Ma, 1998. "Health‐Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 139-142, March.
    17. Bruno S. Frey & Lorenz Goette, "undated". "Does Pay Motivate Volunteers?," IEW - Working Papers 007, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    18. Allen, Robin & Gertler, Paul J, 1991. "Regulation and the Provision of Quality to Heterogenous Consumers: The Case of Prospective Pricing of Medical Services," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 361-375, December.
    19. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1988. "Insurance principles and the design of prospective payment systems," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 215-237, September.
    20. Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
    21. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
    22. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
    23. David Meltzer & Jeanette Chung, 2002. "Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs Among High- and Low-Cost Admissions: Evidence from California, 1983 and 1993," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 5, pages 53-102, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eberhard Feess, 2012. "Malpractice liability, technology choice and negative defensive medicine," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(2), pages 157-167, April.
    2. Olbrich, Anja, 2008. "Heterogeneous physicians, lawsuit costs, and the negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 78-88, March.
    3. Jiwei Qian & Alex Jingwei He, 2018. "The Bonus Scheme, Motivation Crowding-out and Quality of the Doctor-Patient Encounters in Chinese Public Hospitals," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 143-158, June.

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