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Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation

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  • Feess, Eberhard
  • Ossig, Sonja

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  • Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja, 2007. "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 423-441, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:27:y:2007:i:4:p:423-441
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
    2. Paul Fenn & Alastair Gray & Neil Rickman, 2004. "The Economics of Clinical Negligence Reform in England," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(496), pages 272-292, June.
    3. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1997. "Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers," Papers 0084, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    4. Meltzer David & Chung Jeanette, 2002. "Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs Among High- and Low-Cost Admissions: Evidence from California, 1983 and 1993," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-52, January.
    5. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1996. "Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 257-277, June.
    6. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
    7. Danzon, Patricia M., 1985. "Liability and liability insurance for medical malpractice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 309-331, December.
    8. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
    9. Simon, Michael, 2000. "Neue Krankenhausfinanzierung - Experiment mit ungewissem Ausgang: Zur geplanten Umstellung auf ein DRG-basiertes Fallpauschalensystem," Discussion Papers, Research Group Public Health P 00-201, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    10. Shavell, Steven, 1985. "Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 587-609, October.
    11. Frey, Bruno S., 1993. "Shirking or work morale? : The impact of regulating," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1523-1532, December.
    12. Rogerson, William P, 1994. "Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital under Prospective Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 7-51, Spring.
    13. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1998. "Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives-Reply," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 139-142, March.
    14. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1988. "Insurance principles and the design of prospective payment systems," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 215-237, September.
    15. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2000. "Government purchasing of health services," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 847-890 Elsevier.
    16. Gal-Or, Esther, 1999. "Optimal Reimbursement and Malpractice Sharing Rules in Health Care Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 237-265, November.
    17. Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
    18. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
    19. David Meltzer & Jeanette Chung, 2002. "Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs Among High- and Low-Cost Admissions: Evidence from California, 1983 and 1993," NBER Chapters,in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 5, pages 53-102 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eberhard Feess, 2012. "Malpractice liability, technology choice and negative defensive medicine," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(2), pages 157-167, April.
    2. Olbrich, Anja, 2008. "Heterogeneous physicians, lawsuit costs, and the negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 78-88, March.

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