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Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts

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  • Burguet, Roberto
  • Caminal, Ramon
  • Matutes, Carmen

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  • Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon & Matutes, Carmen, 2002. "Golden cages for showy birds: Optimal switching costs in labor contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(7), pages 1153-1185, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:46:y:2002:i:7:p:1153-1185
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    7. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    8. Kathryn E. Spier & Michael D. Whinston, 1995. "On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 180-202, Summer.
    9. George A. Akerlof & Lawrence F. Katz, 1989. "Workers' Trust Funds and the Logic of Wage Profiles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(3), pages 525-536.
    10. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
    11. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    12. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1997. "Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(1997 Micr), pages 283-349.
    13. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
    14. Malcomson, James M., 1999. "Individual employment contracts," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 35, pages 2291-2372, Elsevier.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Managment," Working Papers 07-28, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2003. "The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(1), pages 139-154, March.
    3. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
    4. Roberto Burguet & József Sákovics, 2019. "Bidding For Talent In Sport," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 85-102, January.
    5. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2009. "Preferred suppliers in auction markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 283-295, June.
    6. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2019. "Anti‐Poaching Agreements In Labor Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 243-263, January.
    7. Jue-Shyan Wang & Wei-Hsin Wang & Yen-Chun Liao, 2014. "The Impact of Free Agency on Players¡¯ Compensation," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-12, March.
    8. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon, 2008. "Does the market provide sufficient employment protection?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 406-422, June.
    9. Jorge Fernández‐Ruiz, 2019. "A Mixed Duopoly With Switching Costs," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(2), pages 235-257, June.
    10. Feess, Eberhard & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2003. "Transfer fee regulations in European football," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 645-668, August.
    11. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Cordeiro De Noronha Pessoa, Joao Paulo & Ponczek, Vladimir, 2021. "Non-compete agreements, wages and efficiency: theory and evidence from Brazilian football," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 114417, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Roberto Burguet & Jozsef Sakovics, 2016. "To the highest bidder: The market for talent in sports leagues," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 275, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    13. Matouschek, Niko & Ramezzana, Paolo & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2009. "Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 19-36, January.
    14. Heski Bar‐Isaac & Johannes Hörner, 2014. "Specialized Careers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 601-627, September.
    15. Motta, Massimo & Rønde, Thomas, 2002. "Trade Secret Laws, Labour Mobility and Innovations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3615, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Jonathan R. Peterson, 2023. "Employee bonding and turnover efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 223-244, January.
    18. Pablo Casas‐Arce, 2010. "Career Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 667-698, September.
    19. Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2018. "Dynamic labor market competition and wage seniority," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-154.
    20. Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2018. "A novel justification for legal restrictions on non-compete clauses," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 49-57.

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