Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

1998

• Weibull, Jorgen W., 1998, "Evolution, rationality and equilibrium in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 641-649, May.
• Guth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998, "Imperfectly Observable Commitments inn-Player Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 23, issue 1, pages 54-74, April.
• Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1998, "Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 23, issue 2, pages 119-145, May.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 2, pages 292-310, November.
• Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998, "Is altruism evolutionarily stable?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 34, issue 2, pages 193-209, February.
• Frijters, P., 1998, "Discrimination and job-uncertainty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 4, pages 433-446, September.
• Schlag, Karl H., 1998, "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 78, issue 1, pages 130-156, January.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1998, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 82, issue 1, pages 65-88, September.
• Cressman, R. & Schlag, K. H., 1998, "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 83, issue 2, pages 260-285, December.
• Nehring, Klaus, 1998, "Incentive-compatibility in large games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 35, issue 1, pages 57-67, January.
• Yoshihara, Naoki, 1998, "Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 35, issue 2, pages 165-184, March.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1998, "Are there dynamic gains from a poor-area development program?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 67, issue 1, pages 65-85, January.
• Glomm, Gerhard & Lagunoff, Roger, 1998, "A Tiebout theory of public vs private provision of collective goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 68, issue 1, pages 91-112, April.
• van de Walle, Dominique, 1998, "Assessing the welfare impacts of public spending," World Development, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 3, pages 365-379, March.
• Levine, Ross & Zervos, Sara, 1998, "Capital Control Liberalization and Stock Market Development," World Development, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 7, pages 1169-1183, July.
• Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1998, "Infrastructure Project Finance and Capital Flows: A New Perspective," World Development, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 7, pages 1283-1298, July.
• Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998, "A model of financial fragility," Research Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, number 98-01.
• Figuieres, C. & Garderes, P. & Rychen, F., 1998, "Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Players Games," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98a03.
• Hollard, G., 1998, "On the Existence of a Stable Group Structure," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98a18.
• Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S., 1998, "Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 349.
• Kline, J.J., 1998, "Carrot and Stick Games," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 357.
• Flam, S.D., 1998, "Averaged Predictions and the Learning of Equilibrium Play," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 178.
• Korsholm, L., 1998, "An Equilibrium Search Model with Capital Accumulation," Papers, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Danmark-, number 98-13.
• Cornu, P. & Isakov, D., 1998, "The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the UK," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 98.16.
• Cornu, P., 1998, "Optimal Bidding in Takeover Contests," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 98.17.
• Viallanex, P., 1998, "Controle des interactions strategiques intra-firmes par allocation des charges jointes," Papers, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, Universite de Geneve-, number 98.4.
• Moulin, Y. & Muller, R., 1998, "nnaire. Contribution a une anthropologie de la cooperation," Papers, Groupe de recherche en économie financière et en gestion des entreprises, Universite Nancy 2, number 1998-13.
• Baland, J.M. & Robinson, J.A., 1998, "Rotten Parents," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 207.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Guth, W., 1998, "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1998-09.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Norde, H. & Reijnierse, H. & Tijs, S., 1998, "The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1998-11.
• Widmalm, F., 1998, "Marriage, Housework and Fairness," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1998:22.
• Ania, A.B. & Troger, T. & Wambach, A., 1998, "An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection," Papers, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy, number 9808.
• Chakrabarti, R., 1998, "Models of Remittances and Migration With or Without Cooperation," Papers, Wellesley College - Department of Economics, number 98-05.
• Charles Anderton, 1998, "Appropriation, Deterrence, and Trade Policy in a Simple Exchange Economy," Working Papers, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, number 9801, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00011-7.
• Segendorff, Björn, 1998, "Delegation of Bargaining and Power," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 248, Aug.
• Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1998, "Markets and Cooperation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 257, Sep, revised 20 Sep 1999.
• Weibull, Jörgen W. & van Damme, Eric, 1998, "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 501, Aug.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1998, "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1998:9, Mar.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Norde, Henk & Reijnierse, Hans & Tijs, Stef, 1998, "The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1998:11, May.
• Widmalm, Frida, 1998, "Marriage, Housework and Fairness," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1998:22, Oct.
• Marco Mariotti, 1998, "Escalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, number 98/12, Feb, revised Feb 1998.
• Gabriel Oxenstierna, 1998, "An asymmetric oligopoly model and a method for its empirical application," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 67, issue 1, pages 39-61, February, DOI: 10.1007/BF01227762.
• Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998, "Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 67, issue 1, pages 63-73, February, DOI: 10.1007/BF01227763.
• Reinhard Selten, 1998, "Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 44, issue 1, pages 1-36, January, DOI: 10.1023/A:1005099909043.
