Physician dual practice: A review of literature
Objectives A combination of public and private practice by physicians, referred to as physician dual practice, has been receiving attention in connection with arguments about its negative impact for the public health care. This paper aims to review and critically discuss findings on the subject of dual practice effects for the public health care.Methods A systematic literature review identified 23 positions on the subject consisting of journal articles, academic working papers, book chapter, and publications of the WHO.Results The subject is short on evidence. Theoretical analyses indicate both positive and negative effects of dual practice. Some of the effects depend, however, on assumptions that are undermined in the broader literature. The analyses assume that the dual practitioners' objective is to maximise income. Yet, while physicians seem to engage in a private practice on top of the public one mainly to increase income, it remains uncertain whether dual practice is an income-maximising combination of jobs. Moreover, costs of enforcing restrictions on dual practice are rarely considered.Conclusions Further research is needed that compares dual practitioners and other physicians in uniform settings, investigates how the dual practitioners divide labour between the two jobs, and analyses the costs of enforcing restrictions on dual practice.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Miriam M. Wiley, 2005. "The Irish health system: developments in strategy, structure, funding and delivery since 1980," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(S1), pages S169-S186.
- Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
- Humphrey, Charlotte & Russell, Jill, 2004. "Motivation and values of hospital consultants in south-east England who work in the national health service and do private practice," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 59(6), pages 1241-1250, September.
- Martimort, David, 1994.
"Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory,"
IDEI Working Papers
43, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 1996.
- David Martimort, 1996. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
- Martimort, D., 1992. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Thoery," Papers 92.278, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1986. "Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement : Cost sharing and supply," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 129-151, June.
- Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
- Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2006.
"Moonlighting: Public Service and Private Practice,"
12, Portuguese Competition Authority.
- Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2006. "Moonlighting: Public Service and Private Practice," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-015, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 1993. "Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 135-151, Fall.
- Susan Averett, 2001. "Moonlighting: multiple motives and gender differences," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(11), pages 1391-1410.
- Martin, Stephen & Smith, Peter C., 1999. "Rationing by waiting lists: an empirical investigation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 141-164, January.
- Pedro Pita Barros & Pau Olivella, .
"Waiting Lists And Patient Selection,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
444.99, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Barros, Pedro Luis Pita, 2000. "Waiting Lists and Patient Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers 2519, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pau Olivella Cunill & Pedro Pita Barros, 2000. "Waiting Lists and Patient Selection," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0283, Econometric Society.
- Gal-Or, Esther, 1999. "Optimal Reimbursement and Malpractice Sharing Rules in Health Care Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 237-65, November.
- Gruen, Reinhold & Anwar, Raqibul & Begum, Tahmina & Killingsworth, James R. & Normand, Charles, 2002. "Dual job holding practitioners in Bangladesh: an exploration," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 267-279, January.
- De Pietro, Carlo, 2006. "Private medical services in the Italian public hospitals: The case for improving HRM," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 56-69, August.
- Mitchell, Jean M. & Sass, Tim R., 1995. "Physician ownership of ancillary services: Indirect demand inducement or quality assurance?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 263-289, August.
- Kurt R. Brekke & Lars Sørgard, 2007.
"Public versus private health care in a national health service,"
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(6), pages 579-601.
- Kurt R. Brekke & Lars Sørgard, 2006. "Public versus Private Health Care in a National Health Service," CESifo Working Paper Series 1679, CESifo Group Munich.
- Claudio Mezzetti, 1997. "Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 323-345, Summer.
- Lundborg, Per, 1995.
"Job amenity and the incidence of double work,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 273-287, March.
- Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 1990. "Optimal payment systems for health services," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 375-396, December.
- Shishko, Robert & Rostker, Bernard, 1976. "The Economics of Multiple Job Holding," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 298-308, June.
- Paula González, 2004. "Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 505-524.
- Erik Magnus Sather, 2005. "Physicians' Labour Supply: The Wage Impact on Hours and Practice Combinations," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 19(4), pages 673-703, December.
- McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536 Elsevier.
- Cullis, John G. & Jones, Philip R. & Propper, Carol, 2000. "Waiting lists and medical treatment: Analysis and policies," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 1201-1249 Elsevier.
- Vrangbæk, Karsten & Østergren, Katarina & Birk, Hans Okkels & Winblad, Ulrika, 2007. "Patient reactions to hospital choice in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(02), pages 125-152, April.
- Iversen, Tor, 1997. "The effect of a private sector on the waiting time in a national health service," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 381-396, August.
- Garcia-Prado, Ariadna & Gonzalez, Paula, 2007. "Policy and regulatory responses to dual practice in the health sector," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 84(2-3), pages 142-152, December.
- Cullis, John G. & Jones, Philip R., 1985. "National health service waiting lists : A discussion of competing explanations and a policy proposal," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 119-135, June.
- Martinussen, Pål E. & Hagen, Terje P., 2009. "Reimbursement systems, organisational forms and patient selection: Evidence from day surgery in Norway," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(02), pages 139-158, April.
- Paula González, 2005. "On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 513-527.
- Smith Conway, Karen & Kimmel, Jean, 1998. "Male labor supply estimates and the decision to moonlight," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 135-166, June.
- Ellis, Randall P., 1998. "Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins1," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 537-555, October.
- Rickman, Neil & McGuire, Alistair, 1999. "Regulating Providers' Reimbursement in a Mixed Market for Health Care," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 46(1), pages 53-71, February.
- McAvinchey, Ian D & Yannopoulos, Andreas, 1994. "A Cost Function Approach to the Choice between Private and Public Acute Health Care Provision," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(2), pages 194-211, May.
- Eggleston, Karen & Bir, Anupa, 2006. "Physician dual practice," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(2-3), pages 157-166, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:102:y:2011:i:1:p:1-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)or ()
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.