Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

2021

• Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2021, "Pendular Voting," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 21/350, May.
• Jan Libich & Martin Machacek & Dat Thanh Nguyen, 2021, "Role Swap: When the Follower Leads and the Leader Follows," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, volume 71, issue 4, pages 282-305, December.
• Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021, "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2021.09, Apr.
• Iwan Bos & Marco A. Marini & Riccardo D. Saulle, 2021, "Myopic Oligopoly Pricing," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2021.32, Dec.
• Svetlana Pevnitskaya & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2021, "The Effect of Access to Clean Technology on Pollution Reduction: an Experiment," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2021_01_01, Jan.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2021, "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2021_07_01, Mar.
• Luke A. Boosey & Christopher Brown, 2021, "Contests with Network Externalities: Theory & Evidence," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2021_07_02, Jul.
• Uwe Dulleck & Andreas Löffler, 2021, "μ – σ Games," Games, MDPI, volume 12, issue 1, pages 1-12, January.
• Sémirat, S. & Forges, F., 2021, "Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2021-03.
• Boucekkine, R. & Fabbri, G. & Federico, S. & Gozzi, F., 2021, "A dynamic theory of spatial externalities," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2021-04.

2020

• Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2020, "Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526.
• Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020, "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108805.
• Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2020, "Centralized versus decentralized contests with risk-averse players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108816.
• Evdokimov, Kirill S., 2020, "Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108931.
• Eichenseer, Michael & Moser, Johannes, 2020, "Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108941.
• Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020, "Maximal miscommunication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108962.
• Yoon, Kiho, 2020, "Implementability with contingent contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108966.
• Ford, Weixing & Lian, Zeng & Lien, Jaimie W. & Zheng, Jie, 2020, "Information sharing in a contest game with group identity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109000.
• Amorós, Pablo, 2020, "Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109068.
• Chen, Bo, 2020, "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109122.
• Chugunova, Marina & Luhan, Wolfgang J. & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2020, "When to leave carrots for sticks: On the evolution of sanctioning institutions in open communities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109155.
• Cohen, Din & Sela, Aner, 2020, "Common-value group contests with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164.
• Jelnov, Artyom & Klunover, Doron, 2020, "When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 192, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109225.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, David, 2020, "Task arrangement in team competitions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109329.
• Ao, Wallice & Wu, Jiabin, 2020, "The silent majority?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 193, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109350.
• Klunover, Doron & Morgan, John, 2020, "Contests with a constrained choice set of effort," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109559.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2020, "Finite blockchain games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109614.
• Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2020, "Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615.
• Lahkar, Ratul & Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2020, "Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109616.
• Jiao, Qian & Xu, Jin, 2020, "Competition for networked agents in the lottery Blotto game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109644.
• Harri, Ardian & Zhllima, Edvin & Imami, Drini & Coatney, Kalyn T., 2020, "Effects of subject pool culture and institutional environment on corruption: Experimental evidence from Albania," Economic Systems, Elsevier, volume 44, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.ecosys.2020.100783.
• Karaivanov, Alexander & Xing, Xiaochuan & Xue, Yi, 2020, "Bogus joint liability groups in microfinance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103353.
• Boucher, Vincent, 2020, "Equilibrium homophily in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103370.
• Liu, Shuo & Pei, Harry, 2020, "Monotone equilibria in signaling games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103408.
• Avoyan, Ala & Schotter, Andrew, 2020, "Attention in games: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103410.
• Kornek, Ulrike & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2020, "The strategic dimension of financing global public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103423.
• Isoni, Andrea & Sugden, Robert & Zheng, Jiwei, 2020, "The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428.
• Wu, Jiemai, 2020, "Non-competing persuaders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103454.
• Duersch, Peter & Lambrecht, Marco & Oechssler, Joerg, 2020, "Measuring skill and chance in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103472.
• Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2020, "Categorization and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103519.
• Freeman, David J. & Kimbrough, Erik O. & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2020, "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder’s curse," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103543.
• Sugden, Robert & Wang, Mengjie, 2020, "Equality of opportunity and the acceptability of outcome inequality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103597.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2020, "Sanctions in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103606.
• Gil-Moltó, Maria José & Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna & Rodrigues-Neto, José A. & Zikos, Vasileios, 2020, "Mixed oligopoly, cost-reducing research and development, and privatisation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 283, issue 3, pages 1094-1106, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.071.
