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The Basel II Accord: Internal ratings and bank defferentiation

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  • Fees, Eberhard
  • Hege, Ulrich

Abstract

The Basel Committee plans to differentiate risk-adjusted capital requirements between banks regulated under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach and banks under the standard approach. We investigate the consequences for the lending capacity and the failure risk of banks in a model with endogenous interest rates. The optimal regulatory response depends on the banks' inclination to increase their portfolio risk. If IRB-banks are well-capitalized or gain little from taking risks, then they will increase their market share and hold safe portfolios. As risk-taking incentives become more important, the optimal portfolio size of banks adopting intern rating systems will be increasingly constrained, and ultimately they may lose market share relative to banks using the standard approach. The regulator has only limited options to avoid the excessive adoption of internal rating systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Fees, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 2004. "The Basel II Accord: Internal ratings and bank defferentiation," CFS Working Paper Series 2004/25, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cfswop:200425
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1996. "The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital Standards Promote Bank Safety?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 160-183, April.
    2. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1998. "The Economics of Bank Regulation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(4), pages 745-770, November.
    3. Craig Furfine, 2001. "Bank Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Capital Requirements, Regulatory Monitoring, and Economic Conditions," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(1), pages 33-56, September.
    4. Reint Gropp & Anthony J. Richards, 2001. "Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 30(3), pages 373-398, November.
    5. Calem, Paul & Rob, Rafael, 1999. "The Impact of Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 317-352, October.
    6. Decamps, Jean-Paul & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Roger, Benoit, 2004. "The three pillars of Basel II: optimizing the mix," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 132-155, April.
    7. Altman, Edward I. & Saunders, Anthony, 2001. "An analysis and critique of the BIS proposal on capital adequacy and ratings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 25-46, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hervé Alexandre & Aymen Smondel, 2010. "Substitution or complementarity between “soft” information and "hard" information : why and which effect on bank profitability ?," Post-Print hal-01622847, HAL.
    2. Eckley, Peter & Benetton, Matteo & Latsi, Georgia & Garbarino, Nicola & Kirwin, Liam, 2017. "Specialisation in mortgage risk under Basel II," Bank of England working papers 639, Bank of England.
    3. Hervé Alexandre & Aymen Smondel, 2010. "Substitution or complementarity between “soft” information and “hard” information: why and which effect on bank profitability?," Post-Print hal-01622844, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Basel II Accord; risk-based capital; internal ratings based approach; bank capital; bank competition; risk-taking;

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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