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Selection of treatment under prospective payment systems in the hospital sector

  • Siciliani, Luigi

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 25 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 479-499

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:25:y:2006:i:3:p:479-499
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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  1. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1990. "Optimal payment systems for health services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-396, December.
  2. David P. Baron & Roger B. Myerson, 1979. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Discussion Papers 412, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Jelovac, Izabela & Macho-Stadler, Ines, 2002. "Comparing organizational structures in health services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 501-522, December.
  4. Allen, Robin & Gertler, Paul J, 1991. "Regulation and the Provision of Quality to Heterogenous Consumers: The Case of Prospective Pricing of Medical Services," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 361-75, December.
  5. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2005. "Hospital price regulation and expenditure cap policy," Post-Print hal-00448922, HAL.
  6. Rogerson, William P, 1994. "Choice of Treatment Intensities by a Nonprofit Hospital under Prospective Pricing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 7-51, Spring.
  7. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 419-443, May.
  8. Pope, Gregory C., 1989. "Hospital nonprice competition and medicare reimbursement policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 147-172, June.
  9. Boyd H. Gilman, 1999. "Measuring Hospital Cost-Sharing Incentives Under Refined Prospective Payment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 433-452, 09.
  10. De Fraja, Gianni, 2000. "Contracts for health care and asymmetric information," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 663-677, September.
  11. Jack, William, 2005. "Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 73-93, January.
  12. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & SATO, Motohiro, 2003. "An optimal contract approach to hospital financing," CORE Discussion Papers 2003021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Mark McClellan, 1997. "Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 91-128, 03.
  14. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2002. "Cost sharing in health service provision: an empirical assessment of cost savings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 219-249, May.
  15. Beitia, Arantza, 2003. "Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 1011-1036, November.
  16. Dranove, David & White, William D, 1994. "Recent Theory and Evidence on Competition in Hospital Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 169-209, Spring.
  17. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 1998. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-19, January.
  18. Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1995. "Contracting for health services with unmonitored quality," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9510, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  19. James Malcomson, 2005. "Supplier Discretion over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care," CESifo Working Paper Series 1407, CESifo Group Munich.
  20. Eggleston, Karen, 2005. "Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 211-223, January.
  21. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 2000. "Government purchasing of health services," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 847-890 Elsevier.
  22. Ma, Ching-to Albert, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
  23. Paula González, 2004. "Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 505-524.
  24. Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
  25. David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 1999. "Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 351-382, 09.
  26. Newhouse, Joseph P., 1983. "Two prospective difficulties with prospective payment of hospitals, or, it's better to be a resident than a patient with a complex problem," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 269-274, December.
  27. Paula González, 2005. "On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 513-527.
  28. David Dranove, 1987. "Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups and Hospital Specialization," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 417-427, Autumn.
  29. Bos, Dieter & De Fraja, Gianni, 2002. "Quality and outside capacity in the provision of health services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 199-218, May.
  30. Boyd H. Gilman, 2000. "Hospital response to DRG refinements: the impact of multiple reimbursement incentives on inpatient length of stay," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 277-294.
  31. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
  32. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1997. "Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers," Papers 0084, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  33. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
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