Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2016

• Seung Han Yoo, 2016, "Signaling with Two Correlated Characteristics," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1605.
• Giuseppe Attanasi & Pierpaolo Battigalli & Elena Manzoni, 2016, "Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 62, issue 3, pages 648-667, March, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2154.
• Jared Rubin & Roman Sheremeta, 2016, "Principal–Agent Settings with Random Shocks," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 62, issue 4, pages 985-999, April, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2177.
• Alexander W. Cappelen & Bjørn-Atle Reme & Erik Ø. Sørensen & Bertil Tungodden, 2016, "Leadership and Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 62, issue 7, pages 1944-1953, July, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2225.
• Dietmar Fehr & Matthias Sutter, 2016, "Gossip and the efficiency of interactions," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2016-03, Feb.
• Banda-Ortiz, Humberto, 2016, "Modelo de Hotelling Aplicado a los Factores en México," Panorama Económico, Escuela Superior de Economía, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, volume 0, issue 22, pages 105-127, primer se.
• Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2016, "Public good agreements under the weakest-link technology," Working Papers, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC, number 1602, Mar.
• Joana Pais & José Pedro Pontes, 2016, "Modes of infrastructure financing and the ‘Big Push’ in development economics," Working Papers Department of Economics, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa, number 2016/01, Jan.
• Holford, Angus J., 2016, "Do Parents Tax Their Children? Teenage Labour Supply and Financial Support," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 10040, Jul.
• Afridi, Farzana & Dhillon, Amrita & Solan, Eilon, 2016, "Exposing Corruption: Can Electoral Competition Discipline Politicians?," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 10396, Nov.
• Bosworth, Steven J. & Singer, Tania & Snower, Dennis J., 2016, "Cooperation, Motivation and Social Balance," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 9703, Feb.
• Fehr, Dietmar & Sutter, Matthias, 2016, "Gossip and the Efficiency of Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 9704, Feb.
• Houy, Nicolas & Nicolaï, Jean-Philippe & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2016, "Doing Your Best When Stakes Are High? Theory and Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 9766, Feb.
• Alex Barrachina, 2016, "Entry under an information-gathering monopoly," Working Papers, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain), number 2016/09.
• Alex Barrachina & Eduardo Jiménez-Fernández, 2016, "Intertemporal strategic investment-consumption model: An example," Working Papers, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain), number 2016/13.
• Alex Barrachina & Víctor González-Chordá, 2016, "To report or not to report: Applying game theory to nursing error reporting," Working Papers, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain), number 2016/14.
• Aleksandr Yakovlevich Rubinstein, 2016, "Theory Of Patronized Goods. Liberal Evolution Of Paternalism," International Journal of Entrepreneurial Knowledge, Center for International Scientific Research of VSO and VSPP, volume 4, issue 1, pages 6-29, June.
• Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2016, "On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 1, issue 1, pages 83-107, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003.
• Philipp Külpmann & Davit Khantadze, 2016, "Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment," 2016 Papers, Job Market Papers, number pkl168, Nov.
• Serhiy Kandul & Oliver Kirchkamp, 2016, "Do I care if others lie? Current and future effects of delegation of lying," Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, number 2016-011, May.
• Tobias Regner, 2017, "Reciprocity under moral wiggle room: is it a preference or a constraint?," Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, number 2016-024, Jan.
• Carsten Vogt, 2016, "Climate Coalition Formation When Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 65, issue 1, pages 33-59, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0016-4.
• Giovanna Devetag & Sibilla Guida & Luca Polonio, 2016, "An eye-tracking study of feature-based choice in one-shot games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 19, issue 1, pages 177-201, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9432-5.
• Yoshio Kamijo & Hiroki Ozono & Kazumi Shimizu, 2016, "Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 19, issue 1, pages 202-217, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9433-4.
• Giovanna Devetag & Sibilla Guida & Luca Polonio, 2016, "An eye-tracking study of feature-based choice in one-shot games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 19, issue 1, pages 177-201, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9432-5.
• Yoshio Kamijo & Hiroki Ozono & Kazumi Shimizu, 2016, "Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 19, issue 1, pages 202-217, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9433-4.
