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Quality and Quantity in Primary Care Mixed Payment Models: Evidence from Family Health Organizations in Ontario

Author

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  • Kantarevic, Jasmin

    () (Ontario Medical Assocation)

  • Kralj, Boris

    () (Ontario Medical Assocation)

Abstract

We study the impact of a mixed capitation model known as the Family Health Organization (FHO) on selected quality and quantity outcomes relative to an enhanced fee-for-service model known as the Family Health Group (FHG) among primary care physicians in Ontario, Canada. Using a panel of administrative data that covers one year before and two years after the FHO model was introduced in 2007, we find that physicians in the FHO model provide about 6 percent fewer services and visits per day, but are between 8 and 15 percent more likely to achieve preventive care bonuses for senior flu shots, toddler immunizations, pap smears, and mammograms compared to physicians in the FHG model. These results are largely consistent with the hypothesis that the mixed payment model may reduce quantity and improve quality of health care relative to the fee-for-service model. We also find that the FHO physicians have lower referral rates and enroll patients of similar complexity compared to the FHG physicians.

Suggested Citation

  • Kantarevic, Jasmin & Kralj, Boris, 2011. "Quality and Quantity in Primary Care Mixed Payment Models: Evidence from Family Health Organizations in Ontario," IZA Discussion Papers 5762, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5762
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    9. Yip, Winnie C., 1998. "Physician response to Medicare fee reductions: changes in the volume of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries in the Medicare and private sectors," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 675-699, December.
    10. Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
    11. Kantarevic, Jasmin & Kralj, Boris & Weinkauf, Darrel, 2011. "Enhanced fee-for-service model and physician productivity: Evidence from Family Health Groups in Ontario," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 99-111, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rudoler, David & Laporte, Audrey & Barnsley, Janet & Glazier, Richard H. & Deber, Raisa B., 2015. "Paying for primary care: A cross-sectional analysis of cost and morbidity distributions across primary care payment models in Ontario Canada," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 18-28.
    2. David Gray & William Hogg & Michael E. Green & Yan Zhang, 2015. "Did Family Physicians Who Opted into a New Payment Model Receive an Offer They Should Not Refuse? Experimental Evidence from Ontario," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 41(2), pages 151-165, June.
    3. Kantarevic, Jasmin & Kralj, Boris, 2014. "Risk selection and cost shifting in a prospective physician payment system: Evidence from Ontario," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 249-257.
    4. Jasmin Kantarevic & Boris Kralj, 2016. "Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(10), pages 1326-1340, October.
    5. repec:eee:jhecon:v:55:y:2017:i:c:p:76-94 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike & Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja & Wiesen, Daniel, 2015. "The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians – Experimental Evidence," Ruhr Economic Papers 543, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Logan McLeod, Jeffrey A. Johnson, 2014. "Changing the Schedule of Medical Benefits and the Effect on Primary Care Physician Billing: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Alberta," LCERPA Working Papers 0077, Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis, revised 28 Aug 2014.
    8. David Rudoler & Raisa Deber & Janet Barnsley & Richard H. Glazier & Adrian Rohit Dass & Audrey Laporte, 2015. "Paying for Primary Care: The Factors Associated with Physician Self‐selection into Payment Models," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(9), pages 1229-1242, September.
    9. repec:zbw:rwirep:0543 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jeannette Brosig-Koch & Heike Hennig-Schmidt & Nadja Kairies-Schwarz & Daniel Wiesen, 2015. "The Effects of Introducing Mixed Payment Systems for Physicians – Experimental Evidence," Ruhr Economic Papers 0543, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    11. Ake Blomqvist & Boris Kralj & Jasmin Kantarevic, 2013. "Accountability and Access to Medical Care: Lessons from the Use of Capitation Payments in Ontario," e-briefs 168, C.D. Howe Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family Health Groups; primary care; Family Health Organizations; physician remuneration; Ontario; Canada;

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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