Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C72: Noncooperative Games

1997

• Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 1997, "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, number 1997:28, Nov.
• Amir, Rabah & Wooders, John, 1997, "One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles and Research Joint Ventures," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 43, May.
• Kosfeld, Michael, 1997, "Corruption within a Cooperative Society," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 48, Jul.
• Volij, Oscar & Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1997, "A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Staff General Research Papers Archive, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 5130, Jan.
• Ana B. Ania & Carlos Alós Ferrer & Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997, "From Walrasian oligopolies to natural monopolyan: An evolutionary model of market structure," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 1997-24, Dec.
• Ussif Sumaila, 1997, "Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 10, issue 2, pages 147-165, September, DOI: 10.1023/A:1026459309123.
• Yvan Lengwiler, 1997, "A model of money counterfeits," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 65, issue 2, pages 123-132, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01226930.
• Walter Elberfeld, 1997, "Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in 2×2 matrix games," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 65, issue 3, pages 279-290, October, DOI: 10.1007/BF01226846.
• Hans-Theo Normann, 1997, "Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 177-187, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01234405.
• Cremer, Helmuth & De Rycke, Marc & Grimaud, Andre, 1997, "Service Quality, Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 11, issue 1, pages 5-19, January.
• Youngse Kim, 1997, "Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 13, issue 2, pages 23-38.
• Sang Chul Suh, 1997, "Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 13, issue 2, pages 39-50.
• Peter Lyk-Jensen, 1997, "How to Cheat the Auctioneer: Collusion in Auctions when Signals are Affiliated," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-05, Feb.
• Luca Lambertini, 1997, "Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games," CIE Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, number 1997-08, May.
• Dan Sasaki, 1997, "Strategic Information Acquisition," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 97-07, Jun.
• Dan Sasaki, 1997, "Ignorance as a Commitment Device," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 97-08, Jun.
• Tone Dieckmann, 1997, "The Evolution of conventions with Mobile Players," Economics Department Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth, number n720897, Aug.
• Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1997, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University, number 1997-02, Feb.
• Paul E. Fischer & John S. Hughes, 1997, "Mutual Monitoring and Best Agency Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 153, issue 2, pages 334-334, June.
• Bardsley, P., 1997, "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 548.
• Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Papers, Sonderforschungsbreich 504, number 97-11.
• Robert Gibbons, 1997, "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory," NBER Technical Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 0199, Jul.
• Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, 1997, "Auction Theory: A Summary with Applications to Treasury Markets," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5873, Jan.
• Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1997, "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 005.
• Mukerji, S. & Song Shin, H., 1997, "Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 137.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997, "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1184R, Mar.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Sandro Brusco, 1997, "The Optimal Design of a Market," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1186, Apr.
• Barton L. Lipman & Ruqu Wang, 1997, "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1190, Jul.
• William H. Sandholm, 1997, "An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1198, Apr.
• Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997, "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics, number 199527, Feb.
• Van Kolpin & Larry Singell Jr., 1997, "Asymmetric information, strategic behavior, and discrimination in the labor market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 175-184.
• Diana Richards, 1997, "The geometry of inductive reasoning in games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 1, pages 185-193.
• Eric W. Bond & Thomas A. Gresik, 1997, "Competition between asymmetrically informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 2, pages 227-240.
• Ed Nosal, 1997, "Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 3, pages 413-435.
• Cheng-Zhong Qin & Charles Stuart, 1997, "Bertrand versus Cournot revisited," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 3, pages 497-507.
• Ko Nishihara, 1997, "A resolution of N -person prisoners' dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 10, issue 3, pages 531-540.
• P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1997, "Endogenously determined price rigidities (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 3, pages 471-498.
• Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997, "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 3, pages 551-556.
• Tony Curzon Price, 1997, "Using co-evolutionary programming to simulate strategic behaviour in markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 3, pages 219-254.
• Gis, le Umbhauer, 1997, "Forward induction, evolutionary processes and behavior evolution," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 4, pages 415-433.
• Frank H. Page Jr., 1997, "Optimal deterministic contracting mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 1, pages 1-13.
• Hiroaki Osana, 1997, "Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 1, pages 57-74.
• John Wooders, 1997, "Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 1, pages 75-89.
• G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997, "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 259-294.
• Ferenc Szidarovszky & Koji Okuguchi, 1997, "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Springer Books, Springer, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_16.
• Maarten C.W. Janssen & Emiel Maasland, 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 97-073/1, Jul.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997, "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-12.
