Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

---

Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

1997

• Steiner, U., 1997, "Signalling in International Environmental Agreements: Using Pre-Agreement Emission Level as a Signalling Device," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 97-9.
• De Wolf, O, 1997, "Fondements des Concepts de Solution en Theorie des Jeux," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a10.
• Bigot de Morogues, F., 1997, "Equilibres Monetaires du Jeu Strategique de Marche dans le Modele a Generations Imbriquees," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a18.
• Sumaila, U.R., 1997, "Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 167.
• Lommerund, K.E., 1997, "Battle of the Sexes: Non-Cooperative Games in the Theory of the Family," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 174.
• Arin, J. & Inarra, E., 1997, "Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 163.
• McLennan, A & Park, I-U, 1997, "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research, number 300.
• Pezanis-Christou, P, 1997, "On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 97/05.
• Krogh Hvide, H, 1997, "Complementary Teams, Linear Sharing Rules and Uncertainty," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 2/97.
• Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997, "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 30-97.
• Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 4-97.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Lundholm, M., 1997, "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1997-28.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Fast Learning in Organizations," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 97-10.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 208, Feb.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "Auctions of licences and market structure," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 209, Feb.
• Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 1997, "Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 221, Feb.
• Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes & Massimo Motta, 1997, "Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 222, Feb.
• Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997, "Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 241, Apr.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1997, "Free entry does not imply zero profits," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 268, Dec.
• Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Mogens Jensen & Birgitte Sloth, 1997, "The evolution of conventions under incomplete information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 475, Jun, revised Feb 2000.
• Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1997, "Infrastructure project finance and capital flows : a new perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1861, Dec.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1997, "Are the poor less well-insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1863, Dec.
• Angelina Keil, 1997, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1997," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 70, issue 10, pages 583-585, October.
• Javier León & Raimundo Soto, 1997, "Structural Breaks And Long-Run Trends In Commodity Prices," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 9, issue 3, pages 347-366, DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199705)9:3<.
• Jacek B. Krawczyk & Steffan Berridge, 1997, "Relaxation Algorithms in Finding Nash Equilibria," Computational Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707002, Jul.
• Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1997, "Stability of the Cournot Process - Experimental Evidence," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707002, Jul.
• Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Loss Aversion Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703001, Mar, revised 19 Jul 1997.
• Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997, "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703006, Mar, revised 25 Nov 1997.
• Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997, "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9704001, Apr, revised 11 Apr 1997.
• Massimo Giannini, 1997, "Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9704002, Apr.
• Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997, "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9705003, May.
• V. Bhaskar, 1997, "Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9706001, Jun.
• Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997, "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707002, Jul.
• Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997, "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707006, Jul.
• Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997, "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707008, Jul.
• Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707010, Jul, revised 01 Apr 1998.
• Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok & Rajiv Sethi, 1997, "On the Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9708001, Aug, revised 08 Aug 1997.
• Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok & Rajiv Sethi, 1997, "Interdependent Preference Formation," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9708002, Aug.
• Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy, 1997, "Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9709001, Sep.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711003, Nov.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997, "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711004, Nov.
• P. Frijters, 1997, "Discrimination and job-uncertainty," Labor and Demography, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9706001, Jun.
• Sandro Brusco & Matthew O. Jackson, 1997, "The Optimal Design of a Market," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711003, Nov.
• Hon-Suir, S. & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 97-11, Jun.
• Kirstein, Roland, 1997, "Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune"," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-04.
• Schmidtchen, Dieter & Neunzig, Alexander R., 1997, "Trade, Trust And The Territoriality Of The Law," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-05.
• Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997, "Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-07.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1997, "Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,28.
• Oechssler, Jörg & Schlag, Karl H., 1997, "Loss of commitment? An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,39.
• Brennan, Geoffrey & Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 1997, "Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,44.
• Dulleck, Uwe, 1997, "A note on the E-mail game: Bounded rationality and induction," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,47.

