A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance
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- Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000068, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," IEPR Working Papers 05.9, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR).
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More about this item
Keywords
experimentation; incomplete and symmetric information; information control; informational rents; learning; optimal stopping rule; principal-agent; public ignorance;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2005-06-14 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2005-06-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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