• Christoph Feldhaus & Julia Stauf, 2016, "More than words: the effects of cheap talk in a volunteer’s dilemma," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 19, issue 2, pages 342-359, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9442-3.
• Takafumi Yamakawa & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2016, "Detecting motives for cooperation in public goods experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 19, issue 2, pages 500-512, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9451-2.
• Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva & Vander Mendes Lucas, 2016, "Common labor market, attachment and spillovers in a large metropolis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, volume 23, issue 4, pages 693-715, August, DOI: 10.1007/s10797-016-9401-8.
• Kjell Hausken, 2016, "Gordon Tullock: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, volume 18, issue 2, pages 121-127, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10818-016-9218-7.
• Deby Cassill & Krista Ford & Lieu Huynh & Daniel Shiffman & S. Bradleigh Vinson, 2016, "A study on abdominal wagging in the fire ant, Solenopsis invicta, with speculation on its meaning," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, volume 18, issue 2, pages 159-167, July, DOI: 10.1007/s10818-016-9226-7.
• Federica Alberti & Edward J. Cartwright, 2016, "Full agreement and the provision of threshold public goods," Public Choice, Springer, volume 166, issue 1, pages 205-233, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0321-z.
• Pablo Amorós & M. Socorro Puy & Ricardo Martínez, 2016, "Closed primaries versus top-two primaries," Public Choice, Springer, volume 167, issue 1, pages 21-35, April, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0328-5.
• François Cochard & Hélène Couprie & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2016, "Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, volume 14, issue 1, pages 1-26, March, DOI: 10.1007/s11150-014-9276-3.
• Oksana Loginova, 2016, "Pricing Strategies in Advance Selling: Should a Retailer Offer a Pre-order Price Guarantee?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, volume 49, issue 3, pages 465-489, November, DOI: 10.1007/s11151-016-9507-2.
• Ɖura-Georg Granić & Johannes Kern, 2016, "Circulant games," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 80, issue 1, pages 43-69, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9478-4.
• Michael Melles & Rainer Nitsche, 2016, "Multiple rounds in a chain store game," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 81, issue 4, pages 571-579, November, DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9551-2.
• Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2016, "Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring," Discussion Papers, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration, number 2016-12, Jun.
• Carmen Camacho & Takashi Kamihigashi & Cagri Saglam, 2016, "Robust Comparative Statics for Non-monotone Shocks in Large Aggregative Games," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2016-02, Feb.
• Hiromasa Takahashi & Junyi Shen & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2016, "Gender-specific Reference-dependent Preferences in an Experimental Trust Game," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2016-09, Mar.
• Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2016, "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay of leave decisions," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 944, Jul.
• Nobuyuki Hanaki & Angela Sutan & Marc Willnger, 2016, "The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, number 03-16, Mar.
• Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris & Bernard Grofman, 2016, "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 135286117.
• Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2016, "Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 16.08, Apr.
• Baptiste Massenot & Maria Maraki & Christian Thoeni, 2016, "Legal compliance and litigation spending under the English and American rule: Experimental evidence," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie, number 16.19, Oct.
• Maxime MENUET, 2016, "Is a Long War Desirable ? Optimal Debt Concessions In Attrition Warfare," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans, number 2367.
• Benteng Zou, 2016, "Differential Games with (A) symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies," Journal of Reviews on Global Economics, Lifescience Global, volume 5, pages 171-179.
• Dario Debowicz & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2016, "Redistributive Politics, Power Sharing and Fairness," LIS Working papers, LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg, number 681, Oct.
• Andrej Angelovski & Daniela Di Cagno & Werner Güth & Francesca Marazzi & Luca Panaccione, 2016, "Does Heterogeneity Spoil the Basket? The Role of Productivity and Feedback Information on Public Good Provision," Working Papers CESARE, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli, number 1604, Oct.
• Zareena Begum Irfan & Jeeva Mary Jacob, 2016, "Game Theoretical Approach to Regulate the Public-Owned River Water Utilities: A case study of Cauvery River," Working Papers, Madras School of Economics,Chennai,India, number 2016-142, Mar.