1996

• Roberto Serrano, 1996, "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 161, Mar.
• Olivier Gossner, 1996, "Comparison of information structures," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 169, May.
• Antonio Cabrales, 1996, "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 179, Jul.
• Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996, "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 190, Nov.
• Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996, "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 200, Mar, revised Dec 1996.
• Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996, "Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 233, Mar, revised Aug 1997.
• Harrison, Glenn W. & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Tarr, David G., 1996, "Economic implications for Turkey of a customs union with the European Union," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1599, May.
• Levine, Ross & Zervos, Sara, 1996, "Capital control liberalization and stock market development," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1622, Jul.
• Ng, Francis & Yeats, Alexander, 1996, "Open economies work better! Did Africa's protectionist policies cause its marginalization in world trade?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1636, Aug.
• Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Dooley, Michael & Leipziger, Danny & Walsh, Carl, 1996, "The lender of last resort function under a currency board : the case of Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1648, Sep.
• van de Walle, Dominique, 1996, "Assessing the welfare impacts of public spending," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1670, Oct.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1996, "Are there dynamic gains from a poor-area development program?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1695, Dec.
• Shah, Shekhar & Mishra, Deepak & Panagariya, Arvind, 1996, "Demand elasticities in international trade : are they really low?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1712, Dec.
• John Payne Bigelow, 1996, "Value Oriented Equilibria in Repeated Games of Complete Information," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9607003, Jul.
• Shlomit Hon-Snir & Dov Monderer & Aner Sela, 1996, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9610004, Oct, revised 07 Oct 1996.
• Uwe Dulleck & Joerg Oechssler, 1996, "The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9610005, Oct, revised 11 Oct 1996.
• Lakshmi K. Raut, 1996, "Subgame perfect manipulation of children by overlapping generations of agents with two-sided altruism and endogenous fertility," Labor and Demography, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604003, Apr.
• Richard T. Boylan, 1996, "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9602001, Feb.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604002, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604003, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Giovanni Ponti, 1996, "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Discussion Papers, University College London, Department of Economics, number 96-22 ISSN 1350-6722, Jun.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996, "Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 98-46, Jun.
• Schmidtchen, Dieter & Kirstein, Roland, 1996, "Judicial Detection Skill, Litigational Opportunism, and Contractual Compliance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 96-04.
• Stähler, Frank, 1996, "Markov perfection and cooperation in repeated games," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 760.
• Arifovic, J & Eaton, C, 1996, "The Evolution of Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp96-05.
• Michel Le Breton & Hideo Konishi & Shlomo Weber, 1996, "Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 97-113.
• Ulrich Schwalbe & Siegfried K. Berninghaus, 1996, "Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 6, issue 3, pages 297-312.
• Reinoud Joosten, 1996, "Deterministic evolutionary dynamics: a unifying approach," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 6, issue 3, pages 313-324.
• Steffen Ziss, 1996, "Public good provision and the Smith Process," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 245-261, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499135.
• Bezalel Peleg, 1996, "Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 311-324, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499138.
• Jonathan Hamilton & Jacques-François Thisse, 1996, "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 379-397, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499142.
• De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Kast, R. & Lapied, A., 1996, "Non-Linear Asset Valuation on Markets with Frictions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1996-112.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996, "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1996-115.
• Voorneveld, M. & Norde, H.W., 1996, "A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games," Research Memorandum, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 734.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996, "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 69b18274-5c68-4723-a5e9-8.
• Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996, "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number ecpap-96-04, Jul.
• Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996, "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-02, Dec.
• McLaren, John, 1996, "Supplier Relations and the Market Context: A Theory of Handshakes," Center Discussion Papers, Yale University, Economic Growth Center, number 28407, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28407.
• Binmore, K. & Proulx, C. & Samuelson, L. & Swierzbinski, J., 1996, "Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9517r.
• Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9518r.
• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9611.
• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9611r.
• Arana, A.Q., 1996, "A Generic Game With no Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 342.96.
• Arana, A-Q, 1996, "Sound Belief-Shaping Rules that Make all Equilibria Strategically Unstable," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 348.96.
• Arana, A-Q, 1996, "Conditions for any Equilibrium Selection Theory to be Self-Defeating," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 349.96.
• L. Lambertini, 1996, "Prisoners` Dilemma in Duopoly Supergames," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number 264, Jul.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010, "Financing Harmful Bubbles," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-227, Sep.
• Yasushi Asako & Kozo Ueda, 2012, "The Boy Who Cried Bubble: Public Warnings Against Riding Bubbles," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-282, Jun.
• RAY, Indrajit, 1996, "A Remark on the Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996017, May.
• VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1996, "Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996041, Sep.
• VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1996, "N-Person Sequential Bargaining with Endogenous Procedure," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996042, Sep.
• BORTOLOTTI, Bernardo, 1996, "Trials and Errors : PLEA Bargaining as a Learning Device," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996049, Oct.
• HAMILTON , Jonathan & THISSE , Jacques-François, 1996, "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1996066, Dec.
• Rosenkranz, Stephanie, 1996, "Simultaneous Choice of Process and Product Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1321, Jan.