• Fandel, Günter & Trockel, Jan, 2020, "Job Allocation and Profits in Service Production," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 287, issue 3, pages 1052-1061, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.055.
• He, Qiao-Chu & Yang, Yun & Bai, Lingquan & Zhang, Baosen, 2020, "Smart energy storage management via information systems design," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104542.
• Hesamzadeh, M.R. & Biggar, D.R. & Bunn, D.W. & Moiseeva, E., 2020, "The impact of generator market power on the electricity hedge market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104649.
• Fuentes González, Fabián & van der Weijde, Adriaan Hendrik & Sauma, Enzo, 2020, "The promotion of community energy projects in Chile and Scotland: An economic approach using biform games," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104677.
• Fernández, Mauricio & Muñoz, Francisco D. & Moreno, Rodrigo, 2020, "Analysis of imperfect competition in natural gas supply contracts for electric power generation: A closed-loop approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104717.
• Petropoulos, Georgios & Willems, Bert, 2020, "Long-term transmission rights and dynamic efficiency," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104714.
• Sobhani, Seyed Omid & Sheykhha, Siamak & Madlener, Reinhard, 2020, "An integrated two-level demand-side management game applied to smart energy hubs with storage," Energy, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2020.118017.
• Zhou, Deqing, 2020, "Strategic trading with transaction cost in the long run," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 32, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2018.12.035.
• Aramendia, Miguel & Wen, Quan, 2020, "Myopic perception in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 1-14, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.003.
• Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras, 2020, "Entry-deterring agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 172-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.012.
• Ziegler, Gabriel & Zuazo-Garin, Peio, 2020, "Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 197-215, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.001.
• He, Simin & Wu, Jiabin, 2020, "Compromise and coordination: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 216-233, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.003.
• Sun, Xiang & Zeng, Yishu, 2020, "Perfect and proper equilibria in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 288-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.005.
• Grech, Philip D. & Nax, Heinrich H., 2020, "Rational altruism? On preference estimation and dictator game experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 309-338, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.004.
• Solan, Eilon & Solan, Omri N. & Solan, Ron, 2020, "Jointly controlled lotteries with biased coins," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 383-391, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.008.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.001.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2020, "The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 132-143, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.009.
• Catonini, Emiliano & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2020, "Weak belief and permissibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 154-179, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.007.
• Kayaba, Yutaka & Matsushima, Hitoshi & Toyama, Tomohisa, 2020, "Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 193-208, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.003.
• Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2020, "Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 225-245, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008.
• Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020, "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 257-288, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.006.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Corrao, Roberto & Sanna, Federico, 2020, "Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 28-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.005.
• García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2020, "Non-equilibrium play in centipede games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 391-433, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.007.
• Sun, Ching-jen, 2020, "A sandwich theorem for generic n × n two person games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 86-95, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.004.
• Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2020, "Payoff information and learning in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 120, issue C, pages 96-120, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.011.
• Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020, "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 329-367, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.004.
• Cabrales, Antonio & Feri, Francesco & Gottardi, Piero & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2020, "Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 368-381, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.002.
• Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Leonetti, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio, 2020, "Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 533-547, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.009.
• Michaeli, Moti, 2020, "Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 90-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.002.
• Aina, Chiara & Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Gamba, Astrid, 2020, "Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 150-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.006.
• Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto, 2020, "A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 240-255, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.012.
• Talamàs, Eduard & Vohra, Rakesh, 2020, "Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 277-289, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.001.
• Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Julien, Ludovic, 2020, "Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 318-327, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.004.
• Ging-Jehli, Nadja R. & Schneider, Florian H. & Weber, Roberto A., 2020, "On self-serving strategic beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 341-353, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.016.
• Hwang, Sung-Ha & Rey-Bellet, Luc, 2020, "Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 370-390, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.003.
• Leister, C. Matthew, 2020, "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 453-475, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.006.
• Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Rainer, Catherine & Solan, Eilon, 2020, "Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 83-104, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.004.
• Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena, 2020, "Fictitious play in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 182-206, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.006.
• DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura K., 2020, "Peers or police?: The effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 210-227, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.004.
• Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & García-Martínez, José A., 2020, "Reputation and news suppression in the media industry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 240-271, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.008.
• Li, Chen & Turmunkh, Uyanga & Wakker, Peter P., 2020, "Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 272-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.007.
• Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori, 2020, "Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 288-294, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.009.
• Feldman, Michal & Fu, Hu & Gravin, Nick & Lucier, Brendan, 2020, "Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 327-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.009.