• Dario Debowicz & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2016, "Redistributive Politics, Power Sharing and Fairness," Economics Discussion Paper Series, Economics, The University of Manchester, number 1604.
• Fernanda A. Ferreira, 2016, "Privatization and Optimum-Welfare in an International Cournot Duopoly," Managing Global Transitions, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, volume 14, issue 4 (Winter, pages 351-358.
• Martin G. Kocher & Dominik Matzat, 2016, "Preferences over Punishment and Reward Mechanisms in Social Dilemmas," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 172, issue 1, pages 163-194, DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14500948554072.
• Martin G. Kocher & Dominik Matzat, 2016, "Preferences over Punishment and Reward Mechanisms in Social Dilemmas," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 172, issue 1, pages 163-194, March, DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14500948554072.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2016, "Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 172, issue 2, pages 235-273, June, DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14534707121162.
• Astrid, Gamba & Luca, Stanca, 2016, "Mis-Judging Merit: The Effects of Adjudication Errors in Contests," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, number 345, Jul, revised 14 Jul 2016.
• Simone Righi & Karoly Takacs, 2016, "The Miracle of Peer Review and Development inScience: An Agent-Based Model," Center for the Analysis of Public Policies (CAPP), Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi", number 0144, Jul.
• Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wuz, 2016, "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Department of Economics, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi", number 0084, Apr.
• Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wu, 2016, "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Center for Economic Research (RECent), University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi", number 121, Apr.
• Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2016, "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 21-16, Nov.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Brian Rogers & Yves Zenou, 2016, "The Economic Consequences of Social Network Structure," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 45-16, Nov.
• Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2016, "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2016_04, Feb.
• Claudia Cerrone, 2016, "Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2016_10, Jun.
• Martin Hellwig, 2016, "A Homeomorphism Theorem for the Universal Type Space with the Uniform Topology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2016_17, Nov, revised Jul 2022.
• Alia Gizatulina & Olga Gorelkina, 2016, "Selling Money on Ebay: A Field Study of Surplus Division," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2016_20, Dec.
• Malin Arve & Marco Serena, 2016, "Level-k Models Rationalize Overspending in Contests," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2018-09, Nov.
• Luis C. Corchón & Marco Serena, 2016, "Properties of Contests," Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, number tax-mpg-rps-2018-10, Dec.
• Nobuyuki Hanaki & Emily Tanimura & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2016, "The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, number 16037, Apr, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.014.
• HORAN, Sean, 2016, "Agendas in legislative decision-making," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 2016-02.
• BONKOUNGOU, Somouaoga, 2016, "Pareto dominance of deferred acceptance through early decision," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 2016-07.
• Sean HORAN, 2016, "Agendas in Legislative Decision-Making," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 02-2016.
• Somouaoga BONKOUNGOU, 2016, "Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 11-2016.
• Rohan DUTTA, 2016, "Joint Search with No Information: An Inefficient Immediate Agreement Theorem," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 12-2016.
• Anurag N. Banerjee & Sarit Markovich & Giulio Seccia, 2016, "The Endgame," Working Papers, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics, number 1601, Oct.
• Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2016, "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation," Working Papers, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics, number 1602, Nov, revised Nov 2016.
• Xiaoyong Cao & Guofu Tan & Guoqiang Tian & Okan Yilankaya, 2016, "Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions with Private Participation Costs," Working Papers, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics, number 1604, Dec, revised Dec 2016.
• Joshua S. Gans & Peter Landry, 2016, "Procrastination in Teams," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 21891, Jan.
• Alessandra Casella & Jean Francois Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2016, "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 22231, May.
• Cuicui Chen & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2016, "Collective Action in an Asymmetric World," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 22240, May.
• Philip Brookins & Jennifer Brown & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016, "Peer Information and Risk-taking under Competitive and Non-competitive Pay Schemes," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 22486, Aug.
• George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016, "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 22785, Oct.
• Soohyun Cho & Liangfei Qiu & Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay, 2016, "Less than Zero? The Economic Impact of Zero Rating on Content Competition," Working Papers, NET Institute, number 16-04, Sep.
