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Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency

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  • Fahad Khalil
  • Martin Chalkley

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Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number UWEC-2003-35-P.

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Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Health Economics, Volume 24-6, 1132-1153, 2005
Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2003-35-p
Contact details of provider: Postal: Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98193-3330
Web page: http://www.econ.washington.edu/Email:


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  1. Alger, Ingela & Albert Ma, Ching-to, 2003. "Moral hazard, insurance, and some collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 225-247, February.
  2. Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1998. "Government purchasing of health services," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9821, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, June.
  4. Ching-to Albert Ma, 1994. "Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives," Papers 0047, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  5. David E. M. Sappington & Tracy R. Lewis, 1999. "Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 351-382, 09.
  6. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1093-1110, July.
  7. Philippe Chone & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2006. "Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency: Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-006, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  8. Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
  9. Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1984. "Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes," UCLA Economics Working Papers 354, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 1998. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-19, January.
  11. Dranove, David & White, William D, 1994. "Recent Theory and Evidence on Competition in Hospital Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 169-209, Spring.
  12. Jack, William, 2005. "Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 73-93, January.
  13. Bontems & Bourgeon, 2000. "Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments," Working Papers 156169, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  14. Khalil, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?," Working Papers 93-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  15. Mark McClellan, 1997. "Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 91-128, 03.
  16. Mingshan Lu, 1999. "Separating the True Effect from Gaming in Incentive-Based Contracts in Health Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 383-431, 09.
  17. David Dranove, 1987. "Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups and Hospital Specialization," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 417-427, Autumn.
  18. Allen, Robin & Gertler, Paul J, 1991. "Regulation and the Provision of Quality to Heterogenous Consumers: The Case of Prospective Pricing of Medical Services," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 361-75, December.
  19. Newhouse, Joseph P, 1970. "Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An Economic Model of a Hospital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 64-74, March.
  20. Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire, 1995. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," Papers 0059, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  21. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 419-443, May.
  22. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1995. "Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 431-455, July.
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Cited by:

  1. Basu, Anirban, 2011. "Economics of individualization in comparative effectiveness research and a basis for a patient-centered health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 549-559, May.
  2. Michael Leung, 2010. "Primary care delivery, risk pooling and economic efficiency," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 161-175, April.
  3. Tsuyoshi Takahara, 2013. "Patient Dumping, Outlier Payments, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information," ISER Discussion Paper 0891r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Oct 2014.
  4. Nadja Kairies, 2012. "P4P, Reputation and the Reduction of Costly Overprovision," Ruhr Economic Papers 0331, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  5. Leonard, Kenneth L., 2008. "Is patient satisfaction sensitive to changes in the quality of care? An exploitation of the Hawthorne effect," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 444-459, March.
  6. Tsuyoshi Takahara, 2013. "Patient Dumping, Outlier Payment, and Optimal Healthcare Payment Policy under Asymmetric Information," ISER Discussion Paper 0891, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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