• Bilò, Vittorio & Flammini, Michele & Moscardelli, Luca, 2020, "The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 359-376, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.09.010.
• Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo & Newton, Jonathan, 2020, "Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 68-80, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.004.
• Song, Yangbo & Zhang, Jiahua, 2020, "Social learning with coordination motives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 123, issue C, pages 81-100, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.002.
• Hagenbach, Jeanne & Koessler, Frédéric, 2020, "Cheap talk with coarse understanding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 105-121, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.015.
• Shafer, Rachel C., 2020, "Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 281-287, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.010.
• Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Mu'alem, Ahuva, 2020, "Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 386-405, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.014.
• Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2020, "Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 534-553, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.008.
• Masiliūnas, Aidas & Nax, Heinrich H., 2020, "Framing and repeated competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 604-619, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.002.
• Friedman, Evan, 2020, "Endogenous quantal response equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 620-643, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.003.
• Chen, Yin & Dang, Chuangyin, 2020, "An extension of quantal response equilibrium and determination of perfect equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 659-670, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.023.
• García-Pola, Bernardo, 2020, "Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 124, issue C, pages 82-104, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.013.
• Funaki, Yukihiko & Shino, Junnosuke & Uto, Nobuyuki, 2020, "Vulnerability of fixed-rate funds-supplying operations to overbidding: An experimental approach," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, volume 46, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2019.100489.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "Digital monopolies: Privacy protection or price regulation?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102623.
• Li, Yanhai, 2020, "Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 71, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102624.
• Heinsalu, Sander, 2020, "Investing to access an adverse selection market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 72, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102660.
• Grossmann, Martin & Hottiger, Dieter, 2020, "Liquidity constraints and the formation of unbalanced contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 73, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102658.
• Lake, James & Nken, Moïse & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2020, "Tariff bindings and the dynamic formation of Preferential Trade Agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.103279.
• Bensalem, Sarah & Santibáñez, Nicolás Hernández & Kazi-Tani, Nabil, 2020, "Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 93, issue C, pages 369-386, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2020.05.006.
• Elten, Jonas van & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2020, "Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 158-188, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.11.006.
• Brünner, Tobias, 2020, "Self-selection with non-equilibrium beliefs: Predicting behavior in a tournament experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 389-396, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.11.028.
• Okada, Akira, 2020, "The cultural transmission of trust and trustworthiness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 169, issue C, pages 53-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.025.
• Alcocer, Christian Diego & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Shupp, Robert, 2020, "Naive and sophisticated mixing: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 157-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.002.
• Liu, Jia & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Zhang, Ruike, 2020, "Firing the right bullets: Exploring the effectiveness of the hired-gun mechanism in the provision of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 222-243, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.007.
• Ganglmair, Bernhard & Holcomb, Alex & Myung, Noah, 2020, "Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 244-267, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.006.
• Zylbersztejn, Adam & Babutsidze, Zakaria & Hanaki, Nobuyuki, 2020, "Preferences for observable information in a strategic setting: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 268-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.009.
• van der Weele, Joël J. & von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2020, "Bracelets of pride and guilt? An experimental test of self-signaling," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 280-291, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.001.
• Miettinen, Topi & Kosfeld, Michael & Fehr, Ernst & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020, "Revealed preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma: A horse-race between six utility functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 1-25, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.018.
• Chan, Nathan W. & Wolk, Leonard, 2020, "Cost-effective giving with multiple public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 130-145, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.011.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2020, "Conditional cooperation and the effect of punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 150-172, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.035.
• Dawid, Herbert & Hellmann, Tim, 2020, "R&D investments under endogenous cluster formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 253-283, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.039.
• Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020, "The evolution of taking roles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 174, issue C, pages 38-63, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.03.014.
• Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2020, "Why should majority voting be unfair?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 281-295, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.015.
• Cason, Timothy N. & Masters, William A. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2020, "Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: Theory and experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 314-327, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.023.
• Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Garagnani, Michele, 2020, "The cognitive foundations of cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 71-85, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.04.019.
• Tolotti, Marco & Yepez, Jorge, 2020, "Hotelling-Bertrand duopoly competition under firm-specific network effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 105-128, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.004.
• Grabiszewski, Konrad & Horenstein, Alex, 2020, "Effort is not a monotonic function of skills: Results from a global mobile experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 634-652, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.011.
• Calford, Evan M., 2020, "Uncertainty aversion in game theory: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 720-734, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.011.
