Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

1998

• Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1998, "Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?," Industrial Organization, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9803004, Mar.
• Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9809003, Sep.
• Feltovich, N. & Harbaugh, R. & To, T., 1998, "Too Cool for School? A Theory of Counter signaling," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 518.
• Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 1998, "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), number FS IV 98-13, Sep.
• Kin Chung Lo, 1998, "Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of epsilon-Contaminated Beliefs," Working Papers, York University, Department of Economics, number 1998_02, Aug.
• Dilger, Alexander, 1998, "The absent-minded prisoner," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics, number 14/1998.
• Stähler, Frank & Wagner, Friedrich, 1998, "Cooperation in a resource extraction game," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 846.
• Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 1998, "Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,68.
• Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut & Peleg, Bezalel, 1998, "Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,72.
• Burda, Michael C. & Güth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Uhlig, Harald, 1998, "Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions: Experimental evidence," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,74.
• Bräuer, Wolfgang, 1998, "Electoral Competition under Media Influence," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 98-19.
• Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998, "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 1, pages 180-197, March.
• Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998, "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 3, pages 643-651, June.
• Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 88, issue 4, pages 834-847, September.
• Feltovich, Nick & Harbaugh, Rick & To, Ted, , "Too Cool For School? A Theory Of Countersignaling," Economic Research Papers, University of Warwick - Department of Economics, number 268800, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268800.
• KONINGS, Jozef & VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke & VEUGELERS, Reinhilde, 1998, "Union wage bargaining and European antidumping policy in imperfectly competitive markets," SESO Working Papers, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics, number 1998003, Mar.
• Battalio,R. & Samuelson,L. & Huyck,J. van, 1998, "Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 2.
• Brandts, J. & Sola, C., 1998, "Reference Points and Negative Reciprocity in Simple Sequential Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 425.98.
• Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017, "Single peakedness and coalition proofness," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University, number 290, Apr.
• Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-1, revised Jan 1998.
• Max Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 1998, "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-5, revised 10 Aug 1998.
• Golan, Amos & Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1998, "Estimating a Mixed Strategy: United and American Airlines," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, number qt2f36z7n1, Jun.
• Golan, Amos & Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1998, "Estimating a Mixed Strategy: United and American Airlines," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley, number qt2f36z7n1, Jun.
• Manfred J. Holler & Bengt-Arne Wickström, 1998, "The Scandal Matrix: The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 159.
• Sylvie Thoron, 1998, "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 1, pages 63-76, February.
• Ross Cressman & Jean-Francois Wen & William Morrison, 1998, "On the Evolutionary Dynamics of Crime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 31, issue 5, pages 1101-1117, November.
• SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Loss aversion in repeated games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998014, Feb.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998, "Profit maximizing in auctions of public goods," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998017, Feb.
• GOSSNER, Olivier & VIEILLE, Nicolas, 1998, "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998023, Apr.
• HERINGS, P. J.-J. & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1998, "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998029, May.
• GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998, "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998035, Jun.
• GABSZEWICZ, Jean & GRAZZINI, Lisa, 1998, "Taxing market power," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1998048, Sep.
• Foucault, Thierry, 1998, "Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in Dynamic Limit Order Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1817, Mar.
• Konings, Jozef & Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde, 1998, "Union Wage Bargaining and European Antidumping Policy in Imperfectly Competitive Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1860, Apr.
• Bester, Helmut & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1998, "Strategic Pricing, Signalling and Costly Information Acquisition," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 2032, Dec.
• Brams, S.J., 1998, "To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-11.
• Kockesen, L. & Ok, E.A. & Sethi, R., 1998, "Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-19.
• P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1998, "The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1173, Mar.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1998, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 66, issue 6, pages 1353-1388, November.
• Flam, Sjur Didrik, 1998, "Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 6, pages 833-848, June.

1997

• Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1997, "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research, number 275627, Nov, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275627.
• Lipman, Barton & Wang, Ruqu, 1997, "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273389, Sep, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273389.
• Prokop, Jacek & Wang, Ruqu, 1997, "Strategic Buybacks of Sovereign Debt," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers, Queen's University - Department of Economics, number 273391, Sep, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273391.
• Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997, "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9729r.
• Rocher, F. & Vila, X., 1997, "A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 398.97.
• S. Albaek & L. Lambertini, 1997, "Price Vs Quantity in Duopoly Supergames With Close Substitutes," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number 303, Oct.
• Rajiv Vohra, 1997, "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Emons, Winand, 1997, "Credence Goods Monopolists," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, number qt9c5508x4, Jan.
• Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura & Harutaka Takahashi, 1997, "Comparing Open-Loop with Markov Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO, number 97s-22, Apr.
• David K Levine, 1997, "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 2047, Oct.
• Jörg Oechssler & Karl H Schlag, 1997, "Loss of Commitment? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell’s Example," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 598, May.
