original papers : Safety regulation and monitor liability
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- González, Patrick, 2003. "Optimal Assignment of Liabilities," Cahiers de recherche 0305, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Joshua Anyangah, 2012. "On information, extended liability and judgment proof firms," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 61-84, January.
More about this item
KeywordsSafety regulation; multiple monitors; Bayesian mechanism;
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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