• Mauleon, Ana & Schopohl, Simon & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020, "Competition for leadership in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 19-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.026.
• Feldhaus, Christoph & Rockenbach, Bettina & Zeppenfeld, Christopher, 2020, "Inequality in minimum-effort coordination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 341-370, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.009.
• Send, Jonas, 2020, "Conflict between non-exclusive groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 177, issue C, pages 858-874, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.07.009.
• Lejarraga, Tomás & Lucena, Abel & Rubí-Barceló, Antoni, 2020, "Beliefs estimated from choices in Proposer-Responder Games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 442-459, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.017.
• Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D., 2020, "Iterative dominance in young children: Experimental evidence in simple two-person games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 623-637, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.006.
• Alan, Sule & Ertac, Seda & Gumren, Mert, 2020, "Cheating and incentives in a performance context: Evidence from a field experiment on children," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 681-701, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.015.
• Andreoni, James & Di Girolamo, Amalia & List, John A. & Mackevicius, Claire & Samek, Anya, 2020, "Risk preferences of children and adolescents in relation to gender, cognitive skills, soft skills, and executive functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 729-742, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.002.
• Bruhin, Adrian & Janizzi, Kelly & Thöni, Christian, 2020, "Uncovering the heterogeneity behind cross-cultural variation in antisocial punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 291-308, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.005.
• Greiff, Matthias & Paetzel, Fabian, 2020, "Information about average evaluations spurs cooperation: An experiment on noisy reputation systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 180, issue C, pages 334-356, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.014.
• Jindani, Sam, 2020, "Community enforcement using modal actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104972.
• Bochet, Olivier & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2020, "Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104952.
• Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2020, "Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 185, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957.
• Bobkova, Nina, 2020, "Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104975.
• Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020, "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105002.
• Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad, 2020, "Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105015.
• Osawa, Minoru & Akamatsu, Takashi, 2020, "Equilibrium refinement for a model of non-monocentric internal structures of cities: A potential game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105025.
• Mensch, Jeffrey, 2020, "On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105026.
• Kim, Jinwoo & Koh, Youngwoo, 2020, "Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105029.
• Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020, "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 187, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105030.
• Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020, "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068.
• Galperti, Simone & Trevino, Isabel, 2020, "Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105039.
• Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2020, "Network formation with multigraphs and strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105033.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Castro, Francisco & Weintraub, Gabriel Y., 2020, "The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105055.
• Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020, "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 188, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105065.
• Müller, Christoph, 2020, "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038.
• Kunimoto, Takashi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020, "Order on types based on monotone comparative statics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105082.
• Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2020, "The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105083.
• Alaoui, Larbi & Janezic, Katharina A. & Penta, Antonio, 2020, "Reasoning about others' reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105091.
• Martin, Simon & Schlag, Karl H., 2020, "Split it up to create incentives: Investment, public goods and crossing the river," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 189, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105092.
• Basu, Pathikrit & Chatterjee, Kalyan & Hoshino, Tetsuya & Tamuz, Omer, 2020, "Repeated coordination with private learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105106.
• Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020, "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105116.
• Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2020, "A game of hide and seek in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105119.
• March, Christoph & Ziegelmeyer, Anthony, 2020, "Altruistic observational learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 190, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105123.
• Boyer, Pierre C. & Kempf, Hubert, 2020, "Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 41, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2017.09.002.
• Schniter, E. & Shields, T.W. & Sznycer, D., 2020, "Trust in humans and robots: Economically similar but emotionally different," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102253.
• Crosetto, Paolo & Filippin, Antonio & Katuščák, Peter & Smith, John, 2020, "Central tendency bias in belief elicitation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 78, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102273.
• Barr, Abigail & Miller, Luis, 2020, "The effect of education, income inequality and merit on inequality acceptance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102276.
• Mitra, Arnab & Shahriar, Quazi, 2020, "Why is dishonesty difficult to mitigate? The interaction between descriptive norm and monetary incentive," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102292.
• Ingene, Charles A. & Parry, Mark E. & Xu, Zibin, 2020, "Resale Price Maintenance: Customer Service Without Free Riding," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, volume 96, issue 4, pages 563-577, DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2020.05.001.
• Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2020, "Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, pages 42-51, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.003.
• Kashyap, Ravi, 2020, "David vs Goliath (You against the Markets), A dynamic programming approach to separate the impact and timing of trading costs," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, volume 545, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2019.122848.
