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Optimal Border Policies for Invasive Species under Asymmetric Information

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  • Linda Fernandez
  • Glenn Sheriff

Abstract

This paper analyzes border protection policies for managing risk of unintended imports of invasive species. Previous work typically assumes invasive species risk to be exogenous and commonly known. Here, we examine cases in which endogenous actions (exporter abatement) affect risk and allow for unobservable differences in exporter abatement cost. We show how the optimal inspection/penalty regime differs in such cases from that derived for homogeneous exporters. The information asymmetry also makes it optimal for the regulator to provide technical assistance grants even if it would be otherwise inefficient to do so. Further, we show that the fungibility of technical assistance with inputs in other sectors of the exporting economy significantly affects the qualitative nature of the optimal policy. If it has no outside value in the exporter's country, the optimal policy is characterized by a menu of contracts trading off higher tariffs with lower penalties for being caught with an invasive. If technical assistance can be used in other sectors of the exporter's economy, it introduces countervailing incentives that make it optimal for the regulator to use a uniform tariff/penalty combination for all exporters.

Suggested Citation

  • Linda Fernandez & Glenn Sheriff, 2010. "Optimal Border Policies for Invasive Species under Asymmetric Information," NCEE Working Paper Series 201003, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Mar 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:nev:wpaper:wp201003
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    File URL: https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/working-paper-optimal-border-policies-invasive-species-under-asymmetric
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Margolis & Jason Shogren, 2012. "Disguised Protectionism, Global Trade Rules and Alien Invasive Species," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(1), pages 105-118, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anthony Rossiter & Susan M Hester, 2017. "Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93(301), pages 277-301, June.
    2. Kaiser, Brooks A. & Bakanev, Sergey & Bertelsen, Rasmus Gjedsø & Carson, Marcus & Eide, Arne & Fernandez, Linda & Halpin, Patrick & Izmalkov, Sergei & Kyhn, Line A. & Österblom, Henrik & Punt, Maarten, 2015. "Spatial issues in Arctic marine resource governance workshop summary and comment," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-5.

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    Keywords

    asymmetric information; inspection; international trade ; invasive species;

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