The Organization of Delegated Expertise
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More about this item
Keywordscollusion; expertise; organization;
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-02-13 (All new papers)
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