A resolution of N -person prisoners' dilemma
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- Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK 2003-04, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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