• Sevostyanova O. G. & Popova N. A., 2016, "Actual Problems of the Estimation of Competitiveness of the Brand," World of economics and management / Vestnik NSU. Series: Social and Economics Sciences, Socionet, volume 16, issue 1, pages 116-125.
• Battaglini, Marco & Lai, Ernest K & Wooyoung Lim & Joseph Tao-yi Wang, 2016, "The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers, National Taiwan University, Department of Economics, number 1601, May, revised May 2016.
• Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2016, "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 2016-W02, Jun.
• Martin von Lampe & Koen Deconinck & Véronique Bastien, 2016, "Trade-Related International Regulatory Co-operation: A Theoretical Framework," OECD Trade Policy Papers, OECD Publishing, number 195, Dec, DOI: 10.1787/3fbf60b1-en.
• Achim Hagen & Leonhard Kaehler & Klaus Eisenack, 2016, "Transnational Environmental Agreements with Heterogeneous Actors," Working Papers, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, number V-387-16, Jan, revised Jan 2016.
• Achim Hagen & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2016, "The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers, University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics, number V-391-16, Aug, revised Aug 2016.
• Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2016, "The Direction of Strategic Delegation and Voter Welfare in Asymmetric Tax Competition Models," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, number 16-27, Nov.
• Heikki Rantakari, 2016, "Soliciting Advice: Active versus Passive Principals," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 32, issue 4, pages 719-761.
• Ispano, Alessandro, 2016, "Persuasion and receiver’s news," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 60-63, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.026.
• Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2016, "Complete rent dissipation when the number of rent seekers is uncertain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 8-10, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.025.
• Grebe, Tim & Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kröger, Sabine, 2016, "“Buy-It-Now” or “Sell-It-Now” auctions: Effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 27-30, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.025.
• Murad, Zahra, 2016, "Does group discussion lead to better informed and more strategic market entry decisions?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 25-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.032.
• Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2016, "Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 98-101, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.036.
• Liu, Zhiyang & Chen, Bo, 2016, "A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 6-10, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.004.
• Lee, Byung Soo, 2016, "A characterization of Brandenburger–Friedenberg–Keisler’s assumption," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 60-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.028.
• Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016, "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, pages 21-23, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.014.
• Iimura, Takuya, 2016, "On the IENBR-solvability of two-person finite games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 146, issue C, pages 68-70, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.023.
• Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2016, "The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: A Bayesian persuasion perspective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 103-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.038.
• Sasaki, Yasuo & Ura, Masahiro, 2016, "Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: A problem of Japan’s nursery school choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 38-41, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.020.
• Zhou, Deqing, 2016, "Public disclosure, information leakage, and strategic trading," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 46-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.007.
• Lopez-Velasco, Armando R., 2016, "Solving dynamic inefficiency with politically sustainable guest worker programs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, pages 1-4, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.09.002.
• Dong, Zhiqiang & Zhang, Yongjing, 2016, "A sequential game of endowment effect and natural property rights," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 108-111, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.009.
• Ruan, Xinfeng & Zhang, Jin E., 2016, "Investor attention and market microstructure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 125-130, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.032.
• Ferrari, Luca, 2016, "How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 157-160, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.041.
• Chen, Hsiao-Chi & Chow, Yunshyong, 2016, "Stability of Cournot equilibria under discrete best-reply dynamics with non-negative output constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 149, issue C, pages 172-175, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.020.
• Cooper, David J. & Kagel, John H., 2016, "A failure to communicate: an experimental investigation of the effects of advice on strategic play," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 24-45, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.10.008.
• Chen, Zhijun, 2016, "Collusion and biased tournaments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 127-143, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.009.
• Weisel, Ori & Zultan, Ro׳i, 2016, "Social motives in intergroup conflict: Group identity and perceived target of threat," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 122-133, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.004.
• Chuah, Swee Hoon & Gächter, Simon & Hoffmann, Robert & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2016, "Religion, discrimination and trust across three cultures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 280-301, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.008.
• Attanasi, Giuseppe & Hopfensitz, Astrid & Lorini, Emiliano & Moisan, Frédéric, 2016, "Social connectedness improves co-ordination on individually costly, efficient outcomes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 86-106, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.006.
