IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v3y1997i1p57-74.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments

Author

Listed:
  • Hiroaki Osana

    (Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108, Japan)

Abstract

A feasible mechanism is constructed which weakly Nash-implements the weak Pareto choice rule over a certain class of indecomposable pure-exchange environments, where there may be no private goods whose consumption has no external effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroaki Osana, 1997. "Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(1), pages 57-74.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:57-74
    Note: Received: 30 November 1995 / Accepted: 24 June 1997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/7003001/70030057.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/papers/7003001/70030057.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Feasible mechanism; Nash implementation; weak Pareto choice rule; indecomposable environments;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:57-74. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.