Why football players may benefit from the ‘shadow of the transfer system’
The transfer system imposed by the football governing bodies on employment relations made sure that a player could not leave his current club and sign with another club without the current club's explicit consent. The 1995 Bosman judgement of the European Court of Justice declaring football players to free agents after expiration of their contracts and the 2001 intervention of the European Commission, which, among other things, limited contract durations in football, can be interpreted as the two major steps towards restricting the application of the transfer system. This paper provides a theoretical model to analyze whether professional football players in the European football leagues benefit from transfer restrictions. It shows that under a restrictive transfer system, clubs can partially insure their players against income uncertainty by transforming a part of the player's risky future salary into risk-free current income. As a result, a risk-averse player benefits from the 'shadow of the transfer system'.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 26 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/journal/10657|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eberhard Feess & Bernd Frick & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2004.
"Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer,"
dp0411, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Feess, Eberhard & Frick, Bernd & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2004. "Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer," IZA Discussion Papers 1180, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2003. "Examining economic organization through the lens of contract," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 917-942, August.
- Bernd Frick & Gunnar Pietzner & Joachim Prinz, 2007. "Career Duration a Competitive Environment: The Labor Market for Soccer Players in Germany," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 429-442, Summer.
- Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 1999. "Golden Cages for Showy Birds: Optimal Switching Costs in Labour Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2003.
"Transfer fee regulations in European football,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 645-668, August.
- Peter Antonioni & John Cubbin, 2000. "The Bosman Ruling and the Emergence of a Single Market in Soccer Talent," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 157-173, March.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Diego Comin, 2005.
"Testing out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer,"
NBER Working Papers
11110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Diego Comin, 2005. "Testing Out Contractual Incompleteness: Evidence from Soccer," Departmental Working Papers 200501, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Eberhard Feess & Gerd Mühlheußer, 2002. "Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 221-237, May.
- Scully, Gerald W, 1974. "Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 915-30, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:26:y:2008:i:2:p:129-151. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.