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Des instruments pour le contrôle des entreprises publiques

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  • Claude Crampes

Abstract

[eng] Some instruments to regulate a public enterprise . . In this paper, we stuc!y the consequences of divergent objectives between a public enterprise and the govenment. While the enterprise, for informational reasons, includes only sectorial elements into its objective function, the performance of the center directly varies with the level of employement. In this context, we show that it is far easier and socially better to regulate the activity of the enterprise by the means of the output level rather than the labor input level. [fre] Quels instruments pour le controle des entreprises publiques ?. . Cet article présente une étude des conséquences des divergences d'objectifs existant entre une entreprise publique et son ministère de tutelle. Alors que l'entreprise, pour des raisons informationnelles, ne tient compte que d'éléments sectoriels, le centre inclut également dans son calcul la valeur sociale du volume de main-d'œuvre employé. Nous montrons alors, en univers certain, puis avec biais informationnel, que la régulation de l'entreprise par le volume d'activité se révèle à la fois plus simple et plus performante que la régulation indirecte par le volume d'emploi.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Crampes, 1986. "Des instruments pour le contrôle des entreprises publiques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(5), pages 757-782.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1986_num_37_5_408941
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1986.408941
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    2. Vogelsang, Ingo, 1983. "Effort rewarding incentive mechanisms for public enterprise managers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 253-273, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:adr:anecst:y:1996:i:43 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Philippe Bontems & Jean-Marc Bourgeon, 1996. "Régulation par la production ou par l'intrant en présence d'incertitude," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 43, pages 181-193.
    3. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2000. "Creating countervailing incentives through the choice of instruments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 181-202, May.

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