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The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football

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  • Eberhard Feess
  • Gerd Muehlheusser

Abstract

We evaluate the effect of the recently approved transfer system for European professional football which will replace the current system (implemented by the Bosman judgment in 1995). The focus is on the comparison of wages, profits, the length of contracts and investment incentives. Our main findings are that (i) the new regime reduces a player's overall payoff because it increases the new club's renegotiation payoff, and (ii) since training generates a general skill, the new regime will also diminish incentives to invest in the education of young talents, because a new club benefits more from the initial club's investment. Copyright The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics", 2002 .

Suggested Citation

  • Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(1), pages 139-154, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:105:y:2003:i:1:p:139-154
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Antonietti, 2008. "Il ruolo economico dell’arbitro di calcio: una rassegna della letteratura e alcune questioni aperte," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 4(3), pages 75-103, Dicembre.
    2. Eberhard Feess & Bernd Frick & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2004. "Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer," Diskussionsschriften dp0411, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Oliver Gürtler, 2012. "A Strategic Rationale for the Use of Sell–On Fees in European Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 13(1), pages 76-84, February.
    4. Padma Rao Sahib, 2015. "Status, Peer Influence, and Racio-ethnic Diversity in Times of Institutional Change: An Examination from European Labour Law," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, pages 205-218.
    5. Paul Downward, 2014. "English professional football," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football, chapter 17, pages 277-297 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Harrie A. A Verbon, 2007. "Migrating Football Players, Transfer Fees and Migration Controls," CESifo Working Paper Series 2004, CESifo Group Munich.

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