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Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments

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  • Bontems, Philippe
  • Bourgeon, Jean-Marc

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  • Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2000. "Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 181-202, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:76:y:2000:i:2:p:181-202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tracy R. Lewis, 1996. "Protecting the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 819-847.
    2. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 1985. "Input versus output incentive schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-23.
    3. Khalil Fahad & Lawarree Jacques, 1995. "Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 139-157.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    5. Claude Crampes, 1986. "Des instruments pour le contrôle des entreprises publiques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(5), pages 757-782.
    6. Besanko, David, 1987. "Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 19-44.
    7. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    8. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 1985. "Input versus output incentive schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-23.
    9. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 329-369.
    10. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Panico, Claudio, 2012. "Control and contract design in research collaborations: A complete contract perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 459-470.
    2. Crepin, Anne-Sophie & Jayet, Pierre-Alain, 2002. "Set-Aside versus Quotas in Contracts for Agro-Environmental Regulation," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24950, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Chalkley, Martin & Khalil, Fahad, 2005. "Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1132-1153, November.
    4. Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki & Beitia Ruiz de Mendarozqueta, María Aranzazu, 2014. "Countervailing incentives in adverse selection models. A synthesis," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2014-84, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    5. Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Roussel, Sébastien, 2018. "Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-17.
    6. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
    7. Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2009. "On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 281-306, June.
    8. Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina & Salvatore Piccolo, 2005. "Competitive Pressure, Incentives and Managerial Rewards," CSEF Working Papers 148, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2006.
    9. Sheriff, Glenn, 2008. "Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 72-89, January.
    10. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2007. "Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion," CEPR Discussion Papers 6261, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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