Primary care delivery, risk pooling and economic efficiency
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- Michael Osti & Johannes Steyrer, 2017. "A perspective on the health care expenditures for defensive medicine," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(4), pages 399-404, May.
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KeywordsPrimary care; Provision efficiency; Health insurance; Asymmetric information; I11;
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
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