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Des instruments pour le contrôle des entreprises publiques

Listed author(s):
  • Claude Crampes

[eng] Some instruments to regulate a public enterprise In this paper, we stuc!y the consequences of divergent objectives between a public enterprise and the govenment. While the enterprise, for informational reasons, includes only sectorial elements into its objective function, the performance of the center directly varies with the level of employement. In this context, we show that it is far easier and socially better to regulate the activity of the enterprise by the means of the output level rather than the labor input level. [fre] Quels instruments pour le controle des entreprises publiques ? Cet article présente une étude des conséquences des divergences d'objectifs existant entre une entreprise publique et son ministère de tutelle. Alors que l'entreprise, pour des raisons informationnelles, ne tient compte que d'éléments sectoriels, le centre inclut également dans son calcul la valeur sociale du volume de main-d'œuvre employé. Nous montrons alors, en univers certain, puis avec biais informationnel, que la régulation de l'entreprise par le volume d'activité se révèle à la fois plus simple et plus performante que la régulation indirecte par le volume d'emploi.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/reco.1986.408941
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_5_408941
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 37 (1986)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 757-782

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_5_408941
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1986.408941
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/reco

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  1. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
  2. Vogelsang, Ingo, 1983. "Effort rewarding incentive mechanisms for public enterprise managers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 253-273, September.
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