• Herings, P.J.J. & Vannetelbosch, V., 1997, "Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-03.
• Slikker, M. & van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M., 1997, "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-23.
• Herings, P.J.J., 1997, "Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-77.
• Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997, "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-91.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Fast Learning in Organizations," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-65.
• Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-106.
• Possajennikov, A., 1997, "An Analysis of a Simple Reinforcement Dynamics : Learning to Play an "Egalitarian" Equilibrium," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-19.
• Brennan, G. & Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1997, "Trust in the Shadow of the Courts," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-89.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-66.
• Voorneveld, M. & Vermeulen, D. & Borm, P.E.M., 1997, "Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games," Research Memorandum, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 749.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Güth, W., 1997, "Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 5e16a5c7-9a69-467f-b00a-6.
• Herings, P.J.J. & Vannetelbosch, V., 1997, "Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 7dc795b0-6250-4c14-828a-d.
• Herings, P.J.J., 1997, "Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number aa81d194-cfe2-4200-8360-e.
• Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997, "When does it take a Nixon to go to China?," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b6a104d7-d4ad-4061-abbf-3.
• Voorneveld, M. & Norde, H.W., 1997, "A characterisation of ordinal potential games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b7112a05-1878-4d36-beb3-f.
• Voorneveld, M. & Vermeulen, D. & Borm, P.E.M., 1997, "Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b8ab2101-f3bb-4a0d-96ee-3.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Fast Learning in Organizations," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number c8a457fb-87c8-44ff-91b6-5.
• Janssen, M.C.W. & Maasland, E., 1997, "On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number cb1945aa-057b-48d0-aad2-5.
• Brennan, G. & Güth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1997, "Trust in the Shadow of the Courts," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number e910a5d9-5939-4d45-b940-9.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number ee9c6bea-a302-4b6c-8566-0.
• Serrano, Roberto, 1997, "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 55, issue 2, pages 203-208, August.
• Dufwenberg, Martin, 1997, "Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 57, issue 1, pages 45-50, November.
• Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997, "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 1, pages 1-35, January.
• Harrison, Glenn W. & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Tarr, David G., 1997, "Economic implications for Turkey of a Customs Union with the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 3-5, pages 861-870, April.
• Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997, "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 1, pages 55-72, January.
• Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 2, pages 193-218, February.
• Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997, "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 2, pages 219-245, February.
• Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997, "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 1, pages 97-132, April.
• Evans, Robert, 1997, "Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 2, pages 211-220, May.
• Voorneveld, Mark & Norde, Henk, 1997, "A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 19, issue 2, pages 235-242, May.
• Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997, "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 17, issue 4, pages 509-520, December.
• Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 73, issue 1, pages 118-156, March.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 388-406, August.
• Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997, "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 1-14, November.
• Lambertini, Luca, 1997, "Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 77, issue 1, pages 181-191, November.
• Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997, "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 27, issue 3, pages 325-345, April.
• Ng, Francis & Yeats, Alexander, 1997, "Open economies work better! did Africa's protectionist policies cause its marginalization in world trade?," World Development, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 6, pages 889-904, June.
• Rehme, Gunther, 1997, "Economic growth, (re-)distributive policies, capital mobility and tax competition in open economies," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number ECO 1997/24.
• Rehme, G., 1997, "Economic Growth, (Re-)Distributive Policies, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition in Open Economies," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco97/24.
• Steiner, U., 1997, "Signalling in International Environmental Agreements: Using Pre-Agreement Emission Level as a Signalling Device," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 97-9.
• De Wolf, O, 1997, "Fondements des Concepts de Solution en Theorie des Jeux," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a10.
• Bigot de Morogues, F., 1997, "Equilibres Monetaires du Jeu Strategique de Marche dans le Modele a Generations Imbriquees," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a18.
• Sumaila, U.R., 1997, "Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 167.
• Lommerund, K.E., 1997, "Battle of the Sexes: Non-Cooperative Games in the Theory of the Family," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 174.
• Arin, J. & Inarra, E., 1997, "Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 163.
• McLennan, A & Park, I-U, 1997, "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Papers, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research, number 300.
• Pezanis-Christou, P, 1997, "On the Impact of Low-Balling : Experimental Results in Asymmetric Auctions," Papers, New South Wales - School of Economics, number 97/05.
• Krogh Hvide, H, 1997, "Complementary Teams, Linear Sharing Rules and Uncertainty," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 2/97.