• Yang, Zaifu & Zhang, Rong & Zhang, Zongyi, 2016, "An exploration of a strategic competition model for the European Union natural gas market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 57, issue C, pages 236-242, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.05.008.
• Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016, "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 1-23, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.006.
• Chaturvedi, Rakesh, 2016, "Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 125-141, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.012.
• Lim, Wooyoung & Neary, Philip R., 2016, "An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 208-219, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.010.
• Pei, Harry Di, 2016, "When does restricting your opponent's freedom hurt you?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 234-239, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.004.
• Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016, "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 24-45, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.009.
• Schroyen, Fred & Treich, Nicolas, 2016, "The power of money: Wealth effects in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 46-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.005.
• Brandt, Felix & Brill, Markus & Suksompong, Warut, 2016, "An ordinal minimax theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 107-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.010.
• Manjunath, Vikram & Turhan, Bertan, 2016, "Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 25-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.004.
• de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur, 2016, "Formal versus informal legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, pages 1-17, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.004.
• Brown, Alexander L. & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2016, "The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, pages 115-131, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.008.
• Kneeland, Terri, 2016, "Coordination under limited depth of reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, pages 49-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.011.
• Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2016, "Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: A strategic communication experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 96, issue C, pages 97-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.012.
• Khalmetski, Kiryl, 2016, "Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 110-119, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.003.
• Kräkel, Matthias, 2016, "Peer effects and incentives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 120-127, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.005.
• Greiff, Matthias & Paetzel, Fabian, 2016, "Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations – an experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 32-43, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.009.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2016, "Sanctions in networks: “The Most Unkindest Cut of All”," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 44-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.005.
• Hota, Ashish R. & Garg, Siddharth & Sundaram, Shreyas, 2016, "Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 135-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.003.
• Doğan, Battal, 2016, "Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 165-171, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.010.
• Berger, Ulrich & Grüne, Ansgar, 2016, "On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 19-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.003.
• Barbieri, Stefano & Malueg, David A., 2016, "Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 219-234, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.015.
• Haeringer, Guillaume & Hałaburda, Hanna, 2016, "Monotone strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 68-77, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.007.
• Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries, 2016, "Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 78-109, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.002.
• Kloosterman, Andrew & Schotter, Andrew, 2016, "Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 99, issue C, pages 186-205, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001.
• Cheung, Man-Wah, 2016, "Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 99, issue C, pages 206-223, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.003.
• Chong, Juin-Kuan & Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin, 2016, "A generalized cognitive hierarchy model of games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 99, issue C, pages 257-274, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.007.
• Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2016, "The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 99, issue C, pages 71-81, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.016.
• Lee, Byung Soo & Stewart, Colin, 2016, "Identification of payoffs in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 99, issue C, pages 82-88, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.004.
• Qiao, Lei & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2016, "On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: A complete characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 99, issue C, pages 89-98, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.007.
• Braendle, Thomas & Colombier, Carsten, 2016, "What drives public health care expenditure growth? Evidence from Swiss cantons, 1970–2012," Health Policy, Elsevier, volume 120, issue 9, pages 1051-1060, DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.07.009.
• Esteve-González, Patricia, 2016, "Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 48, issue C, pages 244-269, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.008.
• Kim, Chulyoung, 2016, "Adversarial bias, litigation, and the Daubert test: An economic approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 47, issue C, pages 67-75, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2016.06.001.
• Sutan, Angela & Vranceanu, Radu, 2016, "Lying about delegation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 29-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.023.
• Kamijo, Yoshio, 2016, "Rewards versus punishments in additive, weakest-link, and best-shot contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 17-30, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.013.
• Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2016, "Peer discipline and incentives within groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 19-30, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.12.006.
• Karakostas, Alexandros & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2016, "Compliance and the power of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 67-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.016.
• Jensen, Martin Kaae & Kozlovskaya, Maria, 2016, "A representation theorem for guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, pages 148-161, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.001.
• Allred, Sarah & Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2016, "Cognitive load and strategic sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 125, issue C, pages 162-178, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.006.
• Duffy, John & Xie, Huan, 2016, "Group size and cooperation among strangers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 126, issue PA, pages 55-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.02.007.