• Grepperud, Sverre & Pedersen, Pål Andreas, 2020, "Positioning and negotiations: The case of pharmaceutical pricing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 62, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101853.
• Cordella, Tito & Onder, Harun, 2020, "Sharing oil rents and political violence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101882.
• Crutzen, Benoît S Y & Flamand, Sabine & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2020, "A model of a team contest, with an application to incentives under list proportional representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.104109.
• Bose, Gautam & Konrad, Kai A., 2020, "Devil take the hindmost: Deflecting attacks to other defenders," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2020.107205.
• Finus, Michael & Schneider, Raoul & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2020, "The role of social and technical excludability for the success of impure public good and common pool agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2019.101122.
• Mao, Liang, 2020, "Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101167.
• Guzmán, Ricardo & Harrison, Rodrigo & Abarca, Nureya & Villena, Mauricio G., 2020, "A game-theoretic model of reciprocity and trust that incorporates personality traits," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 84, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101497.
• Minozzi, William & Woon, Jonathan, 2020, "Direct response and the strategy method in an experimental cheap talk game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101498.
• Boosey, Luke & Mark Isaac, R. & Norton, Douglas & Stinn, Joseph, 2020, "Cooperation, contributor types, and control questions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101489.
• Butz, Britta & Harbring, Christine, 2020, "Donations as an incentive for cooperation in public good games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101510.
• Barron, Kai & Nurminen, Tuomas, 2020, "Nudging cooperation in public goods provision," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101542.
• Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2020, "Open Rule Legislative Bargaining," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 20/346, Nov.
• Gerard Domènech i Gironell, 2020, "Introducing media in a model of electoral competition with candidate quality," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2020/401.
• Chih-Sheng Hsieh & Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu & Christian Zimmermann, 2020, "Collaboration in Bipartite Networks, with an Application to Coauthorship Networks," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, number 2020-030, Aug, DOI: 10.20955/wp.2020.030.
• Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020, "Implementation of Optimal Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/06, Jul.
• Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2020, "Trouble Comes in Threes: Core stability in Minimum Cost Connection Networks," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/07, Jul.
• Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard & Trine Tornøe Platz, 2020, "Decentralized Task Coordination," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/11, Oct.
• Jens Gudmundsson & Jens Leth Hougaard, 2020, "Enabling reciprocity through blockchain design," IFRO Working Paper, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, number 2020/14, Dec, revised 09 Feb 2021.
• Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020, "Entry in group contests," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2020_02_01, Feb.
• Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020, "To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2020_07_01, Jul.
• Esra E. Bayindir & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2020, "Cheap Talk Games with Two-Senders and Different Modes of Communication," Games, MDPI, volume 11, issue 2, pages 1-22, April.
• Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2020, "A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game," Games, MDPI, volume 11, issue 3, pages 1-7, August.
• Anna Lou Abatayo & John Lynham & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2020, "Communication, Expectations, and Trust: An Experiment with Three Media," Games, MDPI, volume 11, issue 4, pages 1-26, October.
• David L. Dickinson, 2020, "Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics," Games, MDPI, volume 11, issue 4, pages 1-25, November.
• Muhammed Bulutay & Camille Cornand & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2020, "Learning to deal with repeated shocks under strategic complementarity: An experiment," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 2003.
• Crosetto, P. & Güth, W., 2020, "What are you calling intuitive? Subject heterogeneity as a driver of response times in an impunity game," Working Papers, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL), number 2020-09.
• Francesco Fallucchi & Daniele Nosenzo, 2020, "The Coordinating Power of Social Norms," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2020-06, Jun.
• Dimitry Rtischev, 2020, "Intensity of Effort in Contests with Few or Many Winners," Gakushuin Economic Papers, Gakushuin University, Faculty of Economics, volume 57, issue 1-2, pages 93-108.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020, "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers, New Economic School (NES), number w0256, Feb.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020, "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers, New Economic School (NES), number w0278, Jul.
• Evan M. Calford, 2020, "Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, number 2020-675, Aug.
• Françoise Forges, 2020, "Games with Incomplete Information: From Repetition to Cheap Talk and Persuasion," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 137, pages 3-30, DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.137.0003.
• Olga Bernard, 2020, "Refutation in Research: How to Improve Publication Quality," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 138, pages 21-48, DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.138.0021.
• Maxime Menuet, 2020, "Is a Long War Desirable? Optimal Debt Concessions in Attrition Warfare," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 139, pages 105-130, DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.139.0105.