• Al-Nowaihi, A & Levine, Paul L, 1996, "Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1387, Apr.
• Cabral, Luís M B, 1996, "R&D Alliances as Non-cooperative Supergames," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 1439, Jul.
• Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996, "Bargaining with an Endogenous Deadline," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1996011, Feb.
• Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1996, "On Rationalizability in Two-Person Alternating-Offer Bargaining," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), number 1996023, Oct.
• Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1996, "What Motives Should Guide Referees? On The Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-01.
• Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1996, "The Folk Theorems For Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-08.
• Schotter, A., 1996, "Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Performance of Work Groups," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-32.
• S. Ghosal & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1996, "Exchange and Optimality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1133, Sep.
• Vettas, Nikolaos, 1996, "Entry, Exit and Coordination with Mixed Strategies," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics, number 96-33.
• Ed Hopkins & Robert M. Seymour, 1996, "Price Dispersion: An Evolutionary Approach," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 1, Feb.
• Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo, 1996, "The new wave of private capital inflows: Push or pull?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 2, pages 389-418, March.
• Haramillo, Fidel & Schiantarelli, Fabio & Weiss, Andrew, 1996, "Capital market imperfections before and after financial liberalization: An Euler equation approach to panel data for Ecuadorian firms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue 2, pages 367-386, December.
• Charles Anderton & Roxane Anderton & John Carter, 1996, "A Predator-Prey Model of Appropriation, Production, and Exchange," Working Papers, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, number 9602, Dec.
• Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1996, "Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion: on Extremal Equilibria of Interdependent Supergames," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 104, Feb, revised 30 Nov 1998.
• Segendorff, Björn, 1996, "Delegation as at threat in bargaining," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 107, Mar.
• Wärneryd, Karl, 1996, "In Defense of Lawyers. Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 126, Sep.
• Clark, D.J. & Riis, C., 1996, "Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1996_027.
• Dufwenberg, Martin, 1996, "Time Consistent Matrimony with Endogenous Trust," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1997:1, Dec.
• Dufwenberg, Martin, 1996, "Some Relationships Between Evolutionary Stability Criteria in Games," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1997:3, Dec.
• Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1996, "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 26, Feb.
• Noeldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 27, Feb.
• Gueth, Werner & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Ritzberger, Klaus, 1996, "Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 35, Sep.
• M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 1996, "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, number 382, Sep.
• Toshihiro Matsumura & Masako Ueda, 1996, "Endogenous timing in the switching of technology with Marshallian externalities," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 63, issue 1, pages 41-56, February, DOI: 10.1007/BF01237245.
• Gerald Caprio & Michael Dooley & Danny Leipziger & Carl Walsh, 1996, "The lender of last resort function under a currency board: The case of Argentina," Open Economies Review, Springer, volume 7, issue 1, pages 625-650, March, DOI: 10.1007/BF01886217.
• Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996, "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 96-03, Apr.
• Leslie M. Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1066R, Sep.
• George J. Mailath, 1996, "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1161, Jul.
• Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996, "Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1173, Oct.
• Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1996, "Experimentation in Markets," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1220, Apr.
• Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull & Ken Binmore, 1996, "Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 4, in: Beth Allen, "Economics in a Changing World", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25168-1_4.
• Bardsley, Peter, 1996, "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , volume 51, issue 4, pages 473-489.
• Moulin, Herve, 1996, "Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 13, issue 2, pages 225-251, April.
• Hendon, Ebbe & Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Sloth, Birgitte, 1996, "Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 15, issue 2, pages 177-202, August.
• Van Cayseele, Patrick & Furth, Dave, 1996, "Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Buyouts or First Refusal Contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 16, issue 2, pages 153-180, October.
• Ray, Indrajit, 1996, "Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 17, issue 1, pages 56-79, November.
• Emons, Winand, 1996, "Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 14, issue 4, pages 465-484, June.
• Celentani, Marco & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996, "Reputation in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 70, issue 1, pages 109-132, July.
• Lo, Kin Chung, 1996, "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 71, issue 2, pages 443-484, November.
• Ray, Indrajit, 1996, "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 32, issue 3, pages 157-178, December.
• F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996, "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-05.
• S. Sorin, 1996, "Bluff and reputation," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-08.
• F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996, "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-24.
• Anderlini, L & Sabourian, H, 1996, "The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules : A Global Stability Result," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco96/05.
• Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0068, May.
• Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 68.
• Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996, "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.389.
• Cremer, H. & De Rycke, M. & Grimaud, A., 1996, "Service Quality, Competition and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.391.
• Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.394.
• Benoit, J.P. & Krishna, V., 1996, "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 1-96-3.
• Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9605.
• Sorin, S., 1996, "Bluff and Reputation," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9608.
• Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9624.
• Ranis, G., 1996, "North-South Conflicts and their Management," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center, number 746.
• McLaren, J, 1996, "Supplier Relations and the Market Context : A Theory of Handshakes," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center, number 766.

