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Eberhard Feess

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Personal Details

First Name:Eberhard
Middle Name:
Last Name:Feess
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfe259
Email:
Homepage:http://www.frankfurt-school.de/content/en/research/dept_management/staff/Feess
Postal Address:Prof. Dr. Eberhard Feess Management Department Sonnemannstraße 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt am Main
Phone:
Location: Frankfurt, Germany
Homepage: http://www.frankfurt-school.de/
Email:
Phone: 069 154008-0
Fax:
Postal: Sonnemannstraße 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt am Main
Handle: RePEc:edi:hfbfide (more details at EDIRC)
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  1. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard, 2010. "When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 135, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
  2. Feess, Eberhard & Gerfin, Michael & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008. "Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer," IZA Discussion Papers 3834, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Hege, Ulrich & Feess, Eberhard, 2007. "Basel II and the Value of Bank Differentiation," Les Cahiers de Recherche 879, HEC Paris.
  4. Sonja Ossig & Eberhard Feess, 2004. "The Impact Of Liability For Malpractice On The Optimal Reimbursement Schemes For Health," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 82, Royal Economic Society.
  5. Feess, Eberhard & Frick, Bernd & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer," IZA Discussion Papers 1180, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Sonja Ossig & Eberhard Feess, 2004. "The impact of liability for malpractice on the optimal reimbursement schemes for health services," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 396, Econometric Society.
  7. Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2002. "Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football," IZA Discussion Papers 423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & Markus Walzl, 2002. "When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse14_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Eberhard Feess & Michael Schieble, 1999. "Credit Scoring and Incentives for Loan Officers in a Principal Agent Model," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 30, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.
  10. Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell, 1998. "The Manager and the Auditor in a Double Moral Hazard Setting: Efficiency through Contingent Fees and Insurance Contracts," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 24, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.
    RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-85388 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-78736 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200033 is not listed on IDEAS
  1. Eberhard Feess & Frank Stähler, 2009. "Revenue Sharing In Professional Sports Leagues," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(2), pages 255-265, 05.
  2. Baum Ido & Feess Eberhard & Wohlschlegel Ansgar, 2009. "Reporter's Privilege and Incentives to Leak," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 701-715, November.
  3. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2009. "Environmental liability under uncertain causation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 133-148, October.
  4. Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2009. "Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 69-71, August.
  5. Z. Ayca Altintig & K. Peren Arin & Eberhard Feess & Christoph Schumacher, 2009. "YOU ARE ONE OF US NOW! HOW DO SHARE PRICES OF RIVALS REACT TO PRIVATIZATION? -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 265-293, 06.
  6. Eberhard Feess & Michael Hoeck & Oliver Lorz, 2009. "International Technology Transfers and Competition ," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 1038-1052, November.
  7. Feess, Eberhard & Ossig, Sonja, 2007. "Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 423-441, December.
  8. Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2006. "Liability and information transmission: The advantage of negligence based rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 63-67, July.
  9. Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl, 2006. "Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(2), pages 277-290, June.
  10. Feess, Eberhard & Schumacher, Christoph, 2006. "Why costless auditing may reduce social welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 407-411, March.
  11. Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl, 2005. "Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 265-279, May.
  12. Eberhard Feess & Sonja Ossig & Markus Walzl, 2005. "The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent-Model," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 57(1), pages 29–45, January.
  13. Feess, Eberhard & Walzl, Markus, 2004. "Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 77-82, January.
  14. Eberhard Feess & Markus Walzl, 2004. "Self-reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement when there are Criminal Teams," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71(283), pages 333-348, 08.
  15. Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2003. "Transfer fee regulations in European football," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 645-668, August.
  16. Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 323-339, September.
  17. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(1), pages 139-154, 03.
  18. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2002. "Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(2), pages 149-166, October.
  19. Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell, 2002. "Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(3), pages 408-, September.
  20. Ulrich Hege & Eberhard Feess, 2002. "original papers : Safety regulation and monitor liability," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 173-185.
  21. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Mühlheußer, 2002. "Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 221-237, May.
  22. Ralf Ewert & Eberhard Feess & Martin Nell, 2000. "Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation: the welfare-increasing effect of liability insurance," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 371-385.
  23. Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 2000. "Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(2), pages 220-234, April.
  24. Eberhard Feess, 1999. "Lender Liability for Environmental Harm: An Argument Against Negligence Based Rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 231-250, November.
  25. Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 1999. "The role of insurance in the adjudication of multiparty accidents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 69-85, March.
  26. Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 1998. "Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents With Moral Hazard," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(2), pages 422-450, June.
11 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (1) 2004-06-22
  2. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2008-01-19
  3. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2010-03-28
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (2) 2008-12-01 2010-03-28
  5. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (2) 1999-03-08 2008-01-19
  6. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2004-10-30
  7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 1999-05-17
  8. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2010-03-28
  9. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (4) 1999-05-17 2002-02-15 2004-10-30 2008-01-19. Author is listed
  10. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 1999-03-08 1999-05-17 2002-10-09. Author is listed
  11. NEP-PKE: Post Keynesian Economics (1) 2002-02-15
  12. NEP-REG: Regulation (2) 2002-09-21 2008-01-19
  13. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (1) 2008-01-19
  14. NEP-SPO: Sports & Economics (2) 2002-02-15 2008-12-01

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