• Youngse Kim, 1998, "Disequilibrium Behavior and Satisficing in the Centipede Game," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 14, pages 245-260.
• Svend Albæk & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1998, "Signaling and rent extraction vis contract proposals in franchising," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-03, Apr.
• Mark N. Hertzendorf & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1998, "Will the high-quality producer please stand up?: A model of duopoly signaling," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-04, Apr.
• Rabah Amir & Val E. Lambson, 1998, "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-06, Sep.
• Rabah Amir, 1998, "Modelling Imperfectly Appropriable R&D via Spillovers," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-07, Jul.
• Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998, "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and Research Jointventures," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1998-10, Jun.
• Hans Jørgen Jacobsen & Mogens Jensen & Birgitte Sloth, 1998, "Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1999-14, Mar, revised Sep 1999.
• Flavio M. Menezes & Paulo K. Monteiro & Akram Temimi, 1998, "Equilibrium Selection and the Rate of Convergence in Coordination Games with Simultaneous Play," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 98-14, Aug.
• Kenneth S. Chan & Rob Godby & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller, 1998, "Crowding Out Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University, number 1998-03, Mar.
• Kenneth S. Chan & Robert Godby & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller, 1998, "Crowding Out Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications, McMaster University, number 1998-01, Jan.
• Hirokawa, M. & Sasaki, D., 1998, "Reexamination of Stackelberg Leadership: Fixed Supply Contracts Under Demand Uncertainty," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 600.
• Lambertini, L. & Sasaki, D., 1998, "Optimal Punishment in Supergames with Product Differentiation," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 607.
• Hirokawa, M & Sasaki, D., 1998, "Endogenously Asynchronous Entries Into an Uncertain Industry," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 608.
• Lambertini, L. & Sasaki, D., 1998, "Non-Negative Quantity Constraints and the Duration of Punishment," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 630.
• Hirokawa, M. & Sasaki, D., 1998, "Endogenous Co-Leadership When Demand Is Unknown," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 669.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1998, "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 98-46.
• Larry Samuelson, 1998, "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, number 0262692198, edition 1, ISBN: ARRAY(0x89e84748), December.
• Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998, "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 006.
• Nir Dagan, 1998, "A Critique on the Theory of Linear Price Monopoly," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 016, Jan, revised 25 Sep 1998.
• Oscar Volij, 1998, "In Defense of DEFECT or Cooperation does not Justify the Solution Concept," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 007, Dec, revised 26 Aug 1999.
• Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998, "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1226, Sep.
• Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G.R. & Savin, N.E., 1998, "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 98-02, Jan.
• Werner Güth & Georg Kirchsteiger & Klaus Ritzberger, 1998, "Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games," ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2013/5907, Apr.
• Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1998, "Endogenous price leadership," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 289, May.
• Gary Charness, 1998, "Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 293, Jun.
• Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Luis Corchón, 1998, "An experiment on Nash implementation," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 300, Jun.
• Clarke, George R. & Cull, Robert, 1998, "Why privatize? : the case of Argentina's public provincial banks," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1972, Sep.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1998, "Behavioral responses to risk in rural China," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1978, Sep.
• Hentschel, Jesko & Lanjouw, Peter, 1998, "Household welfare measurement and the pricing of basic services," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2006, Nov.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 10, pages 661-663, October.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. IV. Quartal 1997," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 1, pages 23-26, January.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. I. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 4, pages 229-231, April.
• Angelina Keil, 1998, "Wirtschaftschronik. II. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 71, issue 7, pages 457-460, July.
• George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1998, "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number imp-mon, Jul.
• Jonathan Shalev, 1998, "Loss Aversion in Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9802005, Feb.
• Roger Lagunoff & Stacey L. Schreft, 1998, "A Model of Financial Fragility," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9803001, Mar, revised 30 Apr 1998.
• Joerg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 1998, "Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9805002, May, revised 05 Aug 1998.
• Aurel Lazar & Nemo Semret, 1998, "Design, Analysis and Simulation of the Progressive Second Price Auction for Network Bandwidth Sharing," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809001, Sep.
• Mauricio Bugarin, 1998, "Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9811001, Nov.
• Nick Feltovich & Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 1998, "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Countersignaling," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9811002, Nov.
• Rajiv Sethi, 1998, "Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9811003, Nov, revised 04 Mar 1999.
• Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1998, "Through Trial & Error to Collusion," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9811004, Nov, revised 24 Nov 1998.
• Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1998, "Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?," Industrial Organization, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9803004, Mar.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809003, Sep.
• Feltovich, N. & Harbaugh, R. & To, T., 1998, "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Counter signaling," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 518.
• Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 1998, "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), number FS IV 98-13, Sep.