1995

• Schmidt, Klaus M. & Schnitzer, Monika, 1995, "The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 2, pages 193-199, May.
• Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995, "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 1, pages 20-55.
• Selten, Reinhard, 1995, "An axiomatic theory of a risk dominance measure for bipolar games with linear incentives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 1, pages 213-263.
• Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995, "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 1, pages 56-90.
• Bagwell, Kyle, 1995, "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 2, pages 271-280.
• Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1995, "Cooperation in a one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 2, pages 364-377.
• Mertens, J.-F., 1995, "Two examples of strategic equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 2, pages 378-388.
• Matsui Akihiko & Matsuyama Kiminori, 1995, "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 65, issue 2, pages 415-434, April.
• Eggerstedt, Harald & Hall, Rebecca Brideau & Van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1995, "Measuring capital flight: A case study of Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, volume 23, issue 2, pages 211-232, February.
• Beth Allen & Raymond Deneckere & Tom Faith & Dan Kovenock, 1995, "Capacity precommitment as a barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth approach," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, number 187.
• Hopkins, E., 1995, "Learning, Matching and Aggregation," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a20.
• Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995, "Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a39.
• Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995, "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Game with Positive Externalities," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 95a40.
• Nehring, K., 1995, "Incentive Compatibility in Large Games," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs, number 95-16.
• Nehring, K., 1995, "Incentive Compatibility in Large Games," Department of Economics, California Davis - Department of Economics, number 95-16.