• Cukierman, A. & Tommasi, M., 1997, "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 30-97.
• Osborne, M-J & Rubinstein, A, 1997, "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 4-97.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Lundholm, M., 1997, "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series, number 1997-28.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Fast Learning in Organizations," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 97-10.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 97-11.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 208, Feb.
• Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997, "Auctions of licences and market structure," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 209, Feb.
• Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 1997, "Implementation, elimination of weakly dominated strategies and evolutionary dynamics," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 221, Feb.
• Antonio Cabrales & Walter Garcia Fontes & Massimo Motta, 1997, "Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 222, Feb.
• Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997, "Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 241, Apr.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1997, "Free entry does not imply zero profits," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 268, Dec.
• Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Mogens Jensen & Birgitte Sloth, 1997, "The evolution of conventions under incomplete information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 475, Jun, revised Feb 2000.
• Dailami, Mansoor & Leipziger, Danny, 1997, "Infrastructure project finance and capital flows : a new perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1861, Dec.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1997, "Are the poor less well-insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1863, Dec.
• Angelina Keil, 1997, "Wirtschaftschronik. III. Quartal 1997," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, volume 70, issue 10, pages 583-585, October.
• Javier León & Raimundo Soto, 1997, "Structural Breaks And Long-Run Trends In Commodity Prices," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 9, issue 3, pages 347-366, DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199705)9:3<.
• Jacek B. Krawczyk & Steffan Berridge, 1997, "Relaxation Algorithms in Finding Nash Equilibria," Computational Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707002, Jul.
• Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1997, "Stability of the Cournot Process - Experimental Evidence," Experimental, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707002, Jul.
• Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Loss Aversion Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703001, Mar, revised 19 Jul 1997.
• Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997, "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703006, Mar, revised 25 Nov 1997.
• Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997, "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9704001, Apr, revised 11 Apr 1997.
• Massimo Giannini, 1997, "Education and Job Market Signalling: A Comment," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9704002, Apr.
• Armando Gomes & Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997, "Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9705003, May.
• V. Bhaskar, 1997, "Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9706001, Jun.
• Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997, "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707002, Jul.
• Roger Lagunoff & Hans Haller, 1997, "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707006, Jul.
• Roger Lagunoff & Gerhard Glomm, 1997, "A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707008, Jul.
• Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997, "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9707010, Jul, revised 01 Apr 1998.
• Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok & Rajiv Sethi, 1997, "On the Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9708001, Aug, revised 08 Aug 1997.
• Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok & Rajiv Sethi, 1997, "Interdependent Preference Formation," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9708002, Aug.
• Sergiu Hart & Zohar Levy, 1997, "Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9709001, Sep.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997, "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711003, Nov.
• Matthew O. Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1997, "False Reputation in a Society of Players," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711004, Nov.
• P. Frijters, 1997, "Discrimination and job-uncertainty," Labor and Demography, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9706001, Jun.
• Sandro Brusco & Matthew O. Jackson, 1997, "The Optimal Design of a Market," Microeconomics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9711003, Nov.
• Hon-Suir, S. & Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997, "A learning approach to auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 97-11, Jun.
• Kirstein, Roland, 1997, "Spontaneous Order - Always Efficient? Comment on Patrick Simon's: "Emergence of a European Ius Commune"," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-04.
• Schmidtchen, Dieter & Neunzig, Alexander R., 1997, "Trade, Trust And The Territoriality Of The Law," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-05.
• Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997, "Judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 97-07.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1997, "Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,28.
• Oechssler, Jörg & Schlag, Karl H., 1997, "Loss of commitment? An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,39.
• Brennan, Geoffrey & Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 1997, "Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,44.
• Dulleck, Uwe, 1997, "A note on the E-mail game: Bounded rationality and induction," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1997,47.

1996

• Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 1996, "Corporation Tax Asymmetries: An Oligopolistic Supergame Analysis," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number ecpap-96-04, Jul.
• Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996, "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number peters-96-02, Dec.
• Roberto Serrano, 1996, "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 161, Mar.
• Olivier Gossner, 1996, "Comparison of information structures," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 169, May.
• Antonio Cabrales, 1996, "Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 179, Jul.
• Eric van Damme & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996, "Endogenous Stackelberg leadership," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 190, Nov.
• Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996, "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 200, Mar, revised Dec 1996.
• Esther Hauk & Sjaak Hurkens, 1996, "Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 233, Mar, revised Aug 1997.
• Harrison, Glenn W. & Rutherford, Thomas F. & Tarr, David G., 1996, "Economic implications for Turkey of a customs union with the European Union," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1599, May.
• Levine, Ross & Zervos, Sara, 1996, "Capital control liberalization and stock market development," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1622, Jul.
• Ng, Francis & Yeats, Alexander, 1996, "Open economies work better! Did Africa's protectionist policies cause its marginalization in world trade?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1636, Aug.
• Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Dooley, Michael & Leipziger, Danny & Walsh, Carl, 1996, "The lender of last resort function under a currency board : the case of Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1648, Sep.
• van de Walle, Dominique, 1996, "Assessing the welfare impacts of public spending," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1670, Oct.
• Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1996, "Are there dynamic gains from a poor-area development program?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1695, Dec.
• Shah, Shekhar & Mishra, Deepak & Panagariya, Arvind, 1996, "Demand elasticities in international trade : are they really low?," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank, number 1712, Dec.
• John Payne Bigelow, 1996, "Value Oriented Equilibria in Repeated Games of Complete Information," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9607003, Jul.
• Shlomit Hon-Snir & Dov Monderer & Aner Sela, 1996, "A Learning Approach to Auctions," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9610004, Oct, revised 07 Oct 1996.
• Uwe Dulleck & Joerg Oechssler, 1996, "The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9610005, Oct, revised 11 Oct 1996.
• Lakshmi K. Raut, 1996, "Subgame perfect manipulation of children by overlapping generations of agents with two-sided altruism and endogenous fertility," Labor and Demography, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604003, Apr.
• Richard T. Boylan, 1996, "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9602001, Feb.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604002, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• H. Reiju Mihara, 1996, "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9604003, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2004.
• Giovanni Ponti, 1996, "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Discussion Papers, University College London, Department of Economics, number 96-22 ISSN 1350-6722, Jun.
• Kirchkamp, Oliver, 1996, "Simultaneous Evolution of Learning Rules and Strategies," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim, number 98-46, Jun.
• Schmidtchen, Dieter & Kirstein, Roland, 1996, "Judicial Detection Skill, Litigational Opportunism, and Contractual Compliance," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 96-04.
• Stähler, Frank, 1996, "Markov perfection and cooperation in repeated games," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 760.
• Abhijit Banerjee & Jörgen W. Weibull & Ken Binmore, 1996, "Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 4, in: Beth Allen, "Economics in a Changing World", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25168-1_4.
• Bardsley, Peter, 1996, "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , volume 51, issue 4, pages 473-489.
• Arifovic, J & Eaton, C, 1996, "The Evolution of Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp96-05.
• Michel Le Breton & Hideo Konishi & Shlomo Weber, 1996, "Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 97-113.
• Ulrich Schwalbe & Siegfried K. Berninghaus, 1996, "Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 6, issue 3, pages 297-312.
• Reinoud Joosten, 1996, "Deterministic evolutionary dynamics: a unifying approach," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 6, issue 3, pages 313-324.
• Steffen Ziss, 1996, "Public good provision and the Smith Process," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 245-261, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499135.
• Bezalel Peleg, 1996, "Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 311-324, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499138.
• Jonathan Hamilton & Jacques-François Thisse, 1996, "Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 379-397, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499142.
• De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Kast, R. & Lapied, A., 1996, "Non-Linear Asset Valuation on Markets with Frictions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1996-112.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996, "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1996-115.
• Voorneveld, M. & Norde, H.W., 1996, "A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games," Research Memorandum, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 734.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Hurkens, J.P.M., 1996, "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 69b18274-5c68-4723-a5e9-8.
• McLaren, John, 1996, "Supplier Relations and the Market Context: A Theory of Handshakes," Center Discussion Papers, Yale University, Economic Growth Center, number 28407, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28407.
• Binmore, K. & Proulx, C. & Samuelson, L. & Swierzbinski, J., 1996, "Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9517r.
• Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9518r.
• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9611.
• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9611r.
• Arana, A.Q., 1996, "A Generic Game With no Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 342.96.
• Arana, A-Q, 1996, "Sound Belief-Shaping Rules that Make all Equilibria Strategically Unstable," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 348.96.
• Arana, A-Q, 1996, "Conditions for any Equilibrium Selection Theory to be Self-Defeating," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 349.96.
• L. Lambertini, 1996, "Prisoners` Dilemma in Duopoly Supergames," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number 264, Jul.