• Kin Chung Lo, 1998, "Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs," Working Papers, York University, Department of Economics, number 1998_02, Aug.
• Dilger, Alexander, 1998, "The absent-minded prisoner," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics, number 14/1998.
• Stähler, Frank & Wagner, Friedrich, 1998, "Cooperation in a resource extraction game," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 846.
• Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 1998, "Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,68.
• Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel, 1998, "Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,72.
• Burda, Michael C. & Güth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Uhlig, Harald, 1998, "Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,74.
• Bräuer, Wolfgang, 1998, "Electoral Competition under Media Influence," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 98-19.
• Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998, "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 1, pages 180-197, March.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 3, pages 643-651, June.
• Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 4, pages 834-847, September.
• Feltovich, Nick & Harbaugh, Rick & To, Ted, , "Too Cool For School? A Theory Of Countersignaling," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 268800, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268800.
• KONINGS, Jozef & VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke & VEUGELERS, Reinhilde, 1998, "Union wage bargaining and European antidumping policy in imperfectly competitive markets," SESO Working Papers, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics, number 1998003, Mar.
• Battalio,R. & Samuelson,L. & Huyck,J. van, 1998, "Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 2.
• Brandts, J. & Sola, C., 1998, "Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 425.98.
• Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017, "Single peakedness and coalition proofness," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 290, Apr.
• Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-1, revised Jan 1998.
• Max Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 1998, "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-5, revised 10 Aug 1998.
• Golan, Amos & Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1998, "Estimating a Mixed Strategy: United and American Airlines," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, number qt2f36z7n1, Jun.
• Golan, Amos & Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1998, "Estimating a Mixed Strategy: United and American Airlines," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley, number qt2f36z7n1, Jun.
• Manfred J. Holler & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 1998, "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 159.
• Sylvie Thoron, 1998, "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 1, pages 63-76, February.
• Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998, "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 5, pages 1101-1117, November.
• SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Loss aversion in repeated games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998014, Feb.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998017, Feb.
• GOSSNER, Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas, 1998, "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998023, Apr.
• HERINGS, P. J.-J. & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1998, "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998029, May.
• GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998, "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998035, Jun.
• GABSZEWICZ, Jean & GRAZZINI, Lisa, 1998, "Taxing market power," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998048, Sep.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1998, "Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in Dynamic Limit Order Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1817, Mar.
• Konings, Jozef & Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1998, "Union Wage Bargaining and European Antidumping Policy in Imperfectly Competitive Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1860, Apr.
• Bester, Helmut & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998, "Strategic Pricing, Signalling and Costly Information Acquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2032, Dec.
• Brams, S.J., 1998, "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-11.
• Kockesen, L. & Ok, E.A. & Sethi, R., 1998, "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-19.
• P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1998, "The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1173, Mar.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 66, issue 6, pages 1353-1388, November.
• Flam, Sjur Didrik, 1998, "Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 6, pages 833-848, June.

1997

• Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1997, "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research, number 275627, Nov, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275627.
• Lipman, Barton & Wang, Ruqu, 1997, "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273389, Sep, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273389.
• Prokop, Jacek & Wang, Ruqu, 1997, "Strategic Buybacks of Sovereign Debt," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273391, Sep, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273391.
• Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997, "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9729r.
• Rocher, F. & Vila, X., 1997, "A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 398.97.
• S. Albaek & L. Lambertini, 1997, "Price Vs Quantity in Duopoly Supergames With Close Substitutes," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number 303, Oct.
• Rajiv Vohra, 1997, "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Emons, Winand, 1997, "Credence Goods Monopolists," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, number qt9c5508x4, Jan.
• Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura & Harutaka Takahashi, 1997, "Comparing Open-Loop with Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-22, Apr.
• David K Levine, 1997, "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 2047, Oct.
• Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag, 1997, "Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 598, May.
• HERINGS, Jean - Jacques & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 1997, "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997002, Jan.
• SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Loss aversion equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997023, Mar.
• AMIR, Rabah & WOODERS, John, 1997, "One-way spillovers, endogenous innovator/imitator roles and research joint ventures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997027, Apr.
• ALBANO, Gian Luigi & LIZZERI, Alessandro, 1997, "A monopolistic market for certification," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997037, May.
• CODOGNATO, Giulio, 1997, "Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets: a comparison between two models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997066, Sep.
• SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Loss aversion equilibrium revised," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997074, Oct.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997077, Oct.
• GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997, "Comparison of information structures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997091, Dec.
• Pauwels, Wilfried & Vandenbussche, Hylke & Weverbergh, Marcel, 1997, "Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1565, Feb.
• Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997, "Secret information acquisition in cournot markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 6062, Sep.
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