• Bosworth, Steven J. & Singer, Tania & Snower, Dennis J., 2016, "Cooperation, motivation and social balance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 126, issue PB, pages 72-94, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.12.005.
• Au, Pak Hung & Zhang, Jipeng, 2016, "Deal or no deal? The effect of alcohol drinking on bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 70-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.011.
• Kriss, Peter H. & Weber, Roberto A. & Xiao, Erte, 2016, "Turning a blind eye, but not the other cheek: On the robustness of costly punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 159-177, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.017.
• Czermak, Simon & Feri, Francesco & Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela & Sutter, Matthias, 2016, "How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 265-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.004.
• Cui, Zhiwei & Wang, Rui, 2016, "Collaboration in networks with randomly chosen agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 129-141, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.015.
• Ramalingam, Abhijit & Godoy, Sara & Morales, Antonio J. & Walker, James M., 2016, "An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 18-36, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.003.
• Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2016, "Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 144-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.007.
• Berger, Ulrich & De Silva, Hannelore & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, 2016, "Cognitive hierarchies in the minimizer game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 337-348, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.004.
• Robbett, Andrea, 2016, "Sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 132, issue PA, pages 121-138, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.012.
• van Besouw, Bram & Ansink, Erik & van Bavel, Bas, 2016, "The economics of violence in natural states," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 132, issue PA, pages 139-156, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.009.
• Bhattacharya, Puja, 2016, "Inter-team contests with power differential," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 132, issue PA, pages 157-175, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.004.
• Boosey, Luke & Mark Isaac, R., 2016, "Asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 132, issue PA, pages 26-41, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.09.015.
• Abatayo, Anna Lou & Lynham, John, 2016, "Endogenous vs. exogenous regulations in the commons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 76, issue C, pages 51-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2015.11.006.
• van Soest, Daan & Stoop, Jan & Vyrastekova, Jana, 2016, "Toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 1-13, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2015.12.004.
• Miller, Steve & Nkuiya, Bruno, 2016, "Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 79, issue C, pages 189-207, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2016.05.001.
• He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2016, "Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 181-194, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009.
• Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago, 2016, "Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 209-236, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.011.
• Ganguli, Jayant & Heifetz, Aviad & Lee, Byung Soo, 2016, "Universal interactive preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 237-260, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.012.
• Müller, Christoph, 2016, "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 407-450, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.09.002.
• Veller, Carl & Hayward, Laura K., 2016, "Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 93-113, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.005.
• Okada, Akira, 2016, "A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 318-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.002.
• Hernández, Penélope & Solan, Eilon, 2016, "Bounded computational capacity equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 342-364, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.007.
• Lee, Byung Soo, 2016, "Admissibility and assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 42-72, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.01.006.
• Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016, "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 557-603, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.013.
• Amir, Rabah & Lazzati, Natalia, 2016, "Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 684-698, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.005.
• Dutta, Rohan & Ishii, Ryosuke, 2016, "Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 699-727, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.004.
• Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid, 2016, "Bounded memory Folk Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 728-774, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.001.
• Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2016, "Common belief foundations of global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 826-848, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.007.
• Dekel, Eddie & Friedenberg, Amanda & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2016, "Lexicographic beliefs and assumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 955-985, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.003.
• Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2016, "How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 332-359, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.05.001.
• Koessler, Frédéric & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2016, "Informed seller with taste heterogeneity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 456-471, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.004.
• Saran, Rene, 2016, "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 517-564, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.06.002.
• Aoyagi, Masaki & Bhalla, Manaswini & Gunay, Hikmet, 2016, "Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 565-600, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.05.005.
• Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2016, "Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 311-323, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.004.
• Song, Yangbo, 2016, "Social learning with endogenous observation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 324-333, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.005.
• Carroll, Gabriel, 2016, "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 334-361, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.003.
• Hughes, Niall, 2016, "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 51-93, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.004.
• Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2016, "Random extensive form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 517-535, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.010.
• Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2016, "An evolutionary theory of monogamy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 605-628, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.001.
• Cassola, Nuno & Jorge, José, 2016, "The ECB's OMTs: A tale of governments, investors, and the central bank," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, pages 94-116, DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.03.005.