• HERINGS, Jean - Jacques & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 1997, "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997002, Jan.
• SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Loss aversion equilibrium," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997023, Mar.
• AMIR, Rabah & WOODERS, John, 1997, "One-way spillovers, endogenous innovator/imitator roles and research joint ventures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997027, Apr.
• ALBANO, Gian Luigi & LIZZERI, Alessandro, 1997, "A monopolistic market for certification," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997037, May.
• CODOGNATO, Giulio, 1997, "Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets: a comparison between two models," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997066, Sep.
• SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Loss aversion equilibrium revised," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997074, Oct.
• ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997, "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997077, Oct.
• GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997, "Comparison of information structures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1997091, Dec.
• Pauwels, Wilfried & Vandenbussche, Hylke & Weverbergh, Marcel, 1997, "Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1565, Feb.
• Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997, "Secret information acquisition in cournot markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 6062, Sep.
• Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv & Kockesen, Levent, 1997, "Interdependent Preference Formation," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-18.
• Brams, Steven J. & Jones, Christopher B., 1997, "Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games : Cycling, Frustration, and Power," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-23.
• Orrison, Alannah & Schotter, Andrew & Weigelt, Keith, 1997, "On the Design of Optimal Organizations Using Tournaments: An Experimental Examination," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-26.
• Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 1997, "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 97-34.
• Rehme, Günther, 1997, "Economic growth, (re-)distributive policies, capital mobility and tax competition in open economies," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL), Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL), number 6201.
• Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997, "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 65, issue 4, pages 875-912, July.
• Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997, "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 65, issue 6, pages 1467-1478, November.
• Ed Hopkins, 1997, "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 3, Mar.
• Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Feyzioglu, Tarhan N., 1997, "Is demand for polluting goods manageable? An econometric study of car ownership and use in Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 53, issue 2, pages 423-445, August.
• Mody, Ashoka & Yilmaz, Kamil, 1997, "Is there persistence in the growth of manufactured exports? Evidence from newly industrializing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 53, issue 2, pages 447-470, August.
• J.J. Laffont & D. Martimort, 1997, "Collusion under asymmetric information
  [[Collusion en information asymétrique]]," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02686625.
• Charles Anderton & John Carter, 1996, "An Experimental Test of a Predator-Prey Model of Conflict," Working Papers, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, number 9603, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00165-7.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 1997, "Conventions and Transaction Costs," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 153, Jan.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 1997, "Network Externality and Convention," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 154, Jan.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 1997, "Rationality, Transparency, and Evolutionary Selection," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 167, Apr.
• Ganslandt, Mattias, 1997, "Multi-Market Competition and Coordination in Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 484, Jan.
• Ganslandt, Mattias & Carlsson, Hans, 1997, "Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 485, Jul.
• Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997, "Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 489, Oct.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 1997, "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1997:28, Nov.
• Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 1997, "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and Research Joint Ventures," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 43, May.
• Kosfeld, Michael, 1997, "Corruption within a Cooperative Society," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 48, Jul.
• Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1997, "A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 5130, Jan.
• Ana B. Ania & Carlos Alós Ferrer & Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997, "From Walrasian oligopolies to natural monopolyan: An evolutionary model of market structure," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 1997-24, Dec.
• Ussif Sumaila, 1997, "Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 10, issue 2, pages 147-165, September, DOI: 10.1023/A:1026459309123.
• Yvan Lengwiler, 1997, "A model of money counterfeits," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 65, issue 2, pages 123-132, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01226930.
• Walter Elberfeld, 1997, "Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in 2×2 matrix games," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 65, issue 3, pages 279-290, October, DOI: 10.1007/BF01226846.
• Hans-Theo Normann, 1997, "Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 177-187, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01234405.
• Cremer, Helmuth & De Rycke, Marc & Grimaud, Andre, 1997, "Service Quality, Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 11, issue 1, pages 5-19, January.
• Youngse Kim, 1997, "Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 13, issue 2, pages 23-38.
• Sang Chul Suh, 1997, "Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 13, issue 2, pages 39-50.
• Peter Lyk-Jensen, 1997, "How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals are Affiliated," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-05, Feb.
• Luca Lambertini, 1997, "Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-08, May.
• Dan Sasaki, 1997, "Strategic Information Acquisition," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 97-07, Jun.
• Dan Sasaki, 1997, "Ignorance as a Commitment Device," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 97-08, Jun.
• Tone Dieckmann, 1997, "The Evolution of conventions with Mobile Players," Economics Department Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth, number n720897, Aug.
• Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1997, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University, number 1997-02, Feb.
• Paul E. Fischer & John S. Hughes, 1997, "Mutual Monitoring and Best Agency Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 153, issue 2, pages 334-334, June.
• Bardsley, P., 1997, "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 548.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 97-11.
• Robert Gibbons, 1997, "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory," NBER Technical Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 0199, Jul.
• Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 1997, "Auction Theory: A Summary with Applications to Treasury Markets," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5873, Jan.
• Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1997, "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 005.
• Mukerji, S. & Song Shin, H., 1997, "Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 137.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997, "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1184R, Mar.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Sandro Brusco, 1997, "The Optimal Design of a Market," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1186, Apr.
• Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 1997, "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1190, Jul.
• William H. Sandholm, 1997, "An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1198, Apr.
• Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997, "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199527, Feb.
• Van Kolpin & Larry Singell Jr., 1997, "Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 175-184.
• Diana Richards, 1997, "The geometry of inductive reasoning in games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 185-193.
• Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 1997, "Competition between asymmetrically informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 227-240.
• Ed Nosal, 1997, "Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 3, pages 413-435.
• Cheng-Zhong Qin & Charles Stuart, 1997, "Bertrand versus Cournot revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 3, pages 497-507.
• Ko Nishihara, 1997, "A resolution of N -person prisoners' dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 3, pages 531-540.
• P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1997, "Endogenously determined price rigidities (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 3, pages 471-498.
• Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997, "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 3, pages 551-556.
• Tony Curzon Price, 1997, "Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 219-254.
• Gis, le Umbhauer, 1997, "Forward induction, evolutionary processes and behavior evolution," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 4, pages 415-433.
• Frank H. Page Jr., 1997, "Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-13.
• Hiroaki Osana, 1997, "Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 1, pages 57-74.
• John Wooders, 1997, "Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 1, pages 75-89.
• G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997, "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 259-294.
• Ferenc Szidarovszky & Koji Okuguchi, 1997, "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Springer Books, Springer, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_16.
• Maarten C.W. Janssen & Emiel Maasland, 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 97-073/1, Jul.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997, "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-12.
• Herings, P.J.J. & Vannetelbosch, V., 1997, "Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-03.
• Slikker, M. & van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M., 1997, "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-23.
• Herings, P.J.J., 1997, "Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-77.
• Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997, "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-91.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Fast Learning in Organizations," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-65.
• Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-106.
• Possajennikov, A., 1997, "An Analysis of a Simple Reinforcement Dynamics : Learning to Play an "Egalitarian" Equilibrium," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-19.
• Brennan, G. & Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1997, "Trust in the Shadow of the Courts," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-89.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-66.
• Voorneveld, M. & Vermeulen, D. & Borm, P.E.M., 1997, "Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games," Research Memorandum, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 749.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997, "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 5e16a5c7-9a69-467f-b00a-6.
• Herings, P.J.J. & Vannetelbosch, V., 1997, "Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 7dc795b0-6250-4c14-828a-d.
• Herings, P.J.J., 1997, "Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number aa81d194-cfe2-4200-8360-e.
• Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997, "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b6a104d7-d4ad-4061-abbf-3.
• Voorneveld, M. & Norde, H.W., 1997, "A characterisation of ordinal potential games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b7112a05-1878-4d36-beb3-f.
• Voorneveld, M. & Vermeulen, D. & Borm, P.E.M., 1997, "Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b8ab2101-f3bb-4a0d-96ee-3.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Fast Learning in Organizations," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number c8a457fb-87c8-44ff-91b6-5.
• Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number cb1945aa-057b-48d0-aad2-5.
• Brennan, G. & Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1997, "Trust in the Shadow of the Courts," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number e910a5d9-5939-4d45-b940-9.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number ee9c6bea-a302-4b6c-8566-0.
• Serrano, Roberto, 1997, "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 55, issue 2, pages 203-208, August.
• Dufwenberg, Martin, 1997, "Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 57, issue 1, pages 45-50, November.
• Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997, "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 1, pages 1-35, January.
• Harrison, Glenn W. & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Tarr, David G., 1997, "Economic implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 3-5, pages 861-870, April.
• Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997, "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 1, pages 55-72, January.
• Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 2, pages 193-218, February.
• Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997, "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 2, pages 219-245, February.
• Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997, "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 1, pages 97-132, April.
• Evans, Robert, 1997, "Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 2, pages 211-220, May.
• Voorneveld, Mark & Norde, Henk, 1997, "A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 2, pages 235-242, May.
• Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997, "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 17, issue 4, pages 509-520, December.
• Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 73, issue 1, pages 118-156, March.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 388-406, August.
• Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997, "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 1-14, November.
• Lambertini, Luca, 1997, "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 181-191, November.
• Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997, "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 3, pages 325-345, April.
• Ng, Francis & Yeats, Alexander, 1997, "Open economies work better! did Africa's protectionist policies cause its marginalization in world trade?," World Development, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 6, pages 889-904, June.
• Rehme, Gunther, 1997, "Economic growth, (re-)distributive policies, capital mobility and tax competition in open economies," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number ECO 1997/24.
• Rehme, G., 1997, "Economic Growth, (Re-)Distributive Policies, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition in Open Economies," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/24.