Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

1999

• Barth, James R. & Caprio Jr., Gerard & Levine, Ross, 1999, "Financial regulation and performance : cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2037, Jan.
• Collier, Paul & Dollar, David, 1999, "Aid allocation and poverty reduction," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2041, Jan.
• Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 1999, "ɇ‘Èž ĸ­Ä»‹Ä¸Žç» Ƶžå¢Žé•¿Ï¼Šå› Æžœå…³Ç³»Ä¸Žåžÿå›," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2059, Feb.
• Ravallion, Martin, 1999, "Is more targeting consistent with less spending?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2079, Mar.
• Basu, Kaushik & Bell, Clive & Bose, Pinaki, 1999, "Interlinkage, limited liability, and strategic interaction," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 2134, Jun.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1999," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 10, pages 681-682, October.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. IV. Quartal 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 1, pages 23-26, January.
• Michael Peneder & Michael Pfaffermayr, 1999, "Selbstfinanzierungskraft und Kapitalausstattung im internationalen Vergleich. Cash-flow und Eigenkapital der österreichischen Sachgütererzeugung im Jahr 1998," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 3, pages 177-186, March.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. I. Quartal 1999," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 4, pages 245-248, April.
• Angelina Keil, 1999, "Wirtschaftschronik. II. Quartal 1999," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 72, issue 7, pages 467-469, July.
• Rami Zwick & Xiao-Ping Chen, 1999, "What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902002, Feb.
• Rami Zwick & Ching Chyi Lee, 1999, "Bargaining and Search: An Experimental Study," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902003, Feb.
• Rami Zwick & Amnon Rapoport, 1999, "Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9903001, Mar.
• Rami Zwick & Eythan Weg & Amnon Rapoport, 1999, "Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9903002, Mar.
• Tilman Slembeck, 1999, "Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9905001, May.
• Tilman Slembeck, 1999, "Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining - Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game With Fixed Opponents," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9905002, May.
• Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 1999, "To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9906002, Jun.
• Andreas Krause, 1999, "Implicit Collusion in Dealer Markets with Different Costs of Market Making," Finance, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9903002, Mar.
• Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 1999, "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9901003, Jan, revised 03 Jun 1999.
• Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1999, "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902001, Feb.
• Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999, "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902003, Feb.
• Dov Samet, 1999, "Bayesianism without Learning," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9902004, Feb.
• Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 1999, "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9903001, Mar, revised 12 Mar 1999.
• Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1999, "Are "Anti-Folk Theorems" in Repeated Games Nongeneric?," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9906001, Jun, revised 03 Jun 1999.
• Eric Rasmusen, 1999, "The Games and Information Reader, Table of Contents," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9907002, Jul.
• Eric Rasmusen, 1999, "The Games and Information Reader, Preface," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9907003, Jul.
• Eric Rasmusen & Timothy Perri, 1999, "Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality When Buyers do not Know the Sellers' Cost?," Industrial Organization, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9907002, Jul.
• Eric Rasmusen, 1999, "ames and Information, Third Edition, Preface," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9907004, Jul.
• Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1999, "To Help or not to Help: The Samaritan's Dilemma Revisited," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 99-09.
• Schmidtchen, Dieter & Kirstein, Roland, 1999, "Ordnung," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 99-10.
• Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 1999, "To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,38.
• Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jörg & Normann, Hans-Theo, 1999, "Through trial & error to collusion," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1999,57.
• Hornig, Stephan O., 1999, "Informationsaustausch und trotzdem Wettbewerb? Unternehmensverhalten bei Nachfrageunsicherheit," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics, number 160.
• Anderton, Charles H., 1999, "Appropriation possibilities in a simple exchange economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 63, issue 1, pages 77-83, April.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1999, "Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order market1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, volume 2, issue 2, pages 99-134, May.
• McLennan, Andrew & Park, In-Uck, 1999, "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 1, pages 111-130, January.
• Hopkins, Ed, 1999, "Learning, Matching, and Aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 1, pages 79-110, January.
• Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 26, issue 2, pages 286-336, January.
• Anderlini, Luca, 1999, "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 1, pages 1-37, April.
• Gomes, Armando & Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1999, "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 2, pages 204-228, May.
• van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1999, "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 28, issue 1, pages 105-129, July.
• Voorneveld, Mark & Vermeulen, Dries & Borm, Peter, 1999, "Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 28, issue 1, pages 146-154, July.
• Lo, Kin Chung, 1999, "Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 28, issue 2, pages 256-270, August.
• Hopkins, Ed, 1999, "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 29, issue 1-2, pages 138-150, October.
• McLaren, John, 1999, "Supplier relations and the market context: A theory of handshakes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 1, pages 121-138, June.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1999, "Simultaneous evolution of learning rules and strategies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 40, issue 3, pages 295-312, November.
• Datta, Manjira & Mirman, Leonard J., 1999, "Externalities, Market Power, and Resource Extraction," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 37, issue 3, pages 233-255, May.
• Vohra, Rajiv, 1999, "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 86, issue 1, pages 123-147, May.
• Cabrales, Antonio, 1999, "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 86, issue 2, pages 159-184, June.
• Brusco, Sandro & Jackson, Matthew O., 1999, "The Optimal Design of a Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 88, issue 1, pages 1-39, September.
• Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999, "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 88, issue 1, pages 119-160, September.
• Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999, "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 89, issue 1, pages 127-139, November.
• Schlag, Karl H., 1999, "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 31, issue 4, pages 493-522, May.
• Samet, Dov, 1999, "Bayesianism without learning," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 53, issue 2, pages 227-242, June.
• Clarke, George R. G. & Cull, Robert, 1999, "Why Privatize? The Case of Argentina's Public Provincial Banks," World Development, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 5, pages 865-886, May.
• Roberts, Kevin, 1999, "Dynamic voting in clubs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 19349, Jan.
• O. Gossner, 1999, "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 99-07.
• Rehme, Gunther, 1999, "Why are the data at odds with theory? : growth and (re-)distributive policies in integrated economies," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number ECO 1999/43.
• Rehme, G., 1999, "Why are the Data at Odds with Theory? Growth and (Re-)Distributive Policies in Integrated Economies," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco99/43.
• Hindriks, J., 1999, "Mobility and Redistributive Politics," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9915.
• Yvan Lengwiler & Athanasios Orphanides, 1999, "Optimal discretion," Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 1999-42.
• Mondello, G. & Soubeyran, A., 1999, "Liability, Competition and Environmental Risk: Identical Agents, Different Behaviors," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99a01.
• Thoron, S., 1999, "Market Organization: Noocooperative Models of Coalition Formation," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 99a30.
• Grant, S. & Kajii, A. & Polak, B., 1999, "Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 375.
• Kaarboe, O.M. & Tieman, A.F., 1999, "Equilibrium Selection under Different Learning Modes in Supermodular Games," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 1299.
• Flam, S.D., 1999, "Learning Equilibrium Play: a Myopic Approach," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 189.
• Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 1999, ""Do Norms Against Threats have Real Effects? Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict"," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences, number 98-99-11.
• Jacobsen, H.J. & Jensen, M. & Sloth, B., 1999, "Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games," Papers, Carleton - School of Public Administration, number 99-01.
• Berganza, J.C., 1999, "Is It Welfare Improving to Insulate Monetary Policy from the Political Arena?," Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-, number 9902.
• Holler, M.J. & Wickstrom, B.-A., 1999, "The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre, University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics, number 105.
• McLennan, A., 1999, "The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game," Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research, number 306.
• Davila, J., 1999, "The Connection Between Correlated and Sunspot Equilibria Revisited," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1999.78.
• Spiegler, R., 1999, "Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Extensive Form Games," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 19-99.
• Perez-Castrillo, D. & Wettstein, D., 1999, "Bidding for the Surplus: a Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value. ation," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 24-99.
• Voorneveld, M. & Grahn, S. & Dufwenberg, M., 1999, "Ideal Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Multicriteria Games," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1999:19.
• Westermark, A., 1999, "Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1999:9.
• Grant, S. & Kajii, A. & Polak, B., 1999, "Third Down with a Yard to Go: The Dixit-Skeath Conundrum on Equilibria in Competitive Games," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, number 1999-375, Jul.
• Bruno S. Frey & Iris Bohnet, 1999, "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 1, pages 335-339, March.
• Kevin McCabe & Elizabeth Hoffman & Vernon L. Smith, 1999, "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 1, pages 340-341, March.
• C. Monica Capra, 1999, "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 3, pages 678-690, June.
• Onsong Shin & Michael R. Baye, 1999, "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 3, pages 691-693, June.
• Avinash Dixit, 1999, "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 89, issue 3, pages 694-694, June.
• Roger B. Myerson, 1999, "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, volume 37, issue 3, pages 1067-1082, September.
• Mittenzwei, Klaus & Bullock, David S., 1999, "Government Vs. Anarchy: Modeling The Evolution Of Institutions," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association), number 21496, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21496.
• Bergin, James & Bernhardt, Dan, 1999, "Comparative Dynamics," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273409, Feb, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273409.
• Sandholm,W.H., 1999, "Potential games with continuous player sets," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 23.
• Sandholm,W.H., 1999, "Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 38.
• Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura & Harutaka Takahashi, 1999, "Comparing Open-loop With Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, volume 50, issue 4, pages 457-469, December.
• Jean J. Gabszewicz & Lisa Grazzini, 1999, "Taxing Market Power," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, volume 1, issue 4, pages 475-497, October, DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00022.
• G. Bellettini & G. Ottaviano, 1999, "Special Interests and Technological change," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number 340, Feb.
• L. Lambertini & D. Sasaki, 1999, "A Cost-side Analysis on Collusive Sustainability," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number 355, Sep.
• Spagnolo, G., 1999, "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 9914, Mar.
• Charness, Gary B, 1998, "Pre-Play Communications And Credibility: A Test Of Aumann'S Conjecture," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara, number qt01j786tj, Sep.
• Kevin Roberts, 1999, "Dynamic Voting in Clubs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 367, Jan.
• Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine & Norman Loayza, 1999, "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile, Central Bank of Chile, number 56, Dec.
• Eric Van Damme & Jorgen W Weibull, 1999, "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 2113, Oct.
• Arya, A. & Glover, J. & Rajan, U., 1999, "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, number 1999-8.
• KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas C., 1999, "A remark on the number of trading posts in strategic market games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999005, Jan.
• GHIRARDATO, Paolo & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999, "Choquet rationality," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999012, Feb.
• KOUTSOUGERAS, Leonidas, 1999, "Market games with multiple trading posts," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999018, Mar.
• MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 1999, "Coalitional negotiation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999020, Mar.
• DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1999, "A remark on voters’ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999027, May.
• DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999, "Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999030, May.
• DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999, "Two examples of strategic equilibria in approval voting games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999031, May.
• AMIR, Rabah & LAMBSON, Val, 1999, "On the effects of entry in Cournot markets," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999059, Nov.
• DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999, "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1999060, Nov.
• Widgren, Mika, 1999, "Flexible Integration as an Efficient Decision-Making Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2207, Aug.
• Colombo, Emilio, 1999, "Restructuring as a Signal: A Simple Formalization," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2227, Sep.
• Wambach, Achim & Inderst, Roman, 1999, "Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 2269, Oct.
• Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 1999, "Market Integration, Matching and Wages," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, number 79, Apr.
• Paul Beaudry & Pierre Cahuc & Hubert Kempf, 1999, "Is it Harmful to Allow partial Cooperation ?," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 99-39.
• Perea, Andrés & Jansen, Mathijis & Vermeulen, Dries, 1999, "Player splitting in estensive forms games," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 6150, Jun.
• Arnsperger, Christian & Varoufakis, Yannis, 1999, "Beyond Altruism, Duty or Collusion. Introducting Solidarity into Economics," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1999030, Jan.
• Francis de MOROGUES, 1999, "Jeux stratégiques de marché dans le modèle à générations imbriquées, le modèle “achat ou vente”," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1999032, Sep.
• Nicolas EBER & Jacques THÉPOT, 1999, "Doping in Sport and Competition Design," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1999044, Dec.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999, "Experimentation in Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1214, Apr.
• Joel Watson, 1999, "Starting Small and Commitment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1217, May.
• Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik, 1999, "Toward a Theory of Reinsurance and Retrocession," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1227, Jun.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1999, "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1237, Oct.
• Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy, 1999, "Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 67, issue 4, pages 909-912, July.
• Ahmed Anwar, 1999, "When does immigration facilitate efficiency?," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 40, Mar.
• Ed Hopkins, 1999, "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 42, Oct, revised Dec 2000.
• Ed Hopkins & Robert M Seymour, 1999, "The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 45, Apr, revised Dec 2000.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1999, "Are the poor less well insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 58, issue 1, pages 61-81, February.
• Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999, "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers, Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics, number 154, Jan.
• James Bergin & Dan Bernhardt, 1999, "Comparative Dynamics," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 981, Feb.
• Mario Gilli, 1999, "Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 2, issue 2, pages 472-485, April, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0047.
• Amedeo Panci, 1999, "Multiple equilibria: coordination failure and endogenous cycle," Working Papers in Public Economics, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, number 30, Jun.
• Massimo Giannini, 1999, "Education and Job market signalling: How robust is the nexus?," Working Papers in Public Economics, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, number 35, Jan.
• Emanuele Giovannetti, 1999, "Perpetual leapfrogging in Bertrand duopoly," Working Papers in Public Economics, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, number 37, Nov.
• Rami Zwick & Ching Chyi Lee, 1999, "Bargaining and Search: An Experimental Study," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, volume 8, issue 6, pages 463-487, November, DOI: 10.1023/A:1008616514620.
• Ebbe Groes & Hans JÛrgen Jacobsen & Birgitte Sloth, 1999, "Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 1, pages 125-142.
• Ted To, 1999, "Risk and evolution," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 2, pages 329-343.
• Youngse Kim, 1999, "Satisficing and optimality in 2þ2 common interest games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 2, pages 365-375.
• S. Ghosal & H. M. Polemarchakis, 1999, "Exchange and optimality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 3, pages 629-642.
• Steven R. Williams, 1999, "A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 1, pages 155-180.
• Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1999, "Externalities, expectations, and growth," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 1, pages 203-218.
• Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1999, "Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 2, pages 353-371.
• Kin Chung Lo, 1999, "Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 3, pages 621-633.
• Aner Sela, 1999, "Fictitious play in `one-against-all' multi-player games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 3, pages 635-651.
• Yasuhito Tanaka, 1999, "Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 14, issue 3, pages 705-715.
• Rosemarie Nagel & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1999, "An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 9, issue 1, pages 27-65.
• Cheng-Zhong Qin & Burkhard Hehenkamp & Charles Stuart, 1999, "Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 9, issue 2, pages 211-224.
• Burkhard Hehenkamp & Wolfgang Leininger, 1999, "A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 9, issue 3, pages 367-371.
• Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999, "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 28, issue 1, pages 53-68.
• Aner Sela & Dorothea Herreiner, 1999, "Fictitious play in coordination games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 28, issue 2, pages 189-197.
• Naoki Yoshihara, 1999, "Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 2, pages 127-151.
• Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg, 1999, "A note on van Damme's mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 2, pages 179-187.
• Liqun Liu & Guoqiang Tian, 1999, "A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 3, pages 205-218.
• Ezra Einy & David Wettstein, 1999, "A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 3, pages 219-230.
• Peter Sudhölter & Bezalel Peleg, 1999, "Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 4, pages 381-387.
• Theo Offerman & Jan PottersHarry A.A. Verbon & Harry A.A. Verbon, 1999, "Cooperation in an Overlapping Generations Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 99-019/1, Mar.
• Ronald Bosman & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 1999, "The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 99-039/1, Jun.
• Oddvar M. Kaarboe & Alexander F. Tieman, 1999, "Equilibrium Selection under Different Learning Modes in Supermodular Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 99-061/1, Aug.
• Gerard J. van den Berg, 1999, "Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labor Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogeneous Production Technologies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 99-085/3, Nov.
• Montero, M.P., 1999, "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-121.
• van Damme, E.E.C., 1999, "The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-77.
• Koutsougeras, L., 1999, "Market Games with Multiple Trading Posts," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-40.
• Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Potters, J.A.M., 1999, "Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-46.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1999, "Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-122.
• van den Broek, W.A., 1999, "Moving Horizon Control in Dynamic Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-07.
• Gilles, R.P. & Owen, G., 1999, "Cooperative Games and Disjunctive Permission Structures," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-20.
• Slikker, M., 1999, "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-83.
• Peeters, R.J.A.P. & Potters, J.A.M., 1999, "On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-45.
• Possajennikov, A., 1999, "On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-56.
• Koster, M.A.L. & Reijnierse, J.H. & Voorneveld, M., 1999, "Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Public Projects," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-88.
• Possajennikov, A., 1999, "Optimality of Imitative Behavior in Cournot Oligopoly," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-02.
• Droste, E.J.R., 1999, "Habit Formation and the Evolution of Social Communication Networks," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-50.