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Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news?

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  • Feess, Eberhard
  • Walzl, Markus

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  • Feess, Eberhard & Walzl, Markus, 2004. "Delegated expertise--when are good projects bad news?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 77-82, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:82:y:2004:i:1:p:77-82
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:joares:v:25:y:1987:i:1:p:68-89 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
    3. Steven D. Levitt & Christopher M. Snyder, 1997. "Is No. News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 641-661, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andres Zambrano, 2015. "Motivating Informed Decisions," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 012576, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    2. Malcomson James M, 2009. "Principal and Expert Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-36, May.
    3. Hilmer, Michael, 2014. "Too many to fail - How bonus taxation prevents gambling for bailouts," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100552, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. James M. Malcomson, 2011. "Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 83-120, March.
    5. Feess,Eberhard & Schieble,Michael & Markus,Walzl, 2004. "When should principals acquire verifiable information?," Research Memorandum 049, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    6. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Too Many to Fail - How Bonus Taxation Prevents Gambling for Bailouts," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-18, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

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