Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments
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- Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
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More about this item
KeywordsFeasible mechanism; Nash implementation; weak Pareto choice rule; indecomposable environments;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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