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Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments

Author

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  • Hiroaki Osana

    (Department of Economics, Keio University, 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108, Japan)

Abstract

A feasible mechanism is constructed which weakly Nash-implements the weak Pareto choice rule over a certain class of indecomposable pure-exchange environments, where there may be no private goods whose consumption has no external effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroaki Osana, 1997. "Nash-implementation of the weak Pareto choice rule for indecomposable environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(1), pages 57-74.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:57-74 Note: Received: 30 November 1995 / Accepted: 24 June 1997
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
    3. Eugenio J. Miravete & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2004. "Estimating Price-Cost Markups Under Nonlinear Pricing Competition," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 526-535, 04/05.
    4. Stole, Lars A, 1995. "Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 529-562, Winter.
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    6. Seierstad, Atle & Sydsaeter, Knut, 1977. "Sufficient Conditions in Optimal Control Theory," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(2), pages 367-391, June.
    7. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 171-196.
    8. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 755-785.
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    12. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
    13. Picard Pierre, 1986. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8602, CEPREMAP.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 113-123, January.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 655-708.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Feasible mechanism; Nash implementation; weak Pareto choice rule